btrfs: take commit root semaphore when iterating in mark_block_group_to_copy()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: take commit root semaphore when iterating in mark_block_group_to_copy()
mark_block_group_to_copy() iterates over the commit root with
skip_locking=true. A concurrent transaction commit can swap and free
the commit root during iteration, causing use-after-free when
accessing extent buffers.
Fix it by using path->need_commit_sem to protect the commit root search.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: xfrm: use full sockets in local error paths
xfrm6_local_rxpmtu() and xfrm6_local_error() dereference skb->sk as if it
always pointed at a full IPv6 socket.
That is not guaranteed. TCP SYN-ACK skbs can be owned by a
TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request_sock while the output path itself is driven by the
full listener. If rerouting selects an IPv6 XFRM tunnel route with a lower
MTU, the local PMTU/error handling path can reach these callbacks with that
mini-socket still attached to the skb.
The callbacks then miscast the request socket as a full inet/IPv6 socket and
can read beyon
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lan743x: fix RX checksum use-after-free
lan743x_rx_process_buffer() adds each non-first receive buffer to the
head skb's frag_list. On the last descriptor, lan743x_rx_trim_skb()
linearizes the head and frees the fragment skb metadata.
The checksum-success path then writes ip_summed through the local skb
pointer, which still points to the final fragment. This causes a
use-after-free write when a packet spans more than one receive buffer.
Set ip_summed on the surviving head skb instead. Multi-buffer receive
can occur after a live MTU increase because existing ring e
net: wwan: t7xx: validate the netif index in t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: t7xx: validate the netif index in t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb()
The netif index carried in the DPMAIF PIT header is five bits wide,
but ccmni_inst[] only has room for NIC_DEV_MAX (21) entries.
t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb() indexes the array without a bounds check, so
indexes 21 to 31 read past it. The out-of-bounds value lands in the
callback table that follows the array, which is never NULL, so the
existing !ccmni check does not catch it and the driver dereferences
whatever sits there as a struct t7xx_ccmni.
Drop the skb when the index is out of range.
Verified in a QEMU gu
net: wwan: mhi_wwan_mbim: guard against a cyclic NDP chain
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: mhi_wwan_mbim: guard against a cyclic NDP chain
The NDP traversal in mhi_mbim_rx() only stops when wNextNdpIndex is
zero. Nothing requires the offsets to advance, so a modem that
points an NDP at itself, or at an earlier NDP, keeps the loop
spinning forever on one CPU.
Break out when the next NDP offset is not larger than the current
one.
Verified in a QEMU guest with a fault injector feeding the driver's
receive callback an NTB whose single NDP points at itself: the
unpatched driver spins in mhi_mbim_rx() with one CPU pinned at 100%
and the thread never retu
net: wwan: mhi_wwan_mbim: check skb_copy_bits() return value
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: mhi_wwan_mbim: check skb_copy_bits() return value
mhi_mbim_rx() ignores the return value of skb_copy_bits() when it
copies each datagram out of the NTB. The datagram offset and length
come from the DPE, which is only checked to lie within the NTB
itself, so a modem can point a datagram outside the received skb.
The copy then fails and the freshly allocated skbn is passed to
netif_rx() with its uninitialized contents still in place, leaking
kernel heap memory into the network stack.
Free the skb and account an error when the copy fails.
Verified in a QEMU gues
net/sched: act_api: release tail references on DELACTION failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_api: release tail references on DELACTION failure
A batched RTM_DELACTION request takes a temporary reference on each
action before attempting any deletion. tcf_action_delete() clears
each processed slot and drops its temporary reference before attempting
the deletion. If deletion fails, tca_action_gd() calls
tcf_action_put_many() to release the remaining references, but its
tcf_act_for_each_action() iterator stops at the first NULL slot.
When a batch stops at an action bound to a filter, this leaks a
reference on each subsequent action. A later delete of an
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: hhf: cap hh_flows_limit at change time
hhf_change() stores TCA_HHF_HH_FLOWS_LIMIT with no upper bound. A huge
hh_flows_limit lets each new heavy-hitter flow pass the
hh_flows_current_cnt check in alloc_new_hh() and forces a fixed-size
kzalloc(GFP_ATOMIC) per flow under spoofed traffic, for unbounded memory
growth.
Bound the attribute with NLA_POLICY_MAX() at 2*HH_FLOWS_CNT (the
hhf_init() default) and report the rejected value via extack. The
deprecated nested parse is kept: legacy tc does not set NLA_F_NESTED on
TCA_OPTIONS. Configs relying on hh_limit above th
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/packet: clear RX owner on VNET header error
Commit 61fad6816fc1 ("net/packet: tpacket_rcv: avoid a producer race
condition") added rx_owner_map and made tpacket_rcv() claim a V1 or V2
ring slot before converting the virtio-net header. If the conversion
fails, the drop path leaves the slot claimed.
With a one-frame TPACKET_V2 ring, an unsupported UDP GSO packet leaves
the only slot unavailable, so the ring also drops the next valid packet.
Clear the ownership bit on this error path. TPACKET_V3 already clears
its block state here.
scsi: core: Validate MODE SENSE lengths in scsi_cdl_enable()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: core: Validate MODE SENSE lengths in scsi_cdl_enable()
scsi_cdl_enable() uses length fields returned by MODE SENSE to locate
the ATA feature mode page in a 64-byte stack buffer. A target can report
a total length shorter than its mode header and block descriptors. The
unsigned subtraction used for the MODE SELECT length can wrap, and the
separately computed buf_data can point beyond buf.
During automatic scan, enable is false, so the read-modify-write of
buf_data[4] can clear the low two bits of a target-selected
out-of-bounds stack byte. scsi_mode_select() can then
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: serialize state GC with device state flush
The deferred-device pass in xfrm_dev_state_flush() finds states under
xfrm_state_dev_gc_lock, but drops the lock before calling
xfrm_dev_state_free() because the driver callback may sleep. The device
GC list does not hold an xfrm_state reference, so the state GC worker can
destroy the same state concurrently.
The race can proceed as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
find x on the device GC list
drop xfrm_state_dev_gc_lock
read x->xso.dev
xfrm_state_gc_destroy(x
xfrm: use hlist_del_init_rcu for state_cache and state_cache_input
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: use hlist_del_init_rcu for state_cache and state_cache_input
Commit 14acf9652e56 ("xfrm: defensively unhash xfrm_state lists in
__xfrm_state_delete") converted bydst/bysrc/byseq/byspi from
hlist_del_rcu() to hlist_del_init_rcu() so that a second
__xfrm_state_delete() on the same object becomes a no-op rather than a
write through LIST_POISON pprev. It missed state_cache and
state_cache_input, which kept hlist_del_rcu():
- hlist_del_rcu() leaves pprev = LIST_POISON2 (non-NULL), so
hlist_unhashed() returns false.
- hlist_del_init_rcu() leaves pprev = NULL, so hlist_un
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: save input state data before secpath resets
xfrm_input() stores the current xfrm_state in the skb secpath while it
continues receive-side processing. Some input paths can reset that secpath
before xfrm_input() has finished dereferencing the state.
Receive callback users such as VTI and XFRM interfaces can reset the
secpath. The VTI receive path does so before checking whether the packet
crosses network namespaces, while the XFRM interface path does so only for
cross-network-namespace packets. The XFRM_MAX_DEPTH error path can also
reset the secpath before the final d
memstick: ms_block: destroy io_queue workqueue on removal
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memstick: ms_block: destroy io_queue workqueue on removal
msb_init_disk() creates the per-card ordered workqueue msb->io_queue with
alloc_ordered_workqueue(). It is torn down with destroy_workqueue() only
on the init error path; msb_remove() never destroys it. msb_stop() merely
flushes the queue, and neither msb_data_clear() nor put_disk() free it. As
a result every card insert/remove cycle leaks the workqueue and its
kworker, exhausting kernel memory over repeated cycles.
Destroy the workqueue in msb_remove() after the disk has been removed and
the queue drained.
KEYS: encrypted: fix integer overflow of datablob_len
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KEYS: encrypted: fix integer overflow of datablob_len
encrypted_key_alloc() stores datablob_len in a u16. It is computed from
multiple string and payload lengths. If the result exceeds U16_MAX, the
assignment truncates the allocation size. KASAN reports a 32760-byte
slab-out-of-bounds write when __ekey_init() copies the master key
description into the undersized buffer.
The total payload length stored in key->datalen is also a u16. Use
check_add_overflow() to reject values that do not fit either destination,
and use kzalloc_flex() for the flexible-array allocation.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KEYS: trusted: Fix tpm2_load_cmd() boundary check
tpm2_load_cmd() does boundary checks against the ASN.1 size i.e.,
payload->blob_len. Address this by passing the decoded blob size to
tpm2_load_cmd(), and use it for the boundary checks.
i2c: atr: fix dangling adapter pointer on add failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: atr: fix dangling adapter pointer on add failure
i2c_atr_add_adapter() stores atr->adapter[chan_id] before
i2c_add_adapter() so that the I2C bus notifier can match child clients
during registration. On failure the channel is freed but the slot was
left pointing at freed memory, which can lead to use-after-free in
i2c_atr_del_adapter() / cleanup and also block reuse with -EEXIST.
Clear the slot on the i2c_add_adapter() error path before freeing chan.
IB/mlx4: Fix use-after-free on pkey sysfs registration failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/mlx4: Fix use-after-free on pkey sysfs registration failure
register_pkey_tree() ignores errors from register_one_pkey_tree() and
continues registering the remaining slaves. The per-slave error path has
already released the pkey parent kobjects, but their pointers remain
stored in the device. A later device cleanup therefore passes the stale
pointers to kobject_put(), causing a use-after-free.
Clear the parent pointers after releasing a failed slave tree and skip
unregistered trees during device cleanup. This preserves the existing
best-effort registration behavior whil
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/hfi1: Fix the PIO_CRED credit-return mmap
hfi1_file_mmap()'s PIO_CRED case must hand user space the single
credit-return page that holds this context's entry. That page is the
second or third page of the per-node credit-return allocation once the
hardware send context index reaches 64 or 128, so the failure below is
intermittent: when the entry lands on the first page the offset is zero
and everything works.
Two things are wrong.
First, cr_page_offset is a byte offset but .va is a struct
credit_return *, so adding it is pointer arithmetic and scales the offset
by size
selinux: preserve user SID across nested backing files
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: preserve user SID across nested backing files
SELinux saves the user file SID in a backing-file security blob so it
remains available after mmap() replaces vma->vm_file with a backing file.
For nested backing files (overlayfs over overlayfs, or FUSE passthrough
backed by overlayfs), user_file may itself be a backing file. Its
fsec->sid is the SID of the mounter that opened it, rather than the user
that opened the top-level file. mprotect() then checks fd { use } against
the mounter SID. This can incorrectly deny access without a domain
transition, or check the