PatchFirst · Vulnerabilidades recientes
Vulnerabilidades publicadas para linux-fips en los últimos 30 días: 318. Incluidas en el catálogo KEV: 0.
Vulnerabilidades: 5342
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: fix reading neigh ha Currently arp/neigh_reduce read neigh ha directly which can lead to partial reads while the neigh is being updated. Use neigh_ha_snapshot to take a stable snapshot of the address similar to route_shortcircuit which already does the right thing.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4.1: zero referring call lists before decoding decode_cb_sequence_args() allocates csa_rclists with kmalloc_objs(), so each referring_call_list starts uninitialized. decode_rc_list() assigns rcl_refcalls only when rcl_nrefcalls is nonzero. A valid list with zero referring calls therefore leaves the pointer uninitialized, and nfs4_callback_sequence() later passes stale slab contents to kfree(). Allocate csa_rclists with kzalloc_objs() so every rcl_refcalls member is NULL from the beginning, including valid empty referring call lists.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4.2: fix LAYOUTSTATS send buffer exhaustion encode_layoutstats_maxsz budgets XDR_QUADLEN(PNFS_LAYOUTSTATS_MAXSIZE), i.e. 256 bytes, for the layoutupdate4 body written by the layout driver. The flexfiles record can exceed that. ff_layout_encode_ff_layoutupdate() emits, per data server, a netaddr4, an nfs_fh4, two ff_io_latency4, an nfstime4 and a bool. A data server whose filehandle is NFS_MAXFHSIZE bytes long already accounts for 132 of those bytes, and the two ff_io_latency4 at 64 bytes each, the nfstime4 and the bool add a further 144, so the body passes 256 bytes b
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4/pnfs: key the data server cache on the NFS version nfs4_pnfs_ds_add() keys the per-net data server cache on the multipath address set alone, and struct nfs4_pnfs_ds records no version. That suffices for the files layout driver, which always connects with version 4, but flexfiles takes its version tuple from GETDEVICEINFO per device, and one address can legitimately serve both NFSv3 and NFSv4. Two deviceids on one address with different ds_versions[0].version therefore share a single nfs4_pnfs_ds, and whichever mirror connects first pins ds_clp to its own version. The
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: account classifier filter allocations to memcg Allocations in the tc classifier *_change() paths (filter objects, per-CPU counters, and per-filter aux data) use plain GFP_KERNEL without __GFP_ACCOUNT, allowing unprivileged users to pin kernel memory outside memcg charging. The shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array allocation in cls_api.c was also uncharged; this patch closes it along with the per-classifier filter-object/percpu/aux allocations that remain unaccounted. Add GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT to: - the shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array (cls_api.c), common to
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Validate MTU in rfcomm_apply_pn() to prevent infinite loop rfcomm_apply_pn() accepts the MTU value from a remote PN (Parameter Negotiation) frame without checking for zero. When the remote peer sends an MTU of zero, d->mtu is set to 0. This causes the sendmsg path to enter an infinite loop when fragmenting data, as each fragment has size == min_t(size_t, len, 0) == 0, so the remaining length never decreases. The infinite allocation of zero-length skbs exhausts all system memory. Fix by clamping d->mtu to RFCOMM_DEFAULT_MTU when the negotiated value is ze
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: use wq_has_sleeper() in rds_cong_map_updated() rds_cong_map_updated() runs after a peer's congestion map has been rewritten (by rds_tcp_cong_recv() and rds_ib_cong_recv(), or the clear-all in the loopback and IB send-completion paths). It bumps rds_cong_generation and then checks waitqueue_active() on map->m_waitq and on rds_poll_waitq to decide whether anyone needs waking. atomic_inc() carries no ordering and waitqueue_active() is a plain load, so nothing orders the map and generation stores before the wait queue reads. The waiters do the mirror image: rds_cong
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum fq_init() computes quantum = 2 * psched_mtu() and initial_quantum = 10 * psched_mtu() with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000; the 2 * and 10 * multiplications wrap to 0 in 32-bit arithmetic, so q->quantum == 0. Then in fq_dequeue() the credit-refill loop adds 0 to f->credit (which stays <= 0) and goto begin loops forever under the qdisc lock, creating a soft lockup. Clamp psched_mtu() to [1, 1 << 20] before
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fq_codel: clamp default quantum and mtu fq_codel_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) without clamping. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, which overflows the signed flow->deficit to INT_MIN in fq_codel_dequeue(), causing an infinite loop and soft lockup. Emulate fq_codel_change() and constrain to [256, FQ_CODEL_QUANTUM_MAX]. The same unclamped psched_mtu() is assigned to q->cparams.mtu a bit below, and fq_codel_change() never updates it. codel_should_drop() tests
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum before hhf_change() to avoid overflow hhf_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes weight * quantum overflow the signed deficit in hhf_dequeue(), spinning forever. Clamp q->quantum before hhf_change() so both the opt and !opt paths see a sane quantum. Without this, bare "tc qdisc add ... hhf" succeeds with a clamped quantum but "tc qdisc add ... hhf limit 1000" (any option present) fails with -EINVAL because hhf_change() re
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sfq: clamp quantum to avoid signed overflow soft lockup sfq_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) (unsigned). A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, so slot->allot = INT_MIN and INT_MIN + INT_MIN toggles between INT_MIN and 0 forever, spinning sfq_dequeue() under the qdisc lock. Clamp the quantum to [256, 1 << 20] so the refill loop terminates. The lower bound also covers q->quantum == 0 (psched_mtu() returning 0), which spins sfq_dequeue() identically. sfq_change() alr
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tpm: st33zp24: Return zero on status read failure st33zp24_status() ignores the result of the transport read and returns data even when no byte was received. The I2C transport, for example, skips i2c_master_recv() when the register-select write is short or fails, leaving data uninitialized. The resulting stack value can be interpreted as TPM_STS flags and let status checks complete spuriously. The status callback cannot propagate a transport error. Return zero unless recv() reports exactly one byte. With no status bits set, callers retry or take their existing timeout or e
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: dapm: Fix off-by-one check on the second enum channel The snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double() rejects item[0] once it reaches e->items, but it lets item[1] be equal to it. Both go on to snd_soc_enum_item_to_val(), which indexes e->values with no bound of its own, so an enum with a value table reads one element past the end. The indexing arrived with the MUX consolidation, which relaxed the item[1] check in the same hunk. The value MUX handler it deleted used >= there, and the snd_soc_put_enum_double() in soc-ops.c still does. Only adav80x pairs a value table with two s
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: validate banner payload length When parsing the Ceph messenger v2 protocol banner, the `payload_len` field is decoded from the banner prefix. If a client sends a banner with a `payload_len` of 0, the kernel sets up a 0-length socket read. This violates an invariant in the state machine, triggering a warning in `populate_in_iter()`: ------------[ cut here ]------------ !iov_iter_count(&con->v2.in_iter) WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at populate_in_iter net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 [inline], CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070 WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at cep
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: bound qdisc_pkt_len to prevent qdisc soft lockup qdisc_get_stab() accepts a user-supplied size table, and __qdisc_calculate_pkt_len() amplifies qdisc_pkt_len() through the overhead, the size-table data (u16), and size_log (up to STAB_SIZE_LOG_MAX). A crafted stab can therefore set qdisc_pkt_len() to ~1 GiB for an ordinary skb. Per-flow deficit schedulers such as DRR and ETS replenish one quantum per loop iteration; with a tiny quantum (1) they spin billions of times under the qdisc lock, producing a soft lockup / RCU stall as illustrated by [email protected]. Cap
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: slip: remove slip_hangup() to fix use-after-free in slip_receive_buf() Jaeyoung Chung and Eulgyu Kim reported a slab-use-after-free read in slip_receive_buf() when racing against tty hangup. tty_ldisc_hangup() calls ld->ops->hangup() while holding only a read lock on tty->ldisc_sem (via tty_ldisc_ref()). Because slip_hangup() simply called slip_close(), it ran concurrently with reader functions such as slip_receive_buf(). slip_close() unregisters and frees the net device and its private struct slip, causing concurrent reader threads in slip_receive_buf() to dereference fr
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: fec: only stop PTP if it was initialized fec_ptp_init() is only called when fep->bufdesc_ex is available. However, fec_probe() unconditionally calls fec_ptp_stop() on the failed_init path, and fec_drv_remove() unconditionally calls fec_ptp_stop() during device removal. Check fep->bufdesc_ex before calling fec_ptp_stop() in both paths to avoid stopping PTP when it was not initialized.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: atm: usbatm: fix invalid ci_range initialization syzbot reported a shift-out-of-bounds in __vcc_connect(): UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/atm/common.c:382:32 shift exponent -1 is negative CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5987 Comm: syz.0.18 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/05/2026 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120 ubsan_epilogue+0xa/0x30 lib/ubsan.c:233 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x36d/0x400 lib/ubsan.c:494 __vcc_connect+0x14b4/0x19c0
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sch_htb: limit htb_classify inner-class filter hops htb_classify() follows each filter-selected inner class by switching to cl->filter_list, but never bounds the number of hops. A filter on an inner class can point back to itself or to another inner class that points back, creating an infinite loop in the packet classification path with the qdisc lock held and BH disabled — a soft lockup / panic from a single packet. Bound the traversal with a hop counter and drop the packet with a rate-limited warning once the bound is exceeded. The counter is incremented at th
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: skbuff: don't skb_tx_error() the source skb in skb_zerocopy() skb_zerocopy() copies frags from @from into @to. On an skb_orphan_frags() failure it calls skb_tx_error(@from), a destructive operation on the source skb the copy helper does not own. That completes @from's zerocopy uarg and clears SKBFL_ALL_ZEROCOPY, including the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG page-ownership marker. Both callers already report the failure on their own drop path. nfnetlink_queue does it at nla_put_failure, and Open vSwitch does it in the flow-miss drop arm of ovs_dp_process_packet(), so nothing is lost
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