HID: asus: refactor the two workqueues and init sequence
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: asus: refactor the two workqueues and init sequence
Multiple issues have been found within the hid-asus driver:
- unchecked size in asus_raw_event()
- unclean teardown of asus_probe on failure
- possible use-after-free in asus_probe
- multiple workqueue used for jobs where one was enough
- sleeping calls in atomic context
- packets of incorrect size being sent to the keyboard controller
Join the two workqueues into one reusing the stopping mechanism
of the brightness workqueue, use the joined workqueue to also
move the asus_wmi_send_event() sleeping call away from ato
HID: logitech-hidpp: Fix FF device cleanup on init failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: logitech-hidpp: Fix FF device cleanup on init failure
hidpp_ff_init() creates the input force-feedback device with
input_ff_create(), then allocates the HID++ FF private data,
effect ID array, and workqueue.
If any of those allocations fail after input_ff_create() succeeds,
the function returns an error without destroying the FF device.
Add an unwind path that frees the private allocations made by
hidpp_ff_init() and calls input_ff_destroy() for failures after
input_ff_create() succeeds.
HID: synchronize input before cleaning up a failed probe
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: synchronize input before cleaning up a failed probe
hid_device_io_start() allows reports to run concurrently with probe. If
the probe subsequently fails, __hid_device_probe() releases driver
resources and clears hdev->driver without first excluding those report
callbacks.
For example, a report may enter hidraw_report_event() while the failure
path frees the associated hidraw object, leading to a use-after-free when
the report takes the object's list lock.
Stop input before performing failed-probe cleanup. This reacquires
driver_input_lock and waits for any report cal
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: steam: Reject short reads
Steam Controller FEATURE reports encode the size of the message in the
message itself. Previously we were trusting that the size reported matched
the size we actually read, leading to a potential issue with short reads.
Instead, we should actually verify the length of the read.
phonet: pep: do not write beyond optlen in getsockopt
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phonet: pep: do not write beyond optlen in getsockopt
pep_getsockopt() clamps the reported length to the caller's buffer with
min_t(), but then stores the value with put_user(val, (int __user *)
optval), which always writes sizeof(int) bytes. A getsockopt() call with
an optlen smaller than sizeof(int) thus reports the clamped length yet
writes a full int, one to three bytes past the user buffer.
Write the value with copy_to_user() bounded by len, so at most optlen
bytes are copied, matching the length reported back to userspace.
blk-cgroup: fix race between policy activation and blkg destruction
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-cgroup: fix race between policy activation and blkg destruction
When switching an IO scheduler on a block device, blkcg_activate_policy()
allocates blkg_policy_data (pd) for all blkgs attached to the queue.
However, blkcg_activate_policy() may race with concurrent blkcg deletion,
leading to use-after-free and memory leak issues.
The use-after-free occurs in the following race:
T1 (blkcg_activate_policy):
- Successfully allocates pd for blkg1 (loop0->queue, blkcgA)
- Fails to allocate pd for blkg2 (loop0->queue, blkcgB)
- Enters the enomem rollback path to releas
blk-cgroup: skip dying blkg in blkcg_activate_policy()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-cgroup: skip dying blkg in blkcg_activate_policy()
When switching IO schedulers on a block device, blkcg_activate_policy()
can race with concurrent blkcg deletion, leading to a use-after-free in
rcu_accelerate_cbs.
T1: T2:
blkg_destroy
kill(&blkg->refcnt) // blkg->refcnt=1->0
blkg_release // call_rcu(__blkg_release)
...
blkg_free_workfn
->
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: check import_ubuf() return value
import_ubuf() can fail if the address range (provided by the userspace
ublk server) is outside the allowed user address space. Return that 0
bytes were copied if import_ubuf() fails rather than passing an
uninitialized struct iov_iter to ublk_copy_user_pages().
ublk: validate auto buf reg before taking uring_cmd
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: validate auto buf reg before taking uring_cmd
With UBLK_F_AUTO_BUF_REG, invalid sqe->addr can fail after
ublk_fill_io_cmd() has set UBLK_IO_FLAG_ACTIVE. The uring_cmd is
completed while the tag stays active, which can hang teardown.
Split validation from buffer apply so the check has no side effects,
then take the uring_cmd and store the already-validated buffer. Apply
the same order in FETCH so io->buf is not written before __ublk_fetch()
state checks.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2/cluster: keep heartbeat local node stable
o2nm_node_local_store() handles local=0 by stopping o2net and setting
cl_local_node to O2NM_INVALID_NODE_NUM, but it leaves cl_has_local set.
That stale state makes o2nm_this_node() return 255, blocks a later local=1
attempt with -EBUSY, and can feed 255 to heartbeat users that call
o2nm_this_node() dynamically.
Clearing cl_has_local is required when the local node is reset. But
heartbeat threads can still be running at that point. They pin the local
node config item at startup, yet o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat() and thread
tear
ocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation
Patch series "ocfs2: validate xattr entry bounds", v7.
This series validates OCFS2 xattr entry name/value bounds when xattr
metadata is read and validated, before getxattr() or listxattr() can walk
out-of-range entry arrays or offsets from corrupted metadata.
This patch (of 2):
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() verifies a dinode before OCFS2 users walk
metadata from it, but inline xattr metadata is still checked only in
operation-specific consumers. The existing ibody lookup helper validates
inline header placement
ocfs2: validate external xattr entries when reading metadata
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate external xattr entries when reading metadata
ocfs2_validate_xattr_block() checks the xattr block header before the
block reaches higher-level xattr users, but it does not verify that a
non-indexed block's xh_count and entry offsets fit inside the block.
Indexed buckets likewise reach list/get consumers after ECC without an
entry-bounds check.
Use the flat xattr entry validator for non-indexed external xattr blocks,
and use a bucket-specific validator for indexed buckets at metadata read
time. The bucket validator keeps the entry array bounded by the first
rapidio: clear mport->net when rio_add_net() fails
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rapidio: clear mport->net when rio_add_net() fails
rio_alloc_net() stores the newly allocated rio_net in mport->net before
rio_scan_alloc_net() registers the device.
If rio_add_net() fails, rio_scan_alloc_net() drops the device reference
with put_device(), which releases the rio_net through the device release
callback. However, mport->net is left pointing at the freed object.
A later mport unregister path can then dereference the dangling mport->net
pointer and may try to free the same rio_net again.
Clear mport->net in the rio_add_net() failure path, matching the clean
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fat: release buffer head after rebuilding parent
fat_scan_logstart() leaves the matching directory entry's buffer head in
sinfo.bh for the caller to release, just like fat_scan().
fat_rebuild_parent() uses the directory entry to rebuild the parent inode
for the nostale_ro NFS export path, but does not release sinfo.bh after a
successful scan. Release it once fat_build_inode() has consumed the
directory entry data.
bpf: Invalidate RCU pointers after final spin unlock
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Invalidate RCU pointers after final spin unlock
In a sleepable BPF program, a spin lock can provide the only RCU protection
for a kptr. The final bpf_spin_unlock() ends that protection, but the
verifier leaves the pointer valid. Another CPU can then free the object
before the pointer is used. A capability-limited runtime PoC triggered a
task_struct use-after-free in __bpf_get_task_stack().
Record whether the program is in an RCU-protected context before releasing
the lock. Invalidate RCU-protected pointers only when the unlock leaves the
final such context. This prese
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/omap: dsi: Do not copy isr table
To be able to unregister stuff from isrs, the corresponding table was
copied. Nobody seems to unregister stuff that way, so it does not help.
But there are stack-allocated objects passed to these isrs giving chances
of UAF of these objects if irqs are unregistered while they are handled,
so better do not copy that table.
PCI/sysfs: Add lockdown checks to legacy I/O and memory handlers
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/sysfs: Add lockdown checks to legacy I/O and memory handlers
Currently, the legacy I/O and memory sysfs handlers do not check
security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS), leaving the legacy_io and
legacy_mem files unprotected when the kernel is locked down.
Commit eb627e17727e ("PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked
down") added the check to pci_write_config(), pci_mmap_resource(), and
pci_write_resource_io() to prevent userspace from programming DMA-capable
hardware that could be used to modify kernel code, but did not cover the
legacy handlers.
As a resu
remoteproc: fix OOB read via signed offset in rsc_table_for_each_entry()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
remoteproc: fix OOB read via signed offset in rsc_table_for_each_entry()
table->offset[i] is a u32 from firmware, but was stored into a signed
int. A crafted offset like 0xFFFFFFF0 becomes -16, placing hdr 16 bytes
before the table buffer. The subsequent avail check was bypassed
because the negative int was promoted to a large size_t in the
expression "table_sz - offset - sizeof(*hdr)", yielding a large positive
avail and letting the out-of-bounds hdr->type read proceed undetected.
Store the offset as u32 and validate it with unsigned comparisons before
any pointer arith
bpf, cgroup: Fix invalid storage access after __cgroup_bpf_attach failed
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, cgroup: Fix invalid storage access after __cgroup_bpf_attach failed
A potential invalid storage access issue can occur after replacing a
cgroup bpf prog.
This occurs in the following scenario:
1. prog1 with storage is attached to a cgroup in multi-attach mode.
2. prog1 is replaced with prog2 using BPF_F_REPLACE in multi-attach
mode, but fails midway (e.g. in bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim or
update_effective_progs).
3. A new prog3 is attached to the cgroup in multi-attach mode.
The reason is that __cgroup_bpf_attach overwrites pl->storage with the
new storage
bpf: Check load-acquire src ptr type before the load
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Check load-acquire src ptr type before the load
check_atomic_load() calls check_load_mem() before atomic_ptr_type_ok().
For a load-acquire that fetches into its own source register (dst_reg ==
src_reg), check_load_mem() overwrites src_reg's type with the type of the
loaded value, so the subsequent atomic_ptr_type_ok() no longer sees the
source pointer and fails to reject the disallowed types (ctx, pkt,
flow_keys, sock).
Since bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() does not rewrite atomic loads, the raw
access to the underlying kernel object is left in place. The destination
type