PatchFirst · Vulnérabilités récentes
Vulnérabilités publiées pour linux-azure-fde-5.15 au cours des 30 derniers jours : 594. Présentes dans le catalogue KEV : 0.
Vulnérabilités : 6290
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: embed f2fs_gc_kthread in f2fs_sb_info Instead of allocating f2fs_gc_kthread dynamically, embed it in f2fs_sb_info. This simplifies lifetime management and prepares for fixing race conditions during teardown. - __sbi_store - remount|shutdown - f2fs_stop_gc_thread - access sbi->gc_thread - sbi->gc_thread = NULL - access sbi->gc_thread->f2fs_gc_task
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i3c: master: Fix device_register() error path When device_register() fails in i3c_master_register_new_i3c_devs(), put_device() is called to drop the reference taken by device_register(). That drops the last reference, so the device's release callback i3c_device_release() runs and frees the i3c_device. Two problems follow from that: i3c_device_release() does WARN_ON(i3cdev->desc), so it warns because desc->dev->desc still points back at the descriptor. Clear it before calling put_device(). After put_device() frees the i3c_device, desc->dev is left pointing at freed memo
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix maximum allowed access checks The DACL permission check looks for an ACE matching the current user and falls back to the Everyone ACE. It does not consider an Authenticated Users ACE, even though an authenticated session is a member of that well-known group. As a result, opening a file whose access is granted through S-1-5-11 can incorrectly fail with STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED. Treat an Authenticated Users ACE as a fallback entry alongside Everyone. The maximal access calculation also combines access masks from every ACE, regardless of whether its SID applies to the
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: greybus: audio: bound the topology section sizes against the fetched size gb_audio_gb_get_topology() fetches a topology blob of a module-supplied size, and gbaudio_tplg_parse_data() then walks it by adding the module-supplied size_dais, size_controls and size_widgets fields to form the control, widget and route section offsets. Those le32 sizes are never checked against the fetched blob, so a module reporting a small topology size but large section sizes makes the offsets point past the allocation, and parsing reads out of bounds. Reject a topology whose section sizes do n
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86/intel/pt: Fix stop/start with no update If pt_event_stop() is called without PERF_EF_UPDATE flag, then perf_aux_output_end() is not called. A subsequent call to pt_event_start() will call perf_aux_output_begin() again which violates the rule against nesting and triggers a WARNING in perf_aux_output_begin(). Originally, pt_event_stop() was never called without PERF_EF_UPDATE, because the only code paths to do so are from event overflow, and Intel PT does not do that. However the introduction of group throttling by commit 9734e25fbf5ae ("perf: Fix the throttle log
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pinctrl: bcm2835: Don't remove an unregistered GPIO chip If the devm_pinctrl_register() function fails, bcm2835_pinctrl_probe() calls gpiochip_remove() before gpiochip_add_data() has registered the GPIO chip. This means that upon failure the gpio_chip.gpiodev is NULL resulting in a null pointer dereference inside the gpiochip_remove() function. Remove the unnecessary function call to gpiochip_remove(). No GPIO cleanup is required because the GPIO chip has not yet been registered. Without this change there is potential for a kernel panic upon registration failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: remoteproc: qcom_wcnss: Fix handling the lack of PD regulators in v3 The changes introduced to handle single power domain platforms have swapped the info pointer increment from num_pd_vregs to num_pds, which would shift the info pointer past the end of the array for pronto-v3, which does not list power domain regulators in vregs. This showed up as a difference between GCC- and LLVM-compiled kernels on SDM632 devices, where only with LLVM one would get the "regulator request with no identifier" error, because the out-of-bounds memory ended up being zeroed. Fix by skipping t
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: cap out-of-range rx MCS instead of leaving bogus rate ath11k can receive HT/VHT/HE frames whose reported MCS is above the maximum that can be expressed in the corresponding mac80211 rate space (e.g. an HE frame reported with MCS 12, while HE tops out at MCS 11). The frame itself is valid and decodes correctly, but for such a frame ath11k_dp_rx_h_rate() leaves rx_status->rate_idx set to the out-of-range value and never assigns rx_status->encoding, so it stays RX_ENC_LEGACY from the ath11k_dp_rx_h_ppdu() initialization. Once that frame reaches mac80211 it trips
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix circular lock dependency in ext4_ext_migrate Move iput(tmp_inode) after ext4_writepages_up_write() to avoid a circular lock dependency between s_writepages_rwsem and sb_internal (freeze protection). The deadlock scenario: CPU0 (EXT4_IOC_MIGRATE) CPU1 (orphan cleanup during mount) ---- ---- ext4_ext_migrate() ext4_writepages_down_write() s_writepages_rwsem (write) ext4_evict_inode() sb_start_intwrite() [sb_internal]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: skip extra isize expansion during mount to prevent deadlock ext4_try_to_expand_extra_isize() is called from __ext4_mark_inode_dirty() while holding an active jbd2 handle. During mount (!SB_ACTIVE), the expand path may move xattrs to external blocks and release ea_inodes via iput(). When !SB_ACTIVE, iput() calls write_inode_now() which acquires s_writepages_rwsem, creating a circular lock dependency: s_writepages_rwsem --> jbd2_handle --> xattr_sem --> s_writepages_rwsem This can be triggered via: ext4_process_orphan() -> ext4_truncate() -> ext4_mark_inode_dir
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/efa: Fix PBL chunk length computation On register MR, when creating the PBL, if it's an indirect PBL we create a chunk list to hold the PBL pages pointers. Each chunk is 4KB in size and can hold 510 addresses (EFA_PTRS_PER_CHUNK) and has a 12-byte control buffer at the end of it holding the next chunk's pointer and its length. If the PBL number of pages is a multiple of EFA_PTRS_PER_CHUNK, the calculated last chunk length is wrongly computed as 0, even though that chunk is fully populated with 510 real page pointers. This wrong length is used both to DMA map the chunk
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/raid5-ppl: fix use-after-free in ppl_do_flush() The loop in ppl_do_flush() continues iterating after calling ppl_io_unit_finished(), touching io->pending_flushes and leading to a use-after-free. Add a break statement to stop the loop once io is freed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: locking/lockdep: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __lock_set_class() register_lock_class() can return NULL when the lock class pool is exhausted, graph_lock() fails, or key validation fails. However, __lock_set_class() uses the return value directly in pointer arithmetic without a NULL check: class = register_lock_class(lock, subclass, 0); hlock->class_idx = class - lock_classes; If class is NULL, this computes a wild offset that corrupts hlock->class_idx. The subsequent reacquire_held_locks() call will invoke hlock_class() with this corrupted index, leading to a NULL
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/xive: propagate IPI init errors to prevent use-after-free When xive_init_ipis() fails (e.g. irq_domain_alloc_irqs() fails), the error path frees the global xive_ipis array. However, xive_smp_probe() previously ignored this failure and proceeded to call xive_setup_cpu_ipi(), which dereferences the already-freed xive_ipis pointer -- a use-after-free. Now that xive_smp_probe() returns int (previous patch), propagate the error from xive_init_ipis() and xive_setup_cpu_ipi() through xive_smp_probe(). Check the return value in both pnv_smp_probe() and pSeries_smp_probe(
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: hibernate: mask DAIF before restoring hibernated kernel The arm64 hibernate code manages the exception masking in an unsound way, leading to potential crashes and/or warnings during resume. When a hibernation image is saved in `swsusp_arch_suspend()`, all DAIF exceptions are masked (by virtue of `local_daif_save()`), and the suspended image is saved assuming that all DAIF exceptions will remain masked when the image is restored. When a hibernation image is resumed by `swsusp_arch_resume()`, only interrupts are masked (by virtue of `local_irq_disable()` in `resume_t
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix circular locking dependency in ocfs2_init_acl() A lockdep warning indicates a circular locking dependency between `&oi->ip_xattr_sem` and `&journal->j_trans_barrier`: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected is trying to acquire lock: (&oi->ip_xattr_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_init_acl+0x2fd/0x7e0 fs/ocfs2/acl.c:367 but task is already holding lock: (&journal->j_trans_barrier){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_start_trans+0x3ab/0x700 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:369 The deadlock involves two code paths: Path 1 (setxattr) where `ocfs2_xattr_set()` acquires `ip_xat
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: bus: Introduce acpi_bus_get_primary_device() The function used for obtaining the first "physical" device for which the given ACPI one is the ACPI companion, acpi_get_first_physical_node(), may return a stale device pointer (mostly in theory) because acpi_unbind_one() may run as a whole after dropping the ACPI device's physical_node_lock in acpi_get_first_physical_node() and before it returns. The last reference to the "physical" device may be dropped then before the pointer to it is returned to the caller. If that happens and the acpi_get_first_physical_node() calle
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: policy_int make sure list heads are initialized before fail path If profile create fails before policy_init is complete the list heads are not properly initialized causing profile_free() sanity checks to trigger the following splat. AppArmor WARN aa_policy_destroy: (((!list_empty(&policy->profiles) && (&policy->profiles)->prev != ((void *) 0x122 + (0xdead000000000000UL))))): WARNING: security/apparmor/lib.c:509 at aa_policy_destroy+0x164/0x1b0 security/apparmor/lib.c:509, CPU#0: syz.0.17/5541 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5541 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted s
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages secretmem accounts folios by treating memory as if it were mlock()'d and thus limited by the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit. However the folios are unevictable and remain so until the inode is evicted, eliminating usual mlock() semantics - mapping folios then unmapping them does not clear their unevictable state, since it depends on AS_UNEVICTABLE, not PG_mlocked. A user can therefore easily work around the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit - simply map then unmap and VmLck no longer counts the secretmem range. Worse, folios are not accounted in the
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Fix response queue over-consumption in __qla_consume_iocb() qla24xx_process_response_queue() advances ring_ptr past the head IOCB before dispatching, so by the time __qla_consume_iocb() runs, ring_ptr already points at the first continuation IOCB. The function however looped purex->entry_count times starting at ring_ptr. As entry_count includes the head, this consumed one entry too many: it stamped RESPONSE_PROCESSED on the next, unrelated IOCB and advanced the ring past it, silently dropping a legitimate firmware response. The head IOCB's signature was also
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