In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlegacy: fix broadcast stations deallocation
On the error path of __il4965_up(), il_dealloc_bcast_stations() clears
only IL_STA_UCODE_ACTIVE, leaving IL_STA_BCAST set. This causes the
same broadcast stations to be deallocated again by __il4965_down().
This can occur when RF_KILL is toggled during driver startup.
To fix clear the entire 'used' field, since we will not do any
other operations on the station.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: libertas_tf: fix UAF in lbtf_free_adapter()
lbtf_free_adapter() calls lbtf_free_cmd_buffer() to free the command
buffers before calling timer_delete_sync() to wait for the command
timer callback. If the timer callback (command_timer_fn) is already
running when lbtf_free_cmd_buffer() frees the command array, the
callback dereferences priv->cur_cmd->cmdbuf which points to freed
memory.
Swap the order so that timer_delete_sync() runs first, ensuring any
in-flight callback has completed before the command buffers are freed.
Media · CVSS 6.9EPSS 0,17%Sin corrección publicada
wifi: libipw: reject TKIP frames without a full MIC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: libipw: reject TKIP frames without a full MIC
libipw_michael_mic_verify() assumes that an skb contains an eight-byte
Michael MIC. A short TKIP frame makes the unsigned payload length wrap,
causing michael_mic() to read past the skb.
Check that the MIC is present before verifying it, and use the existing
MICHAEL_MIC_LEN constant for all MIC lengths in the verifier.
wifi: wlcore: release runtime PM ref on regdomain config failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wlcore: release runtime PM ref on regdomain config failure
wlcore_regdomain_config() gets a runtime PM reference before sending
the regulatory-domain command. When
wlcore_cmd_regdomain_config_locked() fails, the function queues recovery
and returns without dropping that reference.
Release the reference after handling the command result so both success
and failure paths balance the preceding
pm_runtime_resume_and_get(). The recovery worker takes a separate
runtime PM reference and cannot release the reference held here.
wifi: wilc1000: fix RX buffer OOB-write in wilc_wlan_handle_isr_ext()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wilc1000: fix RX buffer OOB-write in wilc_wlan_handle_isr_ext()
wilc_wlan_handle_isr_ext() takes the RX transfer size from the
device-reported interrupt status register (a 15-bit field shifted left by 2,
up to 131068 bytes) and reads that many bytes from the device into
rx_buffer, which is only WILC_RX_BUFF_SIZE (96K) large. The wrap
check only handles the current offset; the size itself is never
compared against the buffer, so a bogus SDIO device can make the driver
OOB-write rx_buffer by up to ~32K with data it controls.
The oversized transfer also leaves rx_buffer
wifi: p54: validate curve data length in the calibration curve converters
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: p54: validate curve data length in the calibration curve converters
p54_convert_rev0() and p54_convert_rev1() read calibration curve
data from the device-supplied EEPROM entry using channel and
points-per-channel counts taken verbatim from that same entry, so
an entry that declares more data than it carries drives an
out-of-bounds read past the EEPROM buffer (verified with a KASAN
reproducer of the conversion loop). The sibling converters
p54_convert_output_limits() and p54_convert_db() already validate
their counts against the entry length; this path was missed.
Rej
wifi: p54: require a full exp_if record in PDR_INTERFACE_LIST
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: p54: require a full exp_if record in PDR_INTERFACE_LIST
The PDR_INTERFACE_LIST loop only checks that the record start is within
the entry before reading an entire struct exp_if from it. A truncated
trailing record makes the if_id/variant reads cross the entry boundary
into the heap beyond the EEPROM buffer (verified with a KASAN
reproducer of the loop). The variant also feeds the synth front-end
selection, so this is not only a leak.
Advance only while a full record still fits in the entry.
wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length
mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a
beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that
many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight
from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the
element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id
alone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted
RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up
to 255 * 4 bytes pas
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: validate scan response extents
mwifiex_ret_802_11_scan() subtracts the fixed response fields and the
firmware-provided BSS length from resp->size without first proving that
either extent fits. A short response or oversized BSS length can
therefore underflow tlv_buf_size and make the TLV parser walk beyond the
command response.
Compute the fixed extent from the selected normal or background scan
response. Validate that the fixed fields and BSS data fit before deriving
the TLV extent and entering the parser.
wifi: mac80211: refuse to make a monitor active when it has no queue
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: refuse to make a monitor active when it has no queue
A monitor interface only gets a TXQ if it's created active, and one can't
be added later. Setting the flag on a down interface is still allowed, so
the driver is handed a monitor with no queue. ath9k dereferences it:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000066
RIP: 0010:ath_tx_node_init+0x49/0x170 [ath9k]
ath9k_add_interface+0x10c/0x140 [ath9k]
drv_add_interface+0x54/0x250 [mac80211]
ieee80211_do_open+0x32f/0x800 [mac80211]
Reached with CAP_NET_ADMIN by "iw dev X set moni
Media · CVSS 5.7EPSS 0,15%Sin corrección publicada
drm/amdkfd: Avoid integer underflow in EOP ring size calculation.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Avoid integer underflow in EOP ring size calculation.
The low 6 bits of cp_hqd_eop_control store the base-2 logarithm
of the EOP ring size. This was calculated as
order_base_2(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / 4) - 1
But order_base_2 can in theory return 0, so this could underflow
(although in practice the ring buffer size cannot be less than 4096).
Change this to
order_base_2(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / 8)
using properties of logarithms.
Also add to the above comment to make the mathematics more clear.
(cherry picked from commit f0f43fcf8b2b3a924cad9444340921c96ed
Media · CVSS 4.8EPSS 0,15%Sin corrección publicada
drm/amdkfd: Avoid integer underflow with ffs in EOP ring size calc
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Avoid integer underflow with ffs in EOP ring size calc
The low 6 bits of cp_hqd_eop_control store the base-2 logarithm
of the EOP ring size. This was calculated as
ffs(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / sizeof(unsigned int)) - 1 - 1
But ffs can in theory return 1 or 0, so this could underflow
(although in practice the ring buffer size cannot be less than 4096).
Change this to
ffs(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / sizeof(unsigned int) / 4)
using properties of logarithms.
(cherry picked from commit 4f18c56630383c14bfc6b2d65f88f2f895d2121a)
smb: client: cancel reconnect work in clean_demultiplex_info()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: cancel reconnect work in clean_demultiplex_info()
clean_demultiplex_info() cancels server->echo delayed work but not
server->reconnect, which can cause a use-after-free when the
demultiplex thread exits while a reconnect work is still queued:
cifs_demultiplex_thread()
cifs_readv_from_socket()
cifs_reconnect()
__cifs_reconnect()
cifs_queue_server_reconn()
mod_delayed_work(cifsiod_wq, &server->reconnect, 0)
clean_demultiplex_info()
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&server->echo) // echo canceled
smb: client: fix rlist race and missing initialization
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix rlist race and missing initialization
TCP_Server_Info.rlist is allocated via kzalloc which zeros both ->next
and ->prev to NULL instead of pointing to itself, making list_empty()
always return false and list_add() dereference a NULL ->prev pointer.
Also, cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect() can be called concurrently
from multiple cifsd threads, allowing the same server's rlist node to
be added twice into the local list, corrupting it.
smb: client: fix smbd_connection leak on cifs_get_tcp_session() error
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix smbd_connection leak on cifs_get_tcp_session() error
When an RDMA connection is successfully established via
smbd_get_connection() but cifs_get_tcp_session() later fails (e.g.
kthread_create() returns an error), the error path frees tcp_ses
without first destroying the smbd_connection.
Fix this by calling smbd_destroy() in the out_err cleanup path before
kfree(tcp_ses). smbd_destroy() safely handles the case where
smbd_conn is NULL, so it can be called unconditionally.
smb: client: fix next_buffer UAF and NextCommand bounds in compound PDUs
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix next_buffer UAF and NextCommand bounds in compound PDUs
Fix several related bounds checking and pointer lifecycle issues in
receive_encrypted_standard()'s handling of compound encrypted frames:
- Clear next_buffer after assigning it to server->bigbuf. A stale
next_buffer pointer can lead to a use-after-free on subsequent
error paths.
- Update pdu_length to the decrypted plaintext size (buf_size). Using
the pre-decryption length allows NextCommand to point into stale
ciphertext residue.
- Reject next_cmd values smaller than MID_HEADER_SIZE(server).
smb: client: fix OOB struct field reads in move_smb2_ea_to_cifs()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOB struct field reads in move_smb2_ea_to_cifs()
In move_smb2_ea_to_cifs(), the while (src_size > 0) loop condition is
insufficient. It allows iteration to continue even if the remaining
src_size is too small to contain a complete smb2_ea_info structure.
Consequently, reads of ea_name_length and ea_value_length can occur
out-of-bounds.
Fix this by ensuring src_size >= sizeof(*src) before attempting to read
any structure fields. Additionally, reject any next_entry_offset that is
smaller than sizeof(*src) or that would advance the pointer beyond the
availabl
smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots()
If snapshot_array_size is smaller than GMT_TOKEN_SIZE,
smb3_enum_snapshots() sets ret_data_len to
sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) without verifying the actual length
of the server's reply.
Because SMB2_ioctl() places no lower bound on the server-supplied
OutputCount and allocates retbuf to exactly that length, a short reply
results in ret_data_len exceeding the size of retbuf. The subsequent
copy_to_user() then reads past the end of retbuf, leaking adjacent slab
memory to userspace. The subsequent clamp check
smb: client: fix server->total_read for compound encrypted PDUs
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix server->total_read for compound encrypted PDUs
In receive_encrypted_standard(), server->total_read is left at the
full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted
frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size
to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly
validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU.
This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation,
leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len().
Fix this by setting server->total_read to th
KVM: x86/mmu: Check write tracking in all address spaces
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/mmu: Check write tracking in all address spaces
kvm_gfn_is_write_tracked() checks only the supplied memslot, but page
tracking is per-address-space and shadow pages are shared across all
address spaces. With SMM, a GFN can therefore be write-tracked in one
address space and appear untracked through the other.
Check the supplied slot first, then the slot for the other address space.
This ensures all callers honor write tracking regardless of the active
address space. In particular, it prevents mmu_try_to_unsync_pages() from
marking an upper-level shadow page unsy