inetpeer: randomize RB-tree node comparison using SipHash
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inetpeer: randomize RB-tree node comparison using SipHash
The inetpeer rate limiting system stores peer entries in a Red-Black tree
keyed deterministically on the remote IP address. Because tree lookups walk
the RB-tree using standard lexicographical comparisons (inetpeer_addr_cmp),
an off-path adversary can predict the exact topology of the tree and the
sequence of nodes traversed during lookups (the gc_stack candidate list).
By combining deterministic tree traversal with aggressive garbage collection
(triggered when tree size exceeds inet_peer_threshold), an attacker can
net: sched: fix 32-bit backlog wrap in gred, bfifo and plug enqueue
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: fix 32-bit backlog wrap in gred, bfifo and plug enqueue
gred_enqueue(), bfifo_enqueue() and plug_enqueue() admit a packet when the
current backlog plus the packet length fits within the queue limit:
sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (gred default VQ)
gred_backlog+qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= q->limit (gred configured VQ)
sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (bfifo)
sch->qstats.backlog + skb->len <= q->limit (plug)
sch->qstats.backlog and q->backlog are u32, and qdisc_pkt_len()/skb->len
are unsigned int, so a
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: arp/nd proxy: fix reading neigh ha
Currently neigh ha address is read directly, but that can result in
torn/partial reads if the neigh is being updated. Use neigh_ha_snapshot
to take a stable snapshot of the address.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: fix reading neigh ha
Currently arp/neigh_reduce read neigh ha directly which can lead to
partial reads while the neigh is being updated. Use neigh_ha_snapshot to
take a stable snapshot of the address similar to route_shortcircuit which
already does the right thing.
NFSv4.1: zero referring call lists before decoding
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4.1: zero referring call lists before decoding
decode_cb_sequence_args() allocates csa_rclists with kmalloc_objs(), so
each referring_call_list starts uninitialized. decode_rc_list() assigns
rcl_refcalls only when rcl_nrefcalls is nonzero. A valid list with zero
referring calls therefore leaves the pointer uninitialized, and
nfs4_callback_sequence() later passes stale slab contents to kfree().
Allocate csa_rclists with kzalloc_objs() so every rcl_refcalls member is
NULL from the beginning, including valid empty referring call lists.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4.2: fix LAYOUTSTATS send buffer exhaustion
encode_layoutstats_maxsz budgets XDR_QUADLEN(PNFS_LAYOUTSTATS_MAXSIZE),
i.e. 256 bytes, for the layoutupdate4 body written by the layout driver.
The flexfiles record can exceed that.
ff_layout_encode_ff_layoutupdate() emits, per data server, a netaddr4,
an nfs_fh4, two ff_io_latency4, an nfstime4 and a bool. A data server
whose filehandle is NFS_MAXFHSIZE bytes long already accounts for 132 of
those bytes, and the two ff_io_latency4 at 64 bytes each, the nfstime4
and the bool add a further 144, so the body passes 256 bytes b
NFSv4/pnfs: key the data server cache on the NFS version
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4/pnfs: key the data server cache on the NFS version
nfs4_pnfs_ds_add() keys the per-net data server cache on the multipath
address set alone, and struct nfs4_pnfs_ds records no version. That
suffices for the files layout driver, which always connects with version
4, but flexfiles takes its version tuple from GETDEVICEINFO per device,
and one address can legitimately serve both NFSv3 and NFSv4.
Two deviceids on one address with different ds_versions[0].version
therefore share a single nfs4_pnfs_ds, and whichever mirror connects
first pins ds_clp to its own version. The
net/sched: account classifier filter allocations to memcg
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: account classifier filter allocations to memcg
Allocations in the tc classifier *_change() paths (filter objects,
per-CPU counters, and per-filter aux data) use plain GFP_KERNEL without
__GFP_ACCOUNT, allowing unprivileged users to pin kernel memory outside
memcg charging. The shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array allocation in
cls_api.c was also uncharged; this patch closes it along with the
per-classifier filter-object/percpu/aux allocations that remain
unaccounted.
Add GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT to:
- the shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array (cls_api.c), common to
Bluetooth: btmtksdio: Fix out-of-bounds DMA read in the TX path
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btmtksdio: Fix out-of-bounds DMA read in the TX path
btmtksdio_tx_packet() rounds the transfer size up to the SDIO block size
of 256 bytes, but hands the host controller the SKB buffer as is:
err = sdio_writesb(bdev->func, MTK_REG_CTDR, skb->data,
round_up(skb->len, MTK_SDIO_BLOCK_SIZE));
Only skb->len bytes hold packet data, so the controller reads up to 255
bytes of uninitialised memory and sends it to the device over the SDIO
bus. Depending on how much tailroom slack the SKB allocation happens to
carry, that read can also extend past the end of the bu
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Validate MTU in rfcomm_apply_pn() to prevent infinite loop
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Validate MTU in rfcomm_apply_pn() to prevent infinite loop
rfcomm_apply_pn() accepts the MTU value from a remote PN (Parameter
Negotiation) frame without checking for zero. When the remote peer
sends an MTU of zero, d->mtu is set to 0. This causes the sendmsg
path to enter an infinite loop when fragmenting data, as each fragment
has size == min_t(size_t, len, 0) == 0, so the remaining length never
decreases. The infinite allocation of zero-length skbs exhausts all
system memory.
Fix by clamping d->mtu to RFCOMM_DEFAULT_MTU when the negotiated
value is ze
net/sched: act_ife: Only operate on Ethernet frames
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ife: Only operate on Ethernet frames
act_ife encapsulates/decapsulates the original Ethernet header and uses
skb->dev->hard_header_len as the length of that header. That is only
correct for Ethernet devices: on a device where hard_header_len does not
match the L2 header that was actually pulled (PPP reports PPP_HDRLEN
while nothing is stripped on ingress), the ingress skb_push()/skb_pull()
use the wrong length and can hit skb_under_panic when headroom is tight.
IFE is Ethernet-only by design - it builds an outer ethhdr, rewrites
h_source/h_dest/h_proto, and
net/rds: use wq_has_sleeper() in rds_cong_map_updated()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: use wq_has_sleeper() in rds_cong_map_updated()
rds_cong_map_updated() runs after a peer's congestion map has been
rewritten (by rds_tcp_cong_recv() and rds_ib_cong_recv(), or the
clear-all in the loopback and IB send-completion paths). It bumps
rds_cong_generation and then checks waitqueue_active() on
map->m_waitq and on rds_poll_waitq to decide whether anyone needs
waking. atomic_inc() carries no ordering and waitqueue_active() is a
plain load, so nothing orders the map and generation stores before
the wait queue reads. The waiters do the mirror image: rds_cong
net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum
fq_init() computes quantum = 2 * psched_mtu() and initial_quantum = 10 *
psched_mtu() with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy
with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return
0x80000000; the 2 * and 10 * multiplications wrap to 0 in 32-bit
arithmetic, so q->quantum == 0. Then in fq_dequeue() the credit-refill
loop adds 0 to f->credit (which stays <= 0) and goto begin loops
forever under the qdisc lock, creating a soft lockup.
Clamp psched_mtu() to [1, 1 << 20] before
net/sched: fq_codel: clamp default quantum and mtu
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fq_codel: clamp default quantum and mtu
fq_codel_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) without
clamping. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0
accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, which
overflows the signed flow->deficit to INT_MIN in fq_codel_dequeue(),
causing an infinite loop and soft lockup. Emulate fq_codel_change()
and constrain to [256, FQ_CODEL_QUANTUM_MAX].
The same unclamped psched_mtu() is assigned to q->cparams.mtu a bit
below, and fq_codel_change() never updates it. codel_should_drop()
tests
net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum before hhf_change() to avoid overflow
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum before hhf_change() to avoid overflow
hhf_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) with no overflow
check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting
MTU 2147483634) makes weight * quantum overflow the signed deficit in
hhf_dequeue(), spinning forever.
Clamp q->quantum before hhf_change() so both the opt and !opt paths see
a sane quantum. Without this, bare "tc qdisc add ... hhf" succeeds with
a clamped quantum but "tc qdisc add ... hhf limit 1000" (any option
present) fails with -EINVAL because hhf_change() re
net/sched: sfq: clamp quantum to avoid signed overflow soft lockup
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sfq: clamp quantum to avoid signed overflow soft lockup
sfq_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) (unsigned). A
device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU
2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, so slot->allot = INT_MIN
and INT_MIN + INT_MIN toggles between INT_MIN and 0 forever, spinning
sfq_dequeue() under the qdisc lock.
Clamp the quantum to [256, 1 << 20] so the refill loop terminates. The
lower bound also covers q->quantum == 0 (psched_mtu() returning 0),
which spins sfq_dequeue() identically. sfq_change() alr
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm: st33zp24: Return zero on status read failure
st33zp24_status() ignores the result of the transport read and returns
data even when no byte was received. The I2C transport, for example,
skips i2c_master_recv() when the register-select write is short or fails,
leaving data uninitialized. The resulting stack value can be interpreted
as TPM_STS flags and let status checks complete spuriously.
The status callback cannot propagate a transport error. Return zero
unless recv() reports exactly one byte. With no status bits set, callers
retry or take their existing timeout or e
ASoC: dapm: Fix off-by-one check on the second enum channel
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: dapm: Fix off-by-one check on the second enum channel
The snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double() rejects item[0] once it reaches
e->items, but it lets item[1] be equal to it. Both go on to
snd_soc_enum_item_to_val(), which indexes e->values with no bound of
its own, so an enum with a value table reads one element past the end.
The indexing arrived with the MUX consolidation, which relaxed the
item[1] check in the same hunk. The value MUX handler it deleted used
>= there, and the snd_soc_put_enum_double() in soc-ops.c still does.
Only adav80x pairs a value table with two s
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: validate banner payload length
When parsing the Ceph messenger v2 protocol banner, the `payload_len` field
is decoded from the banner prefix. If a client sends a banner with a
`payload_len` of 0, the kernel sets up a 0-length socket read. This
violates an invariant in the state machine, triggering a warning in
`populate_in_iter()`:
------------[ cut here ]------------
!iov_iter_count(&con->v2.in_iter)
WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at populate_in_iter
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 [inline], CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070
WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at cep
virtio-net: Ensure that TCP packets don't overflow gso_segs
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio-net: Ensure that TCP packets don't overflow gso_segs
The user can specify any gso_size in a packet crafted with an AF_PACKET
PACKET_VNET_HDR socket, even smaller than TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. At the
same time, GSO_MAX_SIZE = 8 * GSO_MAX_SEGS = 8 * 65535. When the user
crafts a packet with gso_size < 8, there is a risk for partial GSO to
overflow the 16-bit gso_segs field when dividing the SKB length by
gso_size.
Adjust gso_size of TCP packets to be at least TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. Keep
gso_size of UDP GSO packets, as gso_size=1 is valid and explicitly
tested at tools/tes