Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F30 keymap to the GPIO/LED count
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F30 keymap to the GPIO/LED count
rmi_f30_map_gpios() allocates gpioled_key_map with
min(gpioled_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) == at most 6 entries, but
rmi_f30_attention() iterates the full f30->gpioled_count (device query
register, range 0..31) and dereferences gpioled_key_map[i], and
input->keycodemax is set to the full gpioled_count while input->keycode
points at the 6-entry allocation.
A device that reports gpioled_count > 6 with GPIO support enabled
therefore causes an out-of-bounds read on the attention interrupt and
out-of-bounds rea
Input: elan_i2c - prevent division by zero and arithmetic underflow
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: elan_i2c - prevent division by zero and arithmetic underflow
The Elan I2C touchpad driver queries the device for its physical
dimensions and trace counts to calculate the device resolution and width.
However, if the device firmware or device tree provides invalid zero
values for x_traces or y_traces, it results in a fatal division-by-zero
exception leading to a kernel panic during device probe.
Add checks to ensure these parameters are non-zero before performing
the division. If invalid trace values are detected, fall back to a safe
default of 1.
Additionally, prev
Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count
goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported
by the device into an on-stack buffer
u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS];
which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only
runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts->max_touch_num,
but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device
configuration block and is never clamped:
ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f;
The nibble can be 0..15, so a mal
Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index
iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by
taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and
using it to address the per-effect state array:
i = data[1] & 0x7f;
if (data[1] & 0x80) {
if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags))
...
} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) {
...
}
The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but
core_effects[] holds
Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet
tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed
three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full
packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree:
tw->data[tw->idx++] = data;
if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) {
...
tw->idx = 0;
}
The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device
controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow
peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes diffe
Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size
mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a
fixed-size on-stack buffer
struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH];
which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes,
i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from
the device:
packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE);
if (packet_size <= 0)
goto out;
...
error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size,
(u8 *)touch);
packet_size is a single device registe
fuse: re-lock request before returning from fuse_ref_folio()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: re-lock request before returning from fuse_ref_folio()
fuse_ref_folio() unlocks the request but does not re-lock it before
returning. fuse_chan_abort() can end the request and the async end
callback (eg fuse_writepage_free()) can free the args while the
subsequent copy chain logic after fuse_ref_folio() accesses them,
leading to use-after-free issues.
Fix this by locking the request in fuse_ref_folio() before returning.
fpga: region: fix use-after-free in child_regions_with_firmware()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fpga: region: fix use-after-free in child_regions_with_firmware()
Move of_node_put(child_region) after the error print to avoid accessing
freed memory when pr_err() references child_region.
[ Yilun: Fix the Fixes tag ]
Input: elan_i2c - validate firmware size before use
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: elan_i2c - validate firmware size before use
Ensure that the firmware file is large enough to contain the expected
number of pages and the signature (which resides at the end of the
firmware blob) before accessing them to prevent potential out-of-bounds
reads.
tty: serial: pch_uart: add check for dma_alloc_coherent()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: serial: pch_uart: add check for dma_alloc_coherent()
Add a check for dma_alloc_coherent() failure to prevent a potential
NULL pointer dereference in dma_handle_rx(). Properly release DMA
channels and the PCI device reference using a goto ladder if the
allocation fails.
spi: ti-qspi: fix use-after-free after DMA setup failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: ti-qspi: fix use-after-free after DMA setup failure
The driver falls back to PIO mode if DMA setup fails during probe.
Make sure to clear the DMA channel pointer also if buffer allocation
fails to avoid passing a pointer to the released channel to the DMA
engine (or trying to free the channel a second time on late probe errors
or driver unbind).
This issue was flagged by Sashiko when reviewing a devres allocation
conversion patch.
drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async
[Why&How]
dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async() copies payload->length bytes into a
16-byte stack buffer (dpaux.data[16]) guarded only by an ASSERT(), which
is a no-op in release builds. If a caller ever passes length > 16 this
results in a stack buffer overflow via memcpy.
Additionally, link_index is used to dereference dc->links[] without
bounds checking against dc->link_count, risking an out-of-bounds access.
Replace the ASSERT with a hard runtime check that returns false when
batman-adv: bla: fix report_work leak on backbone_gw purge
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: bla: fix report_work leak on backbone_gw purge
batadv_bla_purge_backbone_gw() removes stale backbone gateway entries,
but fails to properly handle their associated report_work:
- If report_work is running, the purge must wait for it to finish before
freeing the backbone_gw, otherwise the worker may access freed memory
(e.g. bat_priv).
- If report_work is pending, the purge must cancel it and release the
reference held for that pending work item.
The previous implementation called hlist_for_each_entry_safe() inside a
spin_lock_bh() section, but cancel_wor
xfs: resample the data fork mapping after cycling ILOCK
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: resample the data fork mapping after cycling ILOCK
xfs_reflink_fill_{cow_hole,delalloc} are both presented with an inode,
a data fork mapping, and a cow fork mapping. Unfortunately, these two
helpers cycle the ILOCK to grab a transaction, which means that the
mappings are stale as soon as we reacquire the ILOCK. Currently we
refresh the cow fork mapping by re-calling xfs_find_trim_cow_extent, but
we don't refresh the data fork mapping beforehand, which means that the
xfs_bmap_trim_cow in that function queries the refcount btree about the
wrong physical blocks and ret
Bluetooth: L2CAP: cancel pending_rx_work before taking conn->lock
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: cancel pending_rx_work before taking conn->lock
l2cap_conn_del() takes conn->lock and then calls cancel_work_sync() for
pending_rx_work. process_pending_rx() takes the same mutex, so teardown
can deadlock against the worker it is flushing.
This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually
reviewed against the current tree.
The grounded PoC kept the l2cap_conn_ready() -> queue_work(...,
&conn->pending_rx_work) submit path, the l2cap_conn_del() ->
cancel_work_sync(&conn->pending_rx_work) teardown path, and the
process_pending_rx() -> mute
i2c: stub: Reject I2C block transfers with invalid length
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: stub: Reject I2C block transfers with invalid length
The I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case in stub_xfer() uses data->block[0]
as the transfer length. The existing check only clamps it to avoid
overrunning the chip->words[256] register array, but does not validate
it against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (32), which is the limit of the union
i2c_smbus_data.block buffer (34 bytes total). The driver is a
development/test tool (CONFIG_I2C_STUB=m, not built by default)
that must be loaded with a chip_addr= parameter.
A local user with access to /dev/i2c-* can issue an I2C_SMBUS ioctl
wi
net: team: fix NULL pointer dereference in team_xmit during mode change
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: team: fix NULL pointer dereference in team_xmit during mode change
__team_change_mode() clears team->ops with memset() before restoring
safe dummy handlers via team_adjust_ops(). A concurrent team_xmit()
running under RCU on another CPU can read team->ops.transmit during
this window and call a NULL function pointer, crashing the kernel.
The race requires a mode change (CAP_NET_ADMIN) concurrent with
transmit on the team device.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:0x0
Call Trace:
team_xmit (dr
net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix endpoint use-after-free in rmnet_dellink()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix endpoint use-after-free in rmnet_dellink()
rmnet_dellink() removes the endpoint from the hash table with
hlist_del_init_rcu() and then immediately frees it with kfree(). However,
RCU readers on the receive path (rmnet_rx_handler ->
__rmnet_map_ingress_handler) may still hold a reference to the endpoint and
dereference ep->egress_dev after the memory has been freed. The endpoint is
a kmalloc-32 object, and the stale read at offset 8 corresponds to the
egress_dev pointer.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffde942eef
Oops: 0002
xfs: fail recovery on a committed log item with no regions
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fail recovery on a committed log item with no regions
If the first op of a transaction is a bare transaction header
(len == sizeof(struct xfs_trans_header)), xlog_recover_add_to_trans()
adds an item but no region, leaving it on r_itemq with ri_cnt == 0 and
ri_buf == NULL.
The header can be split across op records, so later ops may still add
regions; the item is only invalid if the transaction commits with none.
The runtime commit path never emits such a transaction, so this only
happens on a crafted log. It came from an AI-assisted code audit of the
recovery parser.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: bnep: Fix UAF read of dev->name
bnep_add_connection() needs to keep holding the bnep_session_sem while
reading dev->name (just like bnep_get_connlist() does); otherwise the
bnep_session() thread can concurrently free the net_device, which can for
example be triggered by a concurrent bnep_del_connection().
(This UAF is fairly uninteresting from a security perspective;
calling bnep_add_connection() requires passing a capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)
check. It also requires completely tearing down a netdev during a fairly
tight race window.)