PatchFirst · Vulnerabilidades recientes
Vulnerabilidades publicadas para jetty9 en los últimos 30 días: 8. Incluidas en el catálogo KEV: 0.
Vulnerabilidades: 57
In Eclipse Jetty, across various versions of `jetty-security`, and `jetty-eeN-security`, and `jetty-eeN-servlet`, the Jakarta Spec constraints defined as `http-method-omission` can be bypassed by using substrings of the defined HTTP Methods.
In Eclipse Jetty, across various versions of `jetty-security`, and `jetty-eeN-security`, two or more security constraints with the same http-method-omission set, and no url-patterns, are not combined properly per Jakarta Servlet Spec. Resulting in later http-method-omission sets overriding previous constraints with the same http-method-omission set.
Eclipse Jetty's `SessionAuthentication` retains authentication credentials in a serializable object. When the credentials contain a plaintext password and the authenticated session is persisted to a session data store, the password may consequently be written to persistent storage in plaintext. An attacker with sufficient privileges to read the persisted session data may obtain the plaintext passwords of authenticated users.
In Eclipse Jetty, across various versions of `jetty-server`, and `jetty-proxy`, the host whitelist/blacklist is case-sensitive, and would allow hosts through that only differ by case.
In Eclipse Jetty, across various versions of `jetty-annotations`, and `jetty-eeN-annotations`, the Jakarta Spec authoritative url-pattern rules for mixed `@ServletSecurity` annotation, and `web.xml` defined `security-constraint` on the same `url-pattern` were not being applied if the `web.xml` had more than 1 `url-pattern` for a servlet, and had a `security-constraint` applying to only some of those `url-pattern` definitions.
When Jetty's `HttpClient` make a request to a server through a forward proxy, the server may reply with a 407 (Proxy Authentication Required). The client mistakenly interprets the 407 as coming from the proxy, so it re-sends the request with the `Proxy-Authentication` header, which arrives to the server, that now has access to the proxy credentials.
In Eclipse Jetty, HttpClient may receive a redirect of the form: ``` /secure/../evil ``` If an attacker is able to control the redirects, then HttpClient matches authentication credentials against `/secure` rather than normalizing the path to `/evil`, and will therefore follow the redirect sending the `Authorization` header for `/secure` to `/evil`. This also mean that the attacker must have an evil application deployed on the same domain as the target.
In Eclipse Jetty, `TryPathsHandler` and `TryFilesFilter` can be configured to forward requests to template URIs such as `index?p=$path`, where `$path` is the request path in context. However, URI paths may contain characters that are reserved in URI queries so that a path of `/s&a=1` when applied to the template becomes `index?p=/s&a=1`, which is interpreted as 2 query parameters: `p=/s` and `a=1`, rather than just one query parameter `p` whose value is `/s&a=1`.
A client may issue HTTP/2 requests to a Jetty server that result in blocking writes that are never unblocked, eventually causing all threads to be blocked and the whole server to become unresponsive. This is caused by a race condition in the server when handling RST_STREAM frames and GOAWAY frames sent by the client. The race condition "resets" the HTTP2Flusher.terminated, previously set to a non-null value, to the null value, allowing entries to be enqueued in the flusher that however will never be processed. These unprocessed entries are the ones that would unblock the write-blocked threads.
A client may issue specially crafted HTTP/1.1 chunked requests to a Jetty server that cause Jetty and an intermediary proxy to interpret different request boundaries, potentially resulting in HTTP request smuggling. This is caused by Jetty accepting a lone LF character as a terminator in parts of chunked request parsing. Depending on the Jetty version and configured HTTP compliance mode, this may occur in chunk extensions, chunk data termination, or trailer termination.
In Eclipse Jetty, the Digest authentication server-side component uses ISO-8859-1 to encode the password as bytes. This was done because the initial specification for HTTP did not specify explicitly a charset, and it was assumed to be ISO-8859-1 for historical reasons. If the password contains characters that cannot be represented in ISO-8859-1, they are silently replaced by `?`. This happens with passwords that contain Chinese, Cyrillic or Greek characters, for example: `αβ123` converts to `??123`. An attacker can send a request with a digest `Authorization` header crafted with a password made of only `?` characters; the server woul
For requests that have a body, but reading the body may end up in reading 0 bytes, there is a buffer leak. This is particularly the case for 100-Continue, but any request where the network is slow can leak.
In Eclipse Jetty, an HTTP URI of this form: /public;/../admin/secret.txt results in an unresolved path of: /public/../admin/secret.txt instead of the expected: /admin/secret.txt Jetty itself is not affected, as it will not serve the secret.txt file because it will not pass the alias checker (only resolved resources are served). However, web applications that rely on resolved paths being provided by Jetty may be confused when receiving an unresolved path.
In Eclipse Jetty, for HTTP/1, HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 requests, there is no strict check that the request authority (host and port) matches what provided in the Host header (if present). This was not enforced in earlier HTTP RFC (for example, in RFC 2616), but it is in the latest RFC (9110 and 9112). This mismatch can cause a number of problems that may be classified as vulnerabilities such as: * URI constructions (for example, for redirects -- this is typical for login pages) * Virtual host selection * Reverse proxying * Misleading logs *
In Eclipse Jetty, a first HTTP/1.1 request with trailers causes the server to retain the trailers in subsequent requests performed over the same connection. Subsequent request that do not have trailers report the trailers of the first request. Subsequent request that do have trailers report the union of trailers of the first request and the current request.
In Eclipse Jetty, the HTTP/1.1 parser is vulnerable to request smuggling when chunk extensions are used, similar to the "funky chunks" techniques outlined here: * https://w4ke.info/2025/06/18/funky-chunks.html * https://w4ke.info/2025/10/29/funky-chunks-2.html Jetty terminates chunk extension parsing at \r\n inside quoted strings instead of treating this as an error. POST / HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost Transfer-Encoding: chunked 1;ext="val X 0 GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1 ... Note how the chunk extension does not close the double quotes, and it is able to inject a smuggled request.
In Eclipse Jetty, the class JASPIAuthenticator initiates the authentication checks, which set two ThreadLocal variable. Upon returning from the initial checks, there are conditions that cause an early return from the JASPIAuthenticator code without clearing those ThreadLocals. A subsequent request using the same thread inherits the ThreadLocal values, leading to a broken access control and privilege escalation.
The Jetty URI parser has some key differences to other common parsers when evaluating invalid or unusual URIs. Differential parsing of URIs in systems using multiple components may result in security by-pass. For example a component that enforces a black list may interpret the URIs differently from one that generates a response. At the very least, differential parsing may divulge implementation details.
jetty9 - security update
In Eclipse Jetty, versions <=9.4.57, <=10.0.25, <=11.0.25, <=12.0.21, <=12.1.0.alpha2, an HTTP/2 client may trigger the server to send RST_STREAM frames, for example by sending frames that are malformed or that should not be sent in a particular stream state, therefore forcing the server to consume resources such as CPU and memory. For example, a client can open a stream and then send WINDOW_UPDATE frames with window size increment of 0, which is illegal. Per specification https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9113.html#name-window_update , the server should send a RST_STREAM frame. The client can now open another stream and send another bad W
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