wifi: mt76: mt7921: Add PCIe AER handler support to prevent system crash
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7921: Add PCIe AER handler support to prevent system crash
When an AER error occurs and the bus is hung, the register reads return
0xFFFFFFFF, causing the DMA queue state to be corrupted and resulting in
an invalid memory access when accessing q->desc[] or q->entry[].
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address
ffffffc01099eac0
pc : mt76_dma_add_buf+0x124/0x188 [mt76]
lr : mt76_dma_rx_fill+0x11c/0x1d8 [mt76]
sp : ffffffc016d9bbf0
x29: ffffffc016d9bc10 x28: 0000000000000000
x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffffffb7855e50b8
x25: ffffffb80d04f000 x24: 00
wifi: mt76: mt7996: hold dev->mt76.mutex while disabling tx worker in SER
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: hold dev->mt76.mutex while disabling tx worker in SER
mt7996_mac_reset_work() parked the tx worker and disabled the RX/TX NAPIs
before taking dev->mt76.mutex. mt76_worker_disable()/_enable() are plain
kthread park/unpark, not refcounted, and __mt76_set_channel() toggles the
same worker and the MT76_RESET bit under the mutex. An L1 SER racing a
channel switch could therefore have the worker unparked and MT76_RESET
cleared while the reset path resets the DMA rings, corrupting descriptors
or tokens. Take the mutex before disabling the worker, as mt7915 does
wifi: mt76: cancel reset and rc work on device unregister
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: cancel reset and rc work on device unregister
Both drivers cancelled dump_work on unregister but left reset_work and
rc_work to be flushed only by destroy_workqueue() in mt76_free_device(),
which runs after the hw is unregistered and the hardware stopped. A
reset_work that fires in that window calls ieee80211_restart_hw() and
re-arms mac_work on an unregistered hw, and rc_work touches station state
being torn down. Cancel both up front, alongside dump_work.
drm/msm: don't tear down KMS twice when KMS init fails
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm: don't tear down KMS twice when KMS init fails
When priv->kms_init() (mdp4_kms_init() / mdp5_kms_init()) fails partway
through, both display drivers already tear their KMS state down via
mdp4_destroy() / mdp5_kms_destroy() before returning the error. The
common error path in msm_drm_init() then runs msm_drm_uninit() ->
msm_drm_kms_uninit(), which tries to destroy the very same KMS a second
time, which causes a use-after-free crash.
Bring MDP4/MDP5 in line with the DPU driver whose dpu_kms_init() doesn't
perform error cleanup on the failure. Let the common path own
bpf: Reject >8 byte return values on return-reading trampoline paths
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject >8 byte return values on return-reading trampoline paths
btf_distill_func_proto() builds the function model used for the
fentry/fexit/fmod_ret/fsession trampolines and struct_ops. It has
accepted a 16-byte __int128 return value since the trampoline was
introduced: __get_type_size() returns the integer's type size, and the
return-type check only rejected ret < 0.
But the BPF trampoline preserves only 8 bytes of the return value (RAX on
x86, i.e. R0). For an attach type that reads the target's return value the
second half (RDX / R3) is neither saved nor restored,
wifi: mt76: mt7996: do not attach hif2 WED when the main WED attach failed
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: do not attach hif2 WED when the main WED attach failed
If the WED attach for the primary PCIe function fails, the probe path
still attached wed_hif2 for the secondary function, leaving the device
in an inconsistent half-WED configuration that crashes later. The hif2
call also re-enabled hwrro_mode, which the failed primary attach had
just turned off.
Skip the hif2 WED setup when the primary WED device is not active.
arm64: ptrace: Keep 'orig_x0' in-sync with x0 on syscall entry
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: ptrace: Keep 'orig_x0' in-sync with x0 on syscall entry
Commit e057b9477232 ("arm64: syscall: Ensure saved x0 is kept in-sync
with tracer updates") attempted to resolve a long-standing issue with
syscall entry tracing, where a tracer is able to manipulate the first
syscall argument without being subjected to seccomp or audit checking.
Unfortunately, that fix was incomplete [1], as it failed to update
'orig_x0' between a tracer updating x0 during a seccomp ptrace exit
(SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) and the seccomp filter being re-evaluated.
Rather than add hooks to the core se
wifi: nl80211: clean up color-change beacon data on errors
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: nl80211: clean up color-change beacon data on errors
nl80211_color_change() calls nl80211_parse_beacon() for the beacon_next
template, which can allocate params.beacon_next.mbssid_ies and .rnr_ies.
A parsing failure returned directly instead of using the out: cleanup,
leaking any allocations completed before the error.
Allocate the nested attribute table before parsing beacon_next. Its
allocation failure can then return before beacon data exists, while a
later parsing failure uses out: to release the parsed data.
wifi: brcmfmac: fix P2P action frame handling without device vif
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: fix P2P action frame handling without device vif
Some P2P action frame paths assume the P2P device vif is always
available. That is not true when userspace sends non-P2P public action
frames through the primary interface, or when action-frame abort runs
after the P2P device vif has not been created.
Fall back to the primary vif when aborting an action frame without a P2P
device vif, and guard P2P device saved IE access before using it for
peer channel search.
wifi: cfg80211: stop PMSR before P2P and NAN teardown
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: stop PMSR before P2P and NAN teardown
PMSR request teardown must abort active measurements while the
wireless_dev is still present in the driver. cfg80211_leave_locked() and
cfg80211_stop_pd() already do this before invoking the driver's stop
callback, but cfg80211_stop_p2p_device() and cfg80211_stop_nan() do not.
Those helpers are also called directly by nl80211, rfkill shutdown, and
wireless_dev unregister paths. If one of these paths stops a P2P device
or NAN interface with a pending request, it removes the mac80211
subinterface from the driver first. Su
serial: core: do fallible allocations before the console can be registered
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: core: do fallible allocations before the console can be registered
serial_core_add_one_port() allocates uport->tty_groups after
uart_configure_port(), which may register the console. If the allocation
fails, the driver unwinds the port while its console remains registered.
The earlier uport->name allocation has a related failure path that leaves
state->uart_port linked to a port being freed.
Failslab reproduced a NULL dereference in PL011 console output and a KASAN
use-after-free in i.MX console output after failed binds.
Allocate the name and tty_groups before li
serial: core: clear freed pointers on uart_register_driver() failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: core: clear freed pointers on uart_register_driver() failure
uart_register_driver() leaves drv->state pointing to freed memory when
tty_alloc_driver() fails. If tty_register_driver() fails, drv->tty_driver
also retains a pointer after its reference is dropped.
Drivers that use drv->state as an "already registered" flag can then skip
registration on the next probe and pass the freed state to
uart_add_one_port().
This issue was found with failslab on QEMU's raspi1ap board by
failing registration and binding the PL011 port again.
Clear both pointers on their failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: skip cdev_del() when no cdev is registered
TTY device registration can fail before a cdev is allocated.
Serial core keeps the port so setserial can still use it, and later
removal passes the NULL cdev slot to cdev_del(), causing a NULL-pointer
dereference.
Only delete the cdev when the slot is not NULL.
dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard filler with a keyed sector marker
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard filler with a keyed sector marker
The discard-block check in dm_integrity_rw_tag() treats a stored tag
of all 0xf6 bytes (DISCARD_FILLER) as proof a block was discarded and
skips HMAC verification. allow_discards is only accepted in
dm-integrity's standalone mode. An attacker with raw write access to
the backing device, but without the integrity key, can stamp any block
with an all-0xf6 tag and have it served as authentic.
Add a new "allow_discards_keyed" target argument that marks discarded
blocks with a keyed checksum of (salt || s
HID: logitech-hidpp: Fix FF device cleanup on init failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: logitech-hidpp: Fix FF device cleanup on init failure
hidpp_ff_init() creates the input force-feedback device with
input_ff_create(), then allocates the HID++ FF private data,
effect ID array, and workqueue.
If any of those allocations fail after input_ff_create() succeeds,
the function returns an error without destroying the FF device.
Add an unwind path that frees the private allocations made by
hidpp_ff_init() and calls input_ff_destroy() for failures after
input_ff_create() succeeds.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: steam: Reject short reads
Steam Controller FEATURE reports encode the size of the message in the
message itself. Previously we were trusting that the size reported matched
the size we actually read, leading to a potential issue with short reads.
Instead, we should actually verify the length of the read.
blk-cgroup: fix race between policy activation and blkg destruction
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-cgroup: fix race between policy activation and blkg destruction
When switching an IO scheduler on a block device, blkcg_activate_policy()
allocates blkg_policy_data (pd) for all blkgs attached to the queue.
However, blkcg_activate_policy() may race with concurrent blkcg deletion,
leading to use-after-free and memory leak issues.
The use-after-free occurs in the following race:
T1 (blkcg_activate_policy):
- Successfully allocates pd for blkg1 (loop0->queue, blkcgA)
- Fails to allocate pd for blkg2 (loop0->queue, blkcgB)
- Enters the enomem rollback path to releas
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: check import_ubuf() return value
import_ubuf() can fail if the address range (provided by the userspace
ublk server) is outside the allowed user address space. Return that 0
bytes were copied if import_ubuf() fails rather than passing an
uninitialized struct iov_iter to ublk_copy_user_pages().
ocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation
Patch series "ocfs2: validate xattr entry bounds", v7.
This series validates OCFS2 xattr entry name/value bounds when xattr
metadata is read and validated, before getxattr() or listxattr() can walk
out-of-range entry arrays or offsets from corrupted metadata.
This patch (of 2):
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() verifies a dinode before OCFS2 users walk
metadata from it, but inline xattr metadata is still checked only in
operation-specific consumers. The existing ibody lookup helper validates
inline header placement
ocfs2: validate external xattr entries when reading metadata
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate external xattr entries when reading metadata
ocfs2_validate_xattr_block() checks the xattr block header before the
block reaches higher-level xattr users, but it does not verify that a
non-indexed block's xh_count and entry offsets fit inside the block.
Indexed buckets likewise reach list/get consumers after ECC without an
entry-bounds check.
Use the flat xattr entry validator for non-indexed external xattr blocks,
and use a bucket-specific validator for indexed buckets at metadata read
time. The bucket validator keeps the entry array bounded by the first