firmware: arm_scmi: Reject out of range DT protocol IDs
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Reject out of range DT protocol IDs
SCMI protocol IDs carried in message headers are limited by
MSG_PROTOCOL_ID_MASK. The DT parsing paths noticed protocol IDs
outside that range, but only logged an error and then kept processing
the invalid value.
That lets a malformed 32-bit DT reg value reach helpers which take a u8
protocol ID, where it can be truncated and/or treated as a different
protocol.
For channel setup, two different out-of-range values can also be used as
distinct IDR keys while aliasing the generated SCMI protocol identity.
Skip DT proto
firmware: arm_scmi: Drop handle on protocol bind failures
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Drop handle on protocol bind failures
The SCMI bus notifier acquires an SCMI handle when the driver core emits
BUS_NOTIFY_BIND_DRIVER, before invoking the protocol driver probe
callback. The protocol probe path only checks whether sdev->handle is
set.
If device_link_add() fails after the handle has been acquired, the
protocol device can still bind with a valid handle but without the
dependency link to the SCMI parent. A concurrent parent unbind can then
miss the child and tear down the SCMI instance while the child still
holds a handle into it.
If the
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Unwind TX receiver mailbox setup failure
mailbox_chan_setup() can request an additional unidirectional TX
receiver channel after successfully acquiring the primary channel. If
that second request fails, the function returns immediately and leaves
the primary channel allocated.
Unwind the primary mailbox channel before returning the error so probe
deferral or other setup failures do not leave the channel busy for later
probe attempts.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Unwind P2A receiver mailbox setup failure
mailbox_chan_setup() can request an additional P2A receiver channel after
successfully acquiring the primary P2A channel. If that later request
fails, the function returns immediately and leaves the primary channel
allocated.
Unwind the primary mailbox channel before returning the error so probe
deferral or other setup failures do not leave the channel busy for later
probe attempts.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix SCMI device destroy lifetimes
scmi_child_dev_find() drops the reference returned by
device_find_child() before returning the scmi_device pointer. A
concurrent unregister can then release the device while the destroy path
is still using the returned pointer.
Make the lookup helper return the device_find_child() reference and keep
it until scmi_device_destroy() has finished unregistering the child.
Also split device_unregister() in __scmi_device_destroy() so the SCMI bus
ID is not made reusable until after device_del() has removed the old
scmi_dev.N
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix transport device teardown lookup
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix transport device teardown lookup
SCMI transport devices are deliberately excluded from normal SCMI bus
matching so protocol drivers cannot bind to the internal transport
children. However, scmi_device_destroy() uses the same protocol/name
lookup to find devices that must be unregistered during channel teardown.
Split the match helper so driver matching still skips transport devices,
while explicit child lookup can find them for teardown. Use a shared
transport-device name prefix macro for both matching and name generation.
Since transport-device na
cxl/features: Reject Get Feature count larger than the output buffer
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/features: Reject Get Feature count larger than the output buffer
cxlctl_get_feature() sizes its output buffer from the user's
fwctl_rpc.out_len, but the device is told to write
cxl_mbox_get_feat_in.count bytes into rpc_out->payload, which is a
separate user-controlled value. Nothing bounds count against out_len, so
a small out_len with a large count overflows the kvzalloc()'d buffer.
A heap OOB write reachable from FWCTL_RPC.
Reject requests where count exceeds the available payload room, before
allocating.
cxl/features: Reject Set Features output buffer smaller than the header
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/features: Reject Set Features output buffer smaller than the header
cxlctl_set_feature() sizes its output buffer from the user's
fwctl_rpc.out_len but never checks it is large enough to hold even the
fwctl_rpc_cxl_out header. With out_len == 0 , kvzalloc() returns
ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the !rpc_out check, the subsequent
rpc_out->size = 0 then writes through the poison pointer.
Reject requests whose output buffer can't hold the response header,
before allocating. The Set Feature reply carries no payload, so the
header is all that is required.
cxl/features: Clamp Get Feature output size to the remaining buffer
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/features: Clamp Get Feature output size to the remaining buffer
cxl_get_feature() reads a feature in a loop but passes a fixed size_out
as the output capacity every iteration. On the last partial iteration
the buffer has less room left, so a device that returns more than asked
can overflow feat_out.
Use the per-iter size data_to_rd_size, which already tracks the
remaining room, as the output capacity.
dax: read holder_ops once in dax_holder_notify_failure()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dax: read holder_ops once in dax_holder_notify_failure()
dax_holder_notify_failure() reads dax_dev->holder_ops twice without
READ_ONCE() -- once for the NULL check and once for the indirect
notify_failure() call. A concurrent fs_put_dax() can clear holder_ops
between the two reads, so the check can observe a non-NULL pointer while
the call dereferences NULL. (kill_dax() also clears holder_ops, but only
after synchronize_srcu(), so it cannot race a reader that is inside
dax_read_lock(); fs_put_dax() does no such synchronization.)
Fetch holder_ops once into a local with READ
irqchip/renesas-irqc: Fix generic interrupt chip leak on remove
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irqchip/renesas-irqc: Fix generic interrupt chip leak on remove
The driver allocates domain generic chips probe. However, on driver
removal, the generic chips are not automatically freed when the interrupt
domain is removed because the domain flags do not include
IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_DESTROY_GC.
This causes both the domain generic chips structure and the associated
generic chips to be leaked. Additionally, the generic chips remain on the
global list and may later be accessed by generic interrupt chip suspend,
resume, or shutdown callbacks after the driver has been removed,
pote
media: bcm2835-unicam: Fix asc leaked in error/remove path
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: bcm2835-unicam: Fix asc leaked in error/remove path
v4l2_async_nf_add_fwnode_remote() allocates the asc, which is freed when
v4l2_async_nf_cleanup() is called.
Call v4l2_async_nf_cleanup() properly in the driver paths.
Discovered with kmemleak after rmmod:
unreferenced object 0xffff000084526b80 (size 64):
comm "modprobe", pid 185, jiffies 4295013512
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e8 0d ff bf 00 00 ff ff ................
40 83 bc 84 00 00 ff ff 60 83 bc 84 00 00 ff ff @.......`.......
backtrace (crc ac584083):
[<00000000ffb08
media: ipu6: Do not free aux device pdata after init
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: ipu6: Do not free aux device pdata after init
ipu6_bus_initialize_device() stores the isys/psys pdata pointer in
struct ipu6_bus_device and initializes the auxiliary device. After that
point, error unwinding must drop the auxiliary device reference and let
ipu6_bus_release() free both the bus device and adev->pdata.
The isys and psys init paths already call put_device() when MMU
initialization fails, and ipu6_bus_add_device() calls
auxiliary_device_uninit() on auxiliary_device_add() failure. Both paths
therefore run the bus release callback. The extra kfree(pdata) i
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
OPP: Fix cleanup ordering
Commit 173e02d67494 ("OPP: Initialize scope-based pointers inline")
added initialization for all pointers. In some cases, the ordering was
changed so that *opp_table was initialized after *opp. This also changes
the order of the registered cleanup functions.
When the cleanup happens, this can cause use-after-free errors when the
last reference is released and the release function _opp_kref_release
tries to access the already freed opp->opp_table.
Initialize *opp_table before *opp again to fix this and ensure the
correct cleanup order.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix DM I2C teardown race
DM I2C adapters can remain visible to userspace while DM teardown is
already in progress. A concurrent i2c-dev transfer may then enter
amdgpu_dm_i2c_xfer() after the backing DM state has been torn down,
leading to a NULL pointer dereference.
Create a devres group around the DM I2C adapter lifetime and release it
at the start of dm_hw_fini(), before HPD, IRQ, and DM state are torn
down. This removes the I2C adapters first and waits for in-flight users
to drain before the structures used by amdgpu_dm_i2c_xfer() disappear.
This fixes
drm/bridge: tc358767: clamp the reported AUX read size to the request
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/bridge: tc358767: clamp the reported AUX read size to the request
tc_aux_transfer() clamps an AUX read to the payload limit:
size_t size = min_t(size_t, DP_AUX_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES - 1, msg->size);
After the transfer it replaces size with the byte count the controller
reports in AUX_BYTES:
if (size)
size = FIELD_GET(AUX_BYTES, auxstatus);
AUX_BYTES is GENMASK(15, 8), so it can be up to 255. Nothing clamps it
back to the request. tc_aux_read_data() reads that many bytes into the
16-byte auxrdata stack buffer, then copies them into the caller buffer. A
reported count
x86/mm/pat: Take cpa_lock around large-page collapse
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mm/pat: Take cpa_lock around large-page collapse
Loading and unloading modules concurrently on several CPUs on a KASAN
build, with a short delay injected at the CPA page-table lookup to
widen the window, faults within minutes:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __change_page_attr+0x7cc/0x7e0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888181139718 by task modprobe
...
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
pfn:0x181139 ... page_type: f2(table)
cpa_collapse_large_pages() rebuilds a leaf PMD from its 4K PTEs and
frees the old PTE-table pages, while __change_page_attr() f
wifi: iwlwifi: fix counter type in iwl_fwrt_dump_error_logs
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: fix counter type in iwl_fwrt_dump_error_logs
The loop counter 'count' was declared as u8 while num_pc is u32.
If firmware advertises more than 255 PC entries the counter wraps
back to zero and the loop never terminates potentially causing an
infinite loop or reading past the allocated pc_data array.
Change the declaration to u32 to match num_pc.
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix off-by-one in TXF key sanitiser
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix off-by-one in TXF key sanitiser
iwl_mvm_frob_txf_key_iter() tracks the last matched byte position
in loop variable 'i'. When a full key match is found (match ==
keylen), 'i' points at the last byte of the matched key. The
memset start offset should therefore be i + 1 - keylen, not
i - keylen; the current code zeroes one byte before the match
and leaves the final key byte un-sanitised.
wifi: iwlwifi: mei: check SAP message length before reading it
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mei: check SAP message length before reading it
Verify the SAP message size is not larger than the local buffer before
reading the message to avoid buffer overflow.