media: verisilicon: rockchip: reject AV1 frames exceeding the tile capacity
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: verisilicon: rockchip: reject AV1 frames exceeding the tile capacity
rockchip_vpu981_av1_dec_set_tile_info() indexes the tile group entry
array by tile1 * tile_cols + tile0, reading up to tile_cols * tile_rows
entries, lays out one descriptor per tile in the AV1_MAX_TILES tile_info
buffer, and programs the real tile_cols / tile_rows into the hardware.
The tile group entry control is a dynamic array sized to the number of
entries userspace submitted, independent of tile_cols / tile_rows, so a
frame that claims more tiles than entries reads past the array. A frame
tha
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: v4l2-ctrls: validate HEVC tile counts
The stateless HEVC decoders read num_tile_columns_minus1 + 1 entries from
column_width_minus1[] and num_tile_rows_minus1 + 1 from row_height_minus1[]
and use them as tile-loop bounds, but std_validate_compound() does not
bound these u8 counts. Reject a V4L2_CTRL_TYPE_HEVC_PPS with tiling
enabled whose tile counts exceed the uAPI array capacity, mirroring the
existing compound-control range checks.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: v4l2-ctrls: validate AV1 tile counts
The stateless AV1 decoders use tile_info.tile_cols and tile_rows as loop
bounds and as indices into the mi_*_starts[] and *_in_sbs_minus_1[]
arrays, as the divisor for context_update_tile_id, and their product
bounds the per-tile descriptor buffers, but std_validate_compound() does
not bound these u8 fields. Reject a V4L2_CTRL_TYPE_AV1_FRAME whose
tile_cols or tile_rows exceeds V4L2_AV1_MAX_TILE_COLS / _ROWS, or whose
product exceeds V4L2_AV1_MAX_TILE_COUNT. A zero tile count is left to the
consuming driver so the zero-initialised
bnxt_en: Handle buffer allocation failure in bnxt_rx_ring_reset()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Handle buffer allocation failure in bnxt_rx_ring_reset()
bnxt_rx_ring_reset() frees the ring buffers and then reallocates them,
ignoring the result.
bnxt_alloc_one_rx_ring() can fail in bnxt_alloc_one_tpa_info_data(), which
returns -ENOMEM on the first failed allocation and leaves the remaining
rxr->rx_tpa[] entries zeroed.
The error isn't propagated up, so the loop in bnxt_rx_ring_reset
continues and at the end the code re-enables TPA with partially
unallocated rx_tpa array.
This means that when the agg_id from hardware is mapped to a SW index in
rxr->rx_tpa[],
bnxt_en: Propagate RX ring init failures in bnxt_init_nic()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Propagate RX ring init failures in bnxt_init_nic()
bnxt_init_rx_rings() returns an error when bnxt_alloc_one_rx_ring()
fails, but bnxt_init_nic() discards that return value and calls
bnxt_init_chip(), which enables TPA.
If an allocation fails, this could leave rxr->rx_tpa[] partially zeroed
and TPA would be enabled over an array with zeroed entries. This would
lead to a zeroed DMA address being handed out if the agg_idx is
translated to a SW index at a zeroed entry.
Fix this by propagating the error out of bnxt_init_nic(). Both callers
already check its return va
mptcp: syncookies: remember the request backup flag
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: syncookies: remember the request backup flag
Instead of using an uninitialised bit when copying the info in
subflow_ulp_clone().
To fix this, no need to extend the join_entry structure: backup is
coming from struct mptcp_subflow_request_sock, only one bit. Do the same
here by using one bit for both.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: prevent race between disconnect() and rtx
Sashiko noted that the two event can race, leading to inconsistent
status. Prevent the race using the synchronous timer stop operation.
mptcp: pm: kernel: drop pending ADD_ADDR when removing ID0
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: pm: kernel: drop pending ADD_ADDR when removing ID0
The in-kernel MPTCP path manager can leave a stale ADD_ADDR announcement
entry alive when removing the id 0 endpoint. This happens because the id 0
removal path does not tear down pending announcements, unlike the non-zero
id path.
When the PM later reselects id 0 after adding another signal endpoint, it
finds the stale anno_list entry and hits WARN_ON_ONCE(mptcp_pm_is_kernel())
in mptcp_pm_announced_alloc().
Root cause: asymmetry between removal paths.
- Non-zero id path: mptcp_nl_remove_subflow_and_signal_addr()
smb: client: reject short READ responses in CIFSSMBRead()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: reject short READ responses in CIFSSMBRead()
CIFSSMBRead() reads DataLengthHigh, DataLength and DataOffset out of
the READ_RSP returned by the server without first checking that a
whole READ_RSP was actually received. The length of the response is
recorded in rsp_iov.iov_len, but nothing constrains it to be at least
read_rsp_size before those fields are dereferenced.
A malicious or compromised SMB1 server can return a response shorter
than the READ_RSP header, so that parsing the header itself reads past
the end of the receive buffer. SMB1 is not negotiated by
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: reject userspace cifs.idmap descriptions
cifs.idmap key descriptions carry authority-bearing fields (owner and
group SIDs and uid/gid values in "os:"/"gs:"/"oi:"/"gi:" form) that the
cifs.idmap upcall helper treats as kernel-originating inputs. Unlike
its sibling cifs.spnego, the cifs.idmap key type has no vet_description
hook, so userspace can create keys of this type through
request_key(2)/add_key(2) and supply those fields without CIFS origin.
A request_key(2) call with a non-NULL callout then drives a root
usermodehelper upcall (/sbin/request-key -> cifs.i
smb: client: reject out-of-bounds DataOffset in CIFSSMBRead()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: reject out-of-bounds DataOffset in CIFSSMBRead()
The SMB1 synchronous read helper CIFSSMBRead() validates the server's
DataLength against CIFSMaxBufSize and the caller's count, but never
validates DataOffset. The copy source is formed as
&pSMBr->hdr.Protocol + le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->DataOffset)
and memcpy()'d for DataLength bytes with no check that the
[DataOffset, DataOffset + DataLength) range lies within the response
actually received from the server.
A malicious or compromised SMB1 server can return a response carrying
an in-range DataLength and a large Dat
smb: client: pin DFS superblock in iterator callback
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: pin DFS superblock in iterator callback
tcon_super_cb() stores a raw superblock pointer, but __cifs_get_super()
takes its active reference only after iterate_supers_type() has dropped
s_umount and its passive reference. Concurrent DFS automount expiry can
therefore free the superblock before cifs_sb_active() uses it.
A deterministic KASAN test reproduces the race as:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cifs_sb_active+0x77/0x80
The same test passes with this change applied.
Take the active reference in the callback while iterate_supers_type()
still holds s_
smb: client: honor forceuid/forcegid when mapping SIDs to uid/gid
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: honor forceuid/forcegid when mapping SIDs to uid/gid
When the administrator mounts with forceuid or forcegid (uid=/gid=
mount options), they expect all files to appear owned by the specified
user/group. However, several code paths unconditionally called
sid_to_id() to overwrite cf_uid/cf_gid with server-provided values,
ignoring the administrator's explicit override:
- smb311_posix_info_to_fattr() (stat via POSIX extensions)
- cifs_posix_to_fattr() (readdir via POSIX extensions)
- parse_sec_desc() (CIFS ACL ownership mapping)
This allowed an untrusted
smb: client: fix one-byte OOB read in smb2_parse_native_symlink()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix one-byte OOB read in smb2_parse_native_symlink()
When parsing a share-root relative native symlink, memcpy copies
smb_target+1 (skipping the leading separator) but uses
strlen(smb_target)+1 as the length, reading one byte past the
allocated buffer.
This fixes the following KASAN splat when accessing an SMB symlink
with a target of '\a\b':
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smb2_parse_native_symlink+0x4f5/0xca0
Read of size 5 at addr ffff88800878fe21 by task netfsfuzz-execu/1
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: netfsfuzz-execu Tainted: G N
7.2.0-11943-g2709d
smb: client: fail DACL rewrite when the new DACL exceeds 64K
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fail DACL rewrite when the new DACL exceeds 64K
replace_sids_and_copy_aces() and set_chmod_dacl() accumulate the size of
the DACL they build in a u16. That accumulator can wrap.
validate_dacl() caps num_aces at (dacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) /
20, i.e. 3276 for a maximally sized DACL, while each rewritten ACE can
grow to sizeof(struct smb_ace) (76 bytes) once its SID is replaced with
one carrying SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES sub-authorities. The worst case is
therefore sizeof(struct smb_acl) + 3276 * 76 = 248984 bytes, far beyond
what a u16 can hold. A wrapar
smb: client: fix cifsFileInfo reference leak in deferred close
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix cifsFileInfo reference leak in deferred close
When cifs_close() defers a close, it hands the cifsFileInfo reference
of the closing struct file to the queued work. Each execution of
smb2_deferred_work_close() drops one such reference.
deferred_close_scheduled can be false while the work is pending: the
workqueue clears PENDING when the callback starts to run, before the
callback clears the flag under deferred_lock. A close in that
interval requeues the running work, and the callback then clears the
flag, leaving the requeued work pending with the flag down.
smb: client: avoid leaking refcount in cifs_queue_oplock_break()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: avoid leaking refcount in cifs_queue_oplock_break()
cifs_queue_oplock_break() unconditionally takes a reference on the
target file before queueing cifs_oplock_break(). Only that work item
decreases the reference counter again.
If another oplock break arrives while that work is still queued,
queue_work() will return false and not queue this second work item. As a
result, we will never reach the point to drop the file reference again
and are leaking this reference. This can be triggered when interacting
with a slow-responding server.
As a result, later unmount
smb: client: avoid leaking refcount when cifs_sb_tlink() fails
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: avoid leaking refcount when cifs_sb_tlink() fails
cifs_oplock_break() takes over the reference that
cifs_queue_oplock_break() acquired when it queued the work, and drops it
with _cifsFileInfo_put() once the break has been processed.
Only in setups with "-o multiuser", cifs_sb_tlink() may fail, at which
point cifs_oplock_break() returns without putting the file reference,
mirroring the reference leak we already fixed in the companion patch to
cifs_queue_oplock_break().
This would trigger a crash due to busy inodes on the next unmount:
BUG: Dentry ... still
smb: client: fix heap overflow in DACL owner/group rewrite
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix heap overflow in DACL owner/group rewrite
When id_mode_to_cifs_acl rewrites an existing DACL, it allocates a
buffer sized according to the on-disk DACL length reported by
dacl_ptr->size. However, replace_sids_and_copy_aces may rewrite each
ACE with a new owner/group SID obtained from the cifs.idmap upcall.
Those SIDs can have up to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15) sub-authorities,
making each ACE up to 76 bytes (sizeof(struct smb_ace)).
If the original DACL contains short SIDs (e.g., 1 sub-authority) while
the replacement SIDs are long, the rewritten ACEs over
smb: client: avoid using uninitialized SIDs in cifs_posix_to_fattr()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: avoid using uninitialized SIDs in cifs_posix_to_fattr()
cifs_posix_to_fattr() ignores the return value of posix_info_parse().
When a malformed POSIX directory entry is encountered (e.g. invalid
SID lengths from an untrusted server), posix_info_parse() returns -1
without populating the 'parsed' struct. The uninitialized stack
memory in parsed.owner and parsed.group is then passed to
sid_to_id(), which processes the garbage bytes and passes them to
request_key() to construct a SID string, potentially leaking kernel
stack contents to the userspace idmap daemon.