PatchFirst · Vulnerabilidades recientes
Vulnerabilidades publicadas para grafana en los últimos 30 días: 10. Incluidas en el catálogo KEV: 0.
Vulnerabilidades: 100
A service account with user-management permissions in one organization can read, modify, disable or delete users belonging to other organizations on the same Grafana instance through the SCIM API (insecure direct object reference). Only Grafana Enterprise instances with SCIM enabled are affected.
Grafana's data source proxy did not apply role-based access control to write requests forwarded to Loki data sources. A user holding only the Viewer role on an affected Grafana instance could send POST, PUT and DELETE requests through the proxy to the Loki rules API (/loki/api/v1/rules), allowing them to create, modify and delete Loki alerting rules. Because those rules are stored by Loki rather than by Grafana, the change took effect for every user of that Loki data source, not only for the Viewer who made the request. Exploitation requires an authenticated Viewer account on the Grafana instance and a configured Loki data source; no other p
The Prometheus rule conversion API endpoints in Grafana do not limit request body size, allowing authenticated users to trigger unbounded memory allocations that can crash the server through out-of-memory conditions.
A user or service account with read-only access to Git Sync (provisioning) connections can modify a connection's configuration through its status subresource (incorrect authorization). On Grafana 12.4 the affected API is only available when the experimental provisioning feature toggle is enabled.
A user with query access to an Azure Monitor data source can use its resource proxy to call Azure Resource Manager APIs beyond those Grafana needs, with the data source's Azure identity (unintended proxy). The impact is bounded by the Azure role granted to that identity.
A Git server that Grafana's Git Sync (provisioning) is configured to use can exhaust Grafana's memory by returning oversized or highly compressed responses (uncontrolled resource consumption). Exploitation requires an administrator to have configured Git Sync with that server.
An Editor can set file-provisioning metadata (the grafana.app/managedBy, grafana.app/managerId and grafana.app/sourcePath annotations) when creating a dashboard through the dashboard API, because these fields were stored without an authorization check. The dashboard then appears file-provisioned, and administrators can no longer update or delete it through Grafana. The impact is limited to the same organization and no data is exposed.
An authenticated user can list alert rules stored in folders they are not allowed to read through the alert rules API list endpoint. When the set of folders the user may read was empty, the folder restriction was dropped and every alert rule in the organization was returned. From Grafana 13.1.0, any user can trigger this with a folder filter. The exposed data is rule configuration; data source credentials are not exposed.
An authenticated user with edit permission on one folder can move a library panel into another folder where they only have view permission, through the library elements API or the equivalent App Platform resource. The update path did not check library panel create permission on the destination folder (incorrect authorization). No data from the destination folder is disclosed, and existing content there cannot be changed.
Pausing a shared (public) dashboard did not revoke its access token for the endpoints that serve frontend bootstrap data. Anyone holding the link to a paused shared dashboard could still retrieve, without authenticating, the configuration of the dashboard's data sources, including stored credentials for data sources using browser access (missing authorization). Deleting the shared dashboard does revoke the token.
Grafana OSS and Grafana Enterprise did not safely resolve symbolic links when extracting plugin archives. A crafted plugin archive can chain relative symbolic link entries to escape the plugin installation directory, writing arbitrary files and an executable backend binary outside that directory. The dropped executable runs with the privileges of the Grafana server process, resulting in remote code execution. Plugin archives are extracted before their signature is verified, so a valid plugin signature does not prevent the write. An operator can therefore be affected by installing a plugin that appears legitimate, as well as by installing a p
A stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the Geomap panel's MapLibre base layer allows a user with the Editor role to execute arbitrary JavaScript in another user's session by hosting a malicious style configuration, enabling escalation to Org Admin.
Only self-managed Grafana instances with Auth Proxy authentication and identity caching enabled (sync_ttl greater than zero) are affected. The Auth Proxy cache key concatenated the username and forwarded identity attributes without a delimiter, so distinct identities could collide on one key. An authenticated user who shapes their own attributes to collide with a higher-privileged user's, while that user's cache entry is live, is authenticated as that user, up to Administrator (authentication bypass by spoofing).
When SAML IdP-initiated login is enabled in Grafana Enterprise, the SAML library skips validation of the InResponseTo field on all SAML responses, including SP-initiated logins. This removes anti-replay protection, allowing an attacker who obtains a valid signed SAML assertion to replay it and gain a session as the victim user. Only instances with the allow_idp_initiated SAML setting enabled are affected; this setting is off by default and Grafana OSS is not affected.
An authenticated user with permission to query a SQL data source can bypass the fix for CVE-2026-33375 by injecting the timeGroup macro through a WHERE clause, which Grafana's regex-based macro parsing does not reject. Evaluating the injected macro causes uncontrolled memory consumption that can terminate the Grafana server process, resulting in a denial of service. The Microsoft SQL Server, PostgreSQL, and MySQL data sources are affected.
A user with organization administrator permissions can delete dashboard snapshots belonging to other organizations on the same Grafana instance, and can recover a snapshot's secret delete key using only its public share key (broken access control).
An authenticated attacker with Editor access or alert.instances.external:write can submit an external Alertmanager alert containing a controlled generatorURL. The attacker is authorized to create the alert, but not to execute script in another user's Grafana session. Grafana renders alert.generatorURL directly as the Alert Details See source LinkButton href without URL-scheme sanitization or a safe-protocol allowlist. The click interceptor's :// heuristic can be bypassed by placing :// inside a JavaScript comment. When a user with read access clicks See source, the browser executes attacker-controlled JavaScript in the Grafana origin with th
An authenticated user with permission to create or edit alert rules can bypass datasource query authorization by marking an alert rule query as a server-side expression while referencing a real datasource UID (incorrect authorization). This can expose data accessible through Grafana's configured datasource credentials to users who lack permission to query that datasource.
This vulnerability only affects Grafana stacks configured with multiple organizations; single-organization deployments are not impacted. In a multi-organization stack, a user who is an Org Admin of a single organization can call GET /api/access-control/users/permissions/search?actionPrefix=dashboards: and receive permission data belonging to other organizations. The disclosed data is limited to dashboard and folder identifiers (UIDs) and per-user permission/scope mappings (which user holds which access on which dashboard). Dashboard contents, panels, query results, datasource credentials, secrets, and personal data are not exposed. This is a
The alertmanager templates test endpoint (/api/alertmanager/grafana/config/api/v1/templates/test) can execute templates with no memory limits. Mass-executing templates in a short period causes OOM and crashes the Grafana service. The endpoint requires very low privileges and is exploitable with anonymous access enabled.
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