ALSA: firewire: isight: bound the sample count to the packet payload
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: firewire: isight: bound the sample count to the packet payload
isight_packet() takes the frame count from the device iso packet and
checks it only against the device claimed iso length.
count = be32_to_cpu(payload->sample_count);
if (likely(count <= (length - 16) / 4))
isight_samples(isight, payload->samples, count);
length is the iso header data_length. It can be up to 0xffff. So the
gate allows a count up to about 16379. isight_samples() then copies
count frames out of payload->samples into the PCM DMA buffer.
payload->samples holds only 2 * MAX_FRAMES_PER_PA
ALSA: usb-audio: avoid kobject path lookup in DualSense match
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: avoid kobject path lookup in DualSense match
The DualSense jack-detection input handler verifies that a matching input
device belongs to the same physical controller by building kobject path
strings for both the input device and the USB audio device, then comparing
the path prefix.
This was observed when a weak physical connection caused the controller
to rapidly disconnect and reconnect. During that repeated hotplug,
snd_dualsense_ih_match() can run while the controller's USB device is
being disconnected. kobject_get_path() walks ancestor kobjects and
der
vfio/pci: Release the VGA arbiter client on register_device() failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/pci: Release the VGA arbiter client on register_device() failure
The re-order in the Fixes commit below displaced vfio_pci_vga_init() as
the last failure point of what is now vfio_pci_core_register_device()
without introducing an unwind for the VGA arbiter registration.
In current kernels this is mostly benign because vfio_pci_set_decode()
only uses pci_dev state, but the original failure path could leave a
callback with a freed vdev cookie. The stale registration also becomes
unsafe again once the callback follows drvdata to the vfio device.
Add the required VGA un
Bluetooth: btusb: fix use-after-free on registration failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btusb: fix use-after-free on registration failure
Make sure to release the sibling interfaces in case controller
registration fails to avoid use-after-free and double-free when they are
eventually disconnected.
This issue was reported by Sashiko while reviewing a fix for a wakeup
source leak in the btusb probe errors paths.
Bluetooth: btusb: fix use-after-free on marvell probe failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btusb: fix use-after-free on marvell probe failure
Make sure to stop any TX URBs submitted during Marvell OOB wakeup
configuration on later probe failures to avoid use-after-free in the
completion callback.
This issue was reported by Sashiko while reviewing a fix for a wakeup
source leak in the btusb probe errors paths.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: fix UAF in binder_thread_release()
When a thread exits, binder_thread_release() walks its transaction stack
to clear the t->from and t->to_proc that correspond with the exiting
thread. However, a process dying in parallel might attempt to kfree some
of these transactions. And if one of them has no associated t->to_proc,
the t->to_proc->inner_lock will not be acquired.
This means that transaction accesses in binder_thread_release() after
t->to_proc has been cleared might race with binder_free_transaction()
and cause a use-after-free error as reported by KASAN:
==
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: fix UAF in binder_free_transaction()
In binder_free_transaction(), the t->to_proc is read under the t->lock.
However, once the t->lock is dropped, the to_proc can die in parallel.
This leads to a use-after-free error when we attempt to acquire its
inner lock right afterwards:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x1a0
Write of size 4 at addr ffff00001125da70 by task B/672
CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 672 Comm: B Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-00284-g8e65320d91cd #4 PREEMPT
Hardware name:
usb: xhci: Fix sleep in atomic context in xhci_free_streams()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: xhci: Fix sleep in atomic context in xhci_free_streams()
When a USB device with active stream endpoints is disconnected,
xhci_free_streams() is called from the hub_event workqueue to
free the stream resources. It calls xhci_free_stream_info()
while holding xhci->lock with irqs disabled.
xhci_free_stream_info() invokes xhci_free_stream_ctx(), which
calls dma_free_coherent() for large stream context arrays.
dma_free_coherent() can sleep (e.g. via vunmap), triggering
a BUG when called from atomic context.
Call trace:
dma_free_attrs+0x174/0x220
xhci_free_stream_info+
usb: typec: tcpci_rt1711h: unregister TCPCI port with devres
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpci_rt1711h: unregister TCPCI port with devres
rt1711h_probe() registers the TCPCI port before requesting the interrupt
and enabling alert interrupts. If either of those later steps fails, the
probe function returns without unregistering the TCPCI port. The explicit
unregister currently only happens from the remove callback.
Register a devres action immediately after tcpci_register_port() succeeds,
so tcpci_unregister_port() runs on later probe failures and on driver
detach. Drop the remove callback to avoid unregistering the same port
twice.
This issue was
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: altera: Fix resource leaks on probe failure
The chained IRQ handler is set during probe, but is only removed during the
driver remove(). If pci_host_probe() fails, the handler and INTx IRQ
domain remain set even though the devm-managed host bridge storage
containing struct altera_pcie will be released, leaving the handler with
a stale data pointer.
Interrupts are also enabled before pci_host_probe() is called. If probe
fails after that point, the controller interrupt source should be disabled
before the chained handler and INTx domain are removed.
So set the chained
PCI: mediatek: Fix IRQ domain leak when port fails to enable
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: mediatek: Fix IRQ domain leak when port fails to enable
When mtk_pcie_enable_port() fails, mtk_pcie_port_free() removes the port
from pcie->ports and frees the port structure. However, the IRQ domains set
up earlier by mtk_pcie_init_irq_domain() are never freed.
Fix this by refactoring mtk_pcie_irq_teardown() into a per-port helper,
mtk_pcie_irq_teardown_port(), and calling it from mtk_pcie_setup() when
mtk_pcie_enable_port() fails. Since the IRQ teardown must only happen in
the probe error path (during resume, child devices may have active MSI
mappings and the NOIRQ
hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data()
random_recv_done() stores the device-reported used.len directly into
vi->data_avail. copy_data() then indexes vi->data[] using
vi->data_idx (advanced by previous copy_data() calls) and issues a
memcpy() without re-validating either value against the posted
buffer size sizeof(vi->data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32
or 64).
A malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can set used.len beyond
sizeof(vi->data), steering the memcpy() past the end of the inline
array into adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes. hwrng_fillf
USB: chaoskey: Fix slab-use-after-free in chaoskey_release()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: chaoskey: Fix slab-use-after-free in chaoskey_release()
The chaoskey driver has a use-after-free bug in its release routine.
If the user closes the device file after the USB device has been
unplugged, a debugging log statement will try to access the
usb_interface structure after it has been deallocated:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dev_driver_string (drivers/base/core.c:2406)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888168e8a0b8 by task chaoskey_raw_re/10106
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
usb: dwc3: run gadget disconnect from sleepable suspend context
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: dwc3: run gadget disconnect from sleepable suspend context
dwc3_gadget_suspend() takes dwc->lock with IRQs disabled and then calls
dwc3_disconnect_gadget(). For async callbacks that helper only uses
plain spin_unlock()/spin_lock(), so the gadget ->disconnect() callback
still runs with IRQs disabled and any sleepable callback trips Lockdep.
This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually
reviewed against the current tree.
The grounded PoC kept the dwc3_gadget_suspend() ->
dwc3_disconnect_gadget() -> gadget_driver->disconnect() chain, and
Lockdep re
6lowpan: fix NHC entry use-after-free on error path
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
6lowpan: fix NHC entry use-after-free on error path
lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression() looks up an NHC descriptor while holding
lowpan_nhc_lock. If the descriptor has no uncompress callback, the error
path drops the lock before printing nhc->name.
lowpan_nhc_del() removes descriptors under the same lock and then relies
on synchronize_net() before the owning module can be unloaded. That only
waits for net RX RCU readers. lowpan_header_decompress() is also exported
and can be reached from callers that are not necessarily covered by the net
core RX critical section, for example
tipc: fix out-of-bounds read in broadcast Gap ACK blocks
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix out-of-bounds read in broadcast Gap ACK blocks
A broadcast PROTOCOL/STATE_MSG can carry a Gap ACK blocks record in its
data area. tipc_get_gap_ack_blks() only verifies that the record's len
field is self-consistent with its ugack_cnt/bgack_cnt counts
(sz == struct_size(p, gacks, ugack_cnt + bgack_cnt)); it does not check
that the record actually fits in the message data area, msg_data_sz().
The unicast caller tipc_link_proto_rcv() bounds it ("if (glen > dlen)
break;"), but the broadcast caller tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() discards the
returned size, so tipc_link_advance
staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size
The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy
'count' bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf ==
PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without
bounding *ppos + count against size_buf.
vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size
(image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the
user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up
to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE. When
smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to responses without data area
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to responses without data area
smb2_check_message() has a long-standing quirk that accepts a response
whose calculated length is one byte larger than the bytes actually
received ("server can return one byte more due to implied bcc[0]").
This was introduced to accommodate servers that omit the trailing bcc[0]
overlap byte when no data area is present.
However, the exemption is applied unconditionally, regardless of whether
the command actually carries a data area (has_smb2_data_area[]). When a
response with a data area is subj
staging: rtl8723bs: fix heap buffer overflow in rtw_cfg80211_set_wpa_ie()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix heap buffer overflow in rtw_cfg80211_set_wpa_ie()
supplicant_ie is a 256-byte array in struct security_priv. The WPA and
WPA2 IE copy paths use:
memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.supplicant_ie, &pwpa[0], wpa_ielen + 2);
where wpa_ielen is the raw IE length field (u8, 0-255). When a local user
supplies a connect request via nl80211 with a crafted WPA IE of length 255,
wpa_ielen + 2 equals 257, overflowing the 256-byte buffer by one byte into
the adjacent last_mic_err_time field.
rtw_parse_wpa_ie() does not prevent this: its length consistency check
staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth()
OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path.
When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without
verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and
ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as:
length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len
and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than
WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative
and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far
beyo