PatchFirst · Vulnérabilités récentes
Vulnérabilités publiées pour python au cours des 30 derniers jours : 5. Présentes dans le catalogue KEV : 0.
Vulnérabilités : 77
When using http.cookies.Morsel, user-controlled cookie values and parameters can allow injecting HTTP headers into messages. Patch rejects all control characters within cookie names, values, and parameters.
The poplib module, when passed a user-controlled command, can have additional commands injected using newlines. Mitigation rejects commands containing control characters.
The imaplib module, when passed a user-controlled command, can have additional commands injected using newlines. Mitigation rejects commands containing control characters.
User-controlled data URLs parsed by urllib.request.DataHandler allow injecting headers through newlines in the data URL mediatype.
User-controlled header names and values containing newlines can allow injecting HTTP headers.
When folding a long comment in an email header containing exclusively unfoldable characters, the parenthesis would not be preserved. This could be used for injecting headers into email messages where addresses are user-controlled and not sanitized.
When building nested elements using xml.dom.minidom methods such as appendChild() that have a dependency on _clear_id_cache() the algorithm is quadratic. Availability can be impacted when building excessively nested documents.
When loading a plist file, the plistlib module reads data in size specified by the file itself, meaning a malicious file can cause OOM and DoS issues
When reading an HTTP response from a server, if no read amount is specified, the default behavior will be to use Content-Length. This allows a malicious server to cause the client to read large amounts of data into memory, potentially causing OOM or other DoS.
If the value passed to os.path.expandvars() is user-controlled a performance degradation is possible when expanding environment variables.
The 'zipfile' module would not check the validity of the ZIP64 End of Central Directory (EOCD) Locator record offset value would not be used to locate the ZIP64 EOCD record, instead the ZIP64 EOCD record would be assumed to be the previous record in the ZIP archive. This could be abused to create ZIP archives that are handled differently by the 'zipfile' module compared to other ZIP implementations. Remediation maintains this behavior, but checks that the offset specified in the ZIP64 EOCD Locator record matches the expected value.
There is a defect in the CPython “tarfile” module affecting the “TarFile” extraction and entry enumeration APIs. The tar implementation would process tar archives with negative offsets without error, resulting in an infinite loop and deadlock during the parsing of maliciously crafted tar archives. This vulnerability can be mitigated by including the following patch after importing the “tarfile” module: https://gist.github.com/sethmlarson/1716ac5b82b73dbcbf23ad2eff8b33e1
The html.parser.HTMLParser class had worse-case quadratic complexity when processing certain crafted malformed inputs potentially leading to amplified denial-of-service.
Allows modifying some file metadata (e.g. last modified) with filter="data" or file permissions (chmod) with filter="tar" of files outside the extraction directory. You are affected by this vulnerability if using the tarfile module to extract untrusted tar archives using TarFile.extractall() or TarFile.extract() using the filter= parameter with a value of "data" or "tar". See the tarfile extraction filters documentation https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile-extraction-filter for more information. Only Python versions 3.12 or later are affected by these vulnerabilities, earlier versions don't include the extraction filter fe
When using a TarFile.errorlevel = 0 and extracting with a filter the documented behavior is that any filtered members would be skipped and not extracted. However the actual behavior of TarFile.errorlevel = 0 in affected versions is that the member would still be extracted and not skipped.
Allows the extraction filter to be ignored, allowing symlink targets to point outside the destination directory, and the modification of some file metadata. You are affected by this vulnerability if using the tarfile module to extract untrusted tar archives using TarFile.extractall() or TarFile.extract() using the filter= parameter with a value of "data" or "tar". See the tarfile extraction filters documentation https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile-extraction-filter for more information. Note that for Python 3.14 or later the default value of filter= changed from "no filtering" to `"data", so if you are relying on this
Allows the extraction filter to be ignored, allowing symlink targets to point outside the destination directory, and the modification of some file metadata. You are affected by this vulnerability if using the tarfile module to extract untrusted tar archives using TarFile.extractall() or TarFile.extract() using the filter= parameter with a value of "data" or "tar". See the tarfile extraction filters documentation https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile-extraction-filter for more information. Note that for Python 3.14 or later the default value of filter= changed from "no filtering" to `"data", so if you are relying on this
Allows arbitrary filesystem writes outside the extraction directory during extraction with filter="data". You are affected by this vulnerability if using the tarfile module to extract untrusted tar archives using TarFile.extractall() or TarFile.extract() using the filter= parameter with a value of "data" or "tar". See the tarfile extraction filters documentation https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile-extraction-filter for more information. Note that for Python 3.14 or later the default value of filter= changed from "no filtering" to `"data", so if you are relying on this new default behavior then your usage is also affect
There is an issue in CPython when using `bytes.decode("unicode_escape", error="ignore|replace")`. If you are not using the "unicode_escape" encoding or an error handler your usage is not affected. To work-around this issue you may stop using the error= handler and instead wrap the bytes.decode() call in a try-except catching the DecodeError.
During an address list folding when a separating comma ends up on a folded line and that line is to be unicode-encoded then the separator itself is also unicode-encoded. Expected behavior is that the separating comma remains a plan comma. This can result in the address header being misinterpreted by some mail servers.
Comparez votre pile et les versions installées aux bases de vulnérabilités actuelles.