Vulnerabilidades de linux-azure-fips · Página 72

power: supply: ab8500_fg: fix use-after-free on remove

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: power: supply: ab8500_fg: fix use-after-free on remove ab8500_fg_remove() destroys the driver workqueue while the threaded interrupt handlers are still armed; they are devm-managed and freed only after ->remove() returns, so a handler that fires in that window queues work on the freed workqueue. Tear the workqueue down through devm instead, registering its cleanup after the power supply and before the interrupt requests. devm then frees the interrupts first, so the handlers can no longer queue work, before disabling the delayed and plain work items and destroying the work

mm/damon/core: avoid infinite kdamond_merge_regions() internal loop

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/core: avoid infinite kdamond_merge_regions() internal loop Patch series "mm/damon: unurgent fixes for infinite loop, NULL de-ref and races", v1.1. Sashiko found a few issues in DAMON that could cause infinite loop, NULL dereference and monitoring results degradation. The first two sounds scary but the infinite loop happens only under unreasonable user setup. The NULL dereference is only in a unit test. Monitoring results degradation is trivial since it is only best-effort, and those happens from only unlikely races. Still those are bugs that better to fix if p

PCI: Allow per function PCI slots to fix slot reset on s390

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI: Allow per function PCI slots to fix slot reset on s390 On s390 systems, which use a machine level hypervisor, PCI devices are always accessed through a form of PCI pass-through which fundamentally operates on a per PCI function granularity. This is also reflected in the s390 PCI hotplug driver which creates hotplug slots for individual PCI functions. Its reset_slot() function, which is a wrapper for zpci_hot_reset_device(), thus also resets individual functions. Currently, the pci_create_slot() assigns the same pci_slot object to multifunction devices. This approach w

ksmbd: zero pipe read compound padding

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: zero pipe read compound padding Compound response handling extends the last response iov to an eight-byte boundary. smb2_read_pipe() allocates only the payload size, so the alignment padding can expose up to seven bytes of uninitialized kernel heap memory. Allocate the aligned size and clear the unused tail before pinning the response buffer.

ksmbd: prevent out-of-bounds reads in share config responses

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: prevent out-of-bounds reads in share config responses Validate IPC share configuration payload sizes before consuming variable-length fields. Bound veto list parsing and account for the separator byte when deriving the path length.

gtp: add synchronize_net() in gtp_newlink() error path to prevent use-after-free

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gtp: add synchronize_net() in gtp_newlink() error path to prevent use-after-free gtp_newlink()'s error path frees tid_hash and addr_hash without waiting for an RCU grace period after clearing sk_user_data. A concurrent gtp_encap_recv() in softirq may still hold the gtp_dev pointer obtained via rcu_dereference_sk_user_data() and access the freed memory. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gtp0_pdp_find+0x1f6/0x200 (gtp.c:152) Call Trace: <IRQ> gtp0_pdp_find+0x1f6/0x200 gtp_encap_recv+0x527/0x24b0 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x75f/0xc10 Add synchronize_net() before

ksmbd: fix tree connection use-after-free in smb2_tree_connect()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix tree connection use-after-free in smb2_tree_connect() ksmbd_tree_conn_connect() publishes a new tree connection in sess->tree_conns with a single reference and returns its pointer to smb2_tree_connect(). The handler continues to initialize the object and build the response after publication. A concurrent session logoff can erase the connection and drop that reference, freeing the object while the handler still uses it. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in smb2_tree_connect+0xe3d/0xf90 smb2_tree_connect (fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c:2872) handle_ksmbd_work process

ext4: check dir entry fits before reading the hash trailer in ext4_search_dir()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: check dir entry fits before reading the hash trailer in ext4_search_dir() For casefolded encrypted directories ext4 stores an 8-byte hash trailer after the name (EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES()), at an offset derived from de->name_len. On the sb_no_casefold_compat_fallback() path ext4_match() reads that trailer, but ext4_search_dir()'s by-hand pre-check only tests de->name + de->name_len <= dlimit, which proves the name fits, not the rounded trailer. A crafted entry whose name ends at the block boundary passes the check while EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de) lands past the block end, so

ext4: fix out-of-bounds read in ext4_read_inline_dir()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix out-of-bounds read in ext4_read_inline_dir() ext4_read_inline_dir() can read a dirent header past the end of its inline buffer, triggering a slab-out-of-bounds read during getdents64(): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __ext4_check_dir_entry Read of size 2 at addr ffff88800f3dd23c by task exploit/148 ... __ext4_check_dir_entry ext4_read_inline_dir iterate_dir The dirent payload lives in a buffer of exactly inline_size bytes: dir_buf = kmalloc(inline_size, GFP_NOFS); but iteration runs in a position space extra_offset bytes larger (extra_size

fs/ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read of INDEX_ROOT in reparse/objid init

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read of INDEX_ROOT in reparse/objid init ntfs_reparse_init() and ntfs_objid_init() parse the index root of the $Extend/$Reparse and $Extend/$ObjId metafiles (the INDEX_ROOT attributes named $R and $O). They read its type and rule fields through resident_data(), which does not check that the resident attribute is large enough to hold them. mi_enum_attr() accepts a resident attribute with data_off == asize and data_size == 0. For such an attribute placed last in its MFT record, resident_data() returns a pointer to the end of the record_size buffer

SUNRPC: check rpc_sockaddr2uaddr() return value in rpcb_register_inet4/6

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: check rpc_sockaddr2uaddr() return value in rpcb_register_inet4/6 rpcb_register_inet4() and rpcb_register_inet6() store the result of rpc_sockaddr2uaddr() into map->r_addr without checking it for NULL. rpc_sockaddr2uaddr() returns NULL when its final kstrdup() fails, and the unchecked NULL is then carried into the synchronous RPCBPROC_SET encode path: rpcb_register_call() -> rpc_call_sync() -> rpcb_enc_getaddr() -> encode_rpcb_string(), whose first statement is strlen(string), dereferencing NULL and oopsing the kernel. The crash reproduces under failslab on v6.12; w

xfrm6: fix out-of-bounds write in xfrm6_input_addr() when secpath is full

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm6: fix out-of-bounds write in xfrm6_input_addr() when secpath is full The depth check in xfrm6_input_addr() is off by one: if (1 + sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) goto drop; ... sp->xvec[sp->len++] = x; xfrm_input() can leave sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH, and the transport-mode receive path re-enters IPv6 input via xfrm_trans_reinject() with that secpath preserved. If the inner packet carries a destination-options HAO option or a type-2 routing header, xfrm6_input_addr() is called with sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH; the check (1 + 6 == 6) is false, so sp->xvec[sp-

fs/ntfs3: reject restart table growth beyond U16_MAX entries

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: reject restart table growth beyond U16_MAX entries During $LogFile replay, log_replay() indexes the transaction table by the transact_id taken from the log record header. check_log_rec() only verifies that transact_id is non-zero and properly aligned, not its magnitude, so a crafted image can request an arbitrarily large index. alloc_rsttbl_from_idx() grows the table to cover that index via extend_rsttbl(), which passes the new entry count to init_rsttbl(): rt = init_rsttbl(esize, used + add); used + add is computed as u32 but init_rsttbl() takes a u16, and t

fs/ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in read_log_rec_buf()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in read_log_rec_buf() read_log_rec_buf() copies a log record into a caller buffer starting at u32 off = lsn_to_page_off(log, lsn) + log->record_header_len; log->record_header_len (and log->data_off, used for the following pages) comes verbatim from the on-disk restart area and is only checked for 8-byte alignment in is_rst_area_valid(), so off can exceed log->page_size. "tail = log->page_size - off" then underflows and memcpy() reads past the page_size-sized buffer returned by read_log_page(), spilling adjacent slab memory into the replay

net: qualcomm: rmnet: restore skb->dev on deaggregated frames

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: qualcomm: rmnet: restore skb->dev on deaggregated frames rmnet_map_deaggregate() allocates each sub-frame with alloc_skb() and leaves skb->dev NULL. __rmnet_map_ingress_handler() assigns skb->dev = ep->egress_dev only on the data path, but a MAP command frame is dispatched to rmnet_map_command() before that, so rmnet_map_send_ack() runs netif_tx_lock(skb->dev) on a NULL device. An unprivileged user reaches this by unsharing a user+net namespace, creating an rmnet link over a tap device with INGRESS_DEAGGREGATION and INGRESS_MAP_COMMANDS, and writing an aggregated frame

fs/ntfs3: validate ef->size covers the record's name and value

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: validate ef->size covers the record's name and value When an EA record has a non-zero ef->size, ntfs_read_ea() only checks that the record fits in the remaining buffer (ea_size > bytes), not that ef->size is large enough to hold the record's own name_len + 1 + elength. A crafted image can pass validation with, e.g., ef->size = 24 but elength = 0xffff. ntfs_get_ea() then trusts elength and copies it out of the undersized record, reading past the kmalloc(info->size) allocation and leaking heap memory to userspace via getxattr(): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in

isofs: fix out-of-bounds page array access on empty zisofs block

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: isofs: fix out-of-bounds page array access on empty zisofs block zisofs_uncompress_block()'s empty-block fast path returns pcount << PAGE_SHIFT, ignoring the incoming poffset, unlike the decompression path which returns bytes produced relative to poffset. zisofs_fill_pages() uses that return to advance its page cursor, so when the zisofs block size is below PAGE_SIZE and a sub-page block leaves poffset partway into a page, a following empty block over-counts and advances pages[] one element past its end, after which "if (poffset && *pages)" reads pages[1] out of bounds. ro

vfio/pci: clear vdev->msi_perm after freeing it on init failure

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/pci: clear vdev->msi_perm after freeing it on init failure vfio_msi_cap_len() lazily allocates the per-device MSI permission table: vdev->msi_perm = kmalloc_obj(struct perm_bits, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!vdev->msi_perm) return -ENOMEM; ret = init_pci_cap_msi_perm(vdev->msi_perm, len, flags); if (ret) { kfree(vdev->msi_perm); return ret; /* vdev->msi_perm left dangling */ } When init_pci_cap_msi_perm() -> alloc_perm_bits() fails with -ENOMEM, the error path frees vdev->msi_perm but leaves the freed pointer stored in it. vdev->msi_perm is not re-zeroed la

Bluetooth: SCO: hold sk properly in sco_conn_ready

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SCO: hold sk properly in sco_conn_ready sk deref in sco_conn_ready must be done either under conn->lock, or holding a refcount, to avoid concurrent close. conn->sk and parent sk is currently accessed without either, and without checking parent->sk_state: [Task 1] [Task 2] sco_sock_release sco_conn_ready sk = conn->sk lock_sock(sk) conn->sk = NULL lock_sock(sk) release_sock(sk) sco_sock_kill(sk) UA

• Actualiza a 5.15.0-1123.132+fips1

timers/itimer: Zero-init old itimerval before copy to userspace

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: timers/itimer: Zero-init old itimerval before copy to userspace On native sparc64, struct __kernel_old_timeval contains a four-byte hole after tv_usec because tv_sec is 64-bit while __kernel_suseconds_t is 32-bit. put_itimerval() fills only the named fields in a stack-allocated __kernel_old_itimerval and copies the entire object to userspace, so getitimer() can expose the two padding holes. Zero-initialize the aggregate before assigning the fields so implicit padding is deterministic before it crosses the user/kernel boundary.