In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: altera: Fix resource leaks on probe failure
The chained IRQ handler is set during probe, but is only removed during the
driver remove(). If pci_host_probe() fails, the handler and INTx IRQ
domain remain set even though the devm-managed host bridge storage
containing struct altera_pcie will be released, leaving the handler with
a stale data pointer.
Interrupts are also enabled before pci_host_probe() is called. If probe
fails after that point, the controller interrupt source should be disabled
before the chained handler and INTx domain are removed.
So set the chained
PCI: mediatek: Fix IRQ domain leak when port fails to enable
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: mediatek: Fix IRQ domain leak when port fails to enable
When mtk_pcie_enable_port() fails, mtk_pcie_port_free() removes the port
from pcie->ports and frees the port structure. However, the IRQ domains set
up earlier by mtk_pcie_init_irq_domain() are never freed.
Fix this by refactoring mtk_pcie_irq_teardown() into a per-port helper,
mtk_pcie_irq_teardown_port(), and calling it from mtk_pcie_setup() when
mtk_pcie_enable_port() fails. Since the IRQ teardown must only happen in
the probe error path (during resume, child devices may have active MSI
mappings and the NOIRQ
hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data()
random_recv_done() stores the device-reported used.len directly into
vi->data_avail. copy_data() then indexes vi->data[] using
vi->data_idx (advanced by previous copy_data() calls) and issues a
memcpy() without re-validating either value against the posted
buffer size sizeof(vi->data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32
or 64).
A malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can set used.len beyond
sizeof(vi->data), steering the memcpy() past the end of the inline
array into adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes. hwrng_fillf
USB: chaoskey: Fix slab-use-after-free in chaoskey_release()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: chaoskey: Fix slab-use-after-free in chaoskey_release()
The chaoskey driver has a use-after-free bug in its release routine.
If the user closes the device file after the USB device has been
unplugged, a debugging log statement will try to access the
usb_interface structure after it has been deallocated:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dev_driver_string (drivers/base/core.c:2406)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888168e8a0b8 by task chaoskey_raw_re/10106
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
usb: dwc3: run gadget disconnect from sleepable suspend context
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: dwc3: run gadget disconnect from sleepable suspend context
dwc3_gadget_suspend() takes dwc->lock with IRQs disabled and then calls
dwc3_disconnect_gadget(). For async callbacks that helper only uses
plain spin_unlock()/spin_lock(), so the gadget ->disconnect() callback
still runs with IRQs disabled and any sleepable callback trips Lockdep.
This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually
reviewed against the current tree.
The grounded PoC kept the dwc3_gadget_suspend() ->
dwc3_disconnect_gadget() -> gadget_driver->disconnect() chain, and
Lockdep re
6lowpan: fix NHC entry use-after-free on error path
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
6lowpan: fix NHC entry use-after-free on error path
lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression() looks up an NHC descriptor while holding
lowpan_nhc_lock. If the descriptor has no uncompress callback, the error
path drops the lock before printing nhc->name.
lowpan_nhc_del() removes descriptors under the same lock and then relies
on synchronize_net() before the owning module can be unloaded. That only
waits for net RX RCU readers. lowpan_header_decompress() is also exported
and can be reached from callers that are not necessarily covered by the net
core RX critical section, for example
tipc: fix out-of-bounds read in broadcast Gap ACK blocks
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix out-of-bounds read in broadcast Gap ACK blocks
A broadcast PROTOCOL/STATE_MSG can carry a Gap ACK blocks record in its
data area. tipc_get_gap_ack_blks() only verifies that the record's len
field is self-consistent with its ugack_cnt/bgack_cnt counts
(sz == struct_size(p, gacks, ugack_cnt + bgack_cnt)); it does not check
that the record actually fits in the message data area, msg_data_sz().
The unicast caller tipc_link_proto_rcv() bounds it ("if (glen > dlen)
break;"), but the broadcast caller tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() discards the
returned size, so tipc_link_advance
staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size
The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy
'count' bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf ==
PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without
bounding *ppos + count against size_buf.
vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size
(image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the
user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up
to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE. When
smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to responses without data area
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to responses without data area
smb2_check_message() has a long-standing quirk that accepts a response
whose calculated length is one byte larger than the bytes actually
received ("server can return one byte more due to implied bcc[0]").
This was introduced to accommodate servers that omit the trailing bcc[0]
overlap byte when no data area is present.
However, the exemption is applied unconditionally, regardless of whether
the command actually carries a data area (has_smb2_data_area[]). When a
response with a data area is subj
staging: rtl8723bs: fix heap buffer overflow in rtw_cfg80211_set_wpa_ie()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix heap buffer overflow in rtw_cfg80211_set_wpa_ie()
supplicant_ie is a 256-byte array in struct security_priv. The WPA and
WPA2 IE copy paths use:
memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.supplicant_ie, &pwpa[0], wpa_ielen + 2);
where wpa_ielen is the raw IE length field (u8, 0-255). When a local user
supplies a connect request via nl80211 with a crafted WPA IE of length 255,
wpa_ielen + 2 equals 257, overflowing the 256-byte buffer by one byte into
the adjacent last_mic_err_time field.
rtw_parse_wpa_ie() does not prevent this: its length consistency check
staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth()
OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path.
When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without
verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and
ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as:
length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len
and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than
WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative
and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far
beyo
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop
The IE parsing loop in OnAssocRsp() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each
iteration but only guards on i < pkt_len. When a malicious AP sends an
AssocResponse whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame
(the element_id byte lands at pkt_len-1), the loop reads pIE->length
from pframe[pkt_len], which is one byte past the allocated receive buffer.
Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length
itself can extend the data window beyond pkt_len, silently passing a
truncated IE to the handler fu
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in update_beacon_info() IE loop
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in update_beacon_info() IE loop
The IE parsing loop in update_beacon_info() advances by
(pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < len.
When a malicious AP sends a Beacon whose last IE has only one byte
remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at len-1), the loop
reads pIE->length from one byte past the allocated receive buffer.
Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length
itself can extend the data window beyond len, passing a truncated IE
to the handler functions.
Add two guards at the top of
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in IE loops in issue_assocreq() and join_cmd_hdl()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in IE loops in issue_assocreq() and join_cmd_hdl()
Two IE parsing loops are missing the header bounds checks before they
dereference pIE->length:
- issue_assocreq() walks pmlmeinfo->network.ies to build the
association request. If the stored IE data ends with only an
element_id byte and no length byte, pIE->length is read one byte
past the end of the buffer.
- join_cmd_hdl() walks pnetwork->ies during station join and has
the same problem under the same conditions.
Both buffers are filled from AP beacon and probe-response f
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_sec_ie(), rtw_get_wapi_ie(), and rtw_get_wps_attr()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_sec_ie(), rtw_get_wapi_ie(), and rtw_get_wps_attr()
Three IE/attribute parsing functions have missing bounds checks.
rtw_get_sec_ie() and rtw_get_wapi_ie() iterate over a raw IE buffer
without verifying that the header bytes (tag + length) are within the
remaining buffer before reading them. Additionally, rtw_get_sec_ie()
compares the 4-byte WPA OUI at cnt+2 without checking that at least
6 bytes remain, and rtw_get_wapi_ie() compares a 4-byte WAPI OUI at
cnt+6 without checking that at least 10 bytes remain.
rtw_get_wps_attr()
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler()
HT_caps_handler() iterates pIE->length bytes and writes into
HT_caps.u.HT_cap[], which is a fixed 26-byte array (sizeof struct
HT_caps_element). Because pIE->length is a raw u8 from an over-the-air
802.11 AssocResponse frame and is never validated, a malicious AP can
set it up to 255, causing up to 229 bytes of out-of-bounds writes into
adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info.
Truncate the iteration count to the size of HT_caps.u.HT_cap using
umin() so that data from a longer-than-expected IE is silently ignored
rather
crypto: qat - fix VF2PF work teardown race in adf_disable_sriov()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qat - fix VF2PF work teardown race in adf_disable_sriov()
The VF2PF interrupt handler queues PF-side response work that stores a
raw pointer to per-VF state (struct adf_accel_vf_info). Currently,
adf_disable_sriov() destroys per-VF mutexes and frees vf_info without
stopping new VF2PF work or waiting for in-flight workers to complete. A
concurrently scheduled or already queued worker can then dereference
freed memory.
This manifests as a use-after-free when KASAN is enabled:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mutex_lock+0x76/0xe0
Write of size 8 at addr 000000000000
net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states
pfkey_msg2xfrm_state() handles the IPComp (SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP) case by
allocating x->calg and copying only the algorithm name:
x->calg = kmalloc_obj(*x->calg);
if (!x->calg) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
strcpy(x->calg->alg_name, a->name);
x->props.calgo = sa->sadb_sa_encrypt;
Unlike the authentication (x->aalg) and encryption (x->ealg) branches of
the same function, the compression branch never initializes
calg->alg_key_len. IPComp carries no key and the allocation only
reserves sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) (i.
audit: Fix data races of skb_queue_len() readers on audit_queue
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
audit: Fix data races of skb_queue_len() readers on audit_queue
Multiple readers access audit_queue.qlen via skb_queue_len() without
holding the queue lock or using READ_ONCE(), while kauditd writes to
this field via the skb_dequeue() → __skb_unlink() path with WRITE_ONCE()
protected by a spinlock. This constitutes data races.
All affected skb_queue_len(&audit_queue) call sites:
- kauditd_thread() wait_event_freezable() condition
- audit_receive_msg() AUDIT_GET handler (s.backlog assignment)
- audit_receive() backlog check
- audit_log_start() backlog check and pr_w
fs/ntfs3: validate Dirty Page Table capacity in log_replay copy_lcns
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: validate Dirty Page Table capacity in log_replay copy_lcns
In the analysis pass of $LogFile journal replay, log_replay() copies
LCNs from each action log record into an existing Dirty Page Table
(DPT) entry without bounding the destination index. A crafted NTFS
image with DPT entry lcns_follow=1 and an action log record with
lcns_follow=2 produces a kernel slab out-of-bounds write at mount
time:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in log_replay+0x654c/0xdb60
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880095e1040 by task mount
Two attacker-controlled fields can drive j+i past t