ACPI: PCI: Clear driver_data on all paths that free the acpi_pci_root
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: PCI: Clear driver_data on all paths that free the acpi_pci_root
acpi_pci_root_add() assigns the freshly allocated root to
device->driver_data before dmar_device_add() and pci_acpi_scan_root().
Both failure paths reach the end: label where root is kfree()'d, but
only the pci_acpi_scan_root() path clears driver_data first.
When dmar_device_add() fails during a hot-add, root is freed while
device->driver_data still points at it. The ACPI core does not clear
driver_data on attach failure, so a later acpi_pci_find_root() call may
dereference this dangling pointer.
acpi_
ext4: use fsdata to track inline data write state and fix race
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: use fsdata to track inline data write state and fix race
Instead of checking the live inode state (ext4_has_inline_data(inode)
and ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)) in the
write_end handlers, use the fsdata parameter of the address space
operations to explicitly pass down the state in which write_begin
prepared the write.
A concurrent thread (such as ext4_page_mkwrite()) can convert the
inline data to an extent between write_begin and write_end. If this
happens, the write_end handlers would previously miss the inline
write_end path and fall th
ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent
A corrupted directory can trigger the following KASAN report when
ext4_readdir() resumes from an invalid position:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810a646000 by task repro_linear/509
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
print_report+0xd0/0x630
kasan_report+0xce/0x100
__ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820
ext4_readdir+0xcde/0x2b70
iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520
__x64_sys_getdents64+0x12b/0x220
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540
entry_SY
wifi: ath6kl: avoid buffer overreads in WMI event handlers
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath6kl: avoid buffer overreads in WMI event handlers
The following WMI event handlers currently read from the event buffer
without first verifying that the message was large enough to hold the
expected event:
ath6kl_wmi_scan_complete_rx()
ath6kl_wmi_addba_req_event_rx()
ath6kl_wmi_delba_req_event_rx()
Add length checks to prevent overread.
pinctrl: mediatek: use devm_gpiochip_add_data() for GPIO chip
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: mediatek: use devm_gpiochip_add_data() for GPIO chip
The gpio_chip is allocated with device-managed memory but registered with
the non-managed gpiochip_add_data(). This was harmless while the drivers
were built-in, but once they can be built as modules and unbound/rmmod'd,
devm frees the gpio_chip's memory while it is still registered, causing a
use-after-free.
Register it with devm_gpiochip_add_data() so it shares the same
device-managed lifecycle, which also lets the manual gpiochip_remove()
error paths go away.
RDMA/mlx5: Fix integer overflow of user QP buffer size
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix integer overflow of user QP buffer size
set_user_buf_size() computes the QP buffer size by left-shifting the
user-supplied rq.wqe_cnt and rq.wqe_shift values as signed integers.
A sufficiently large rq.wqe_cnt causes signed integer overflow, which
is undefined behavior, and yields a small or negative buf_size, causing
ib_umem_get() to map a buffer smaller than the hardware will actually
write into.
Replace the shifts and addition with check_shl_overflow() and
check_add_overflow(), rejecting invalid user inputs.
Moreover, guard the identical shift computing
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
isofs: release zisofs block pointer buffer head
zisofs_fill_pages() reads the compressed block pointer table. The error
paths release the current buffer_head, the loop also releases the old
buffer_head when it advances. However, the success path leaves the last
buffer_head referenced. Release it before returning success.
spi: oc-tiny: switch to managed controller allocation
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: oc-tiny: switch to managed controller allocation
The controller is allocated with the non-managed spi_alloc_host() while
the interrupt is registered with devm_request_irq(). During removal,
spi_bitbang_stop() only unregisters the controller; the subsequent
spi_controller_put() then frees the controller together with its
embedded driver-private devdata, which is the IRQ handler's dev_id. The
devm_request_irq() release action (free_irq()), which drains the
handler, does not run until after .remove() returns. A late or latched
interrupt can therefore reach tiny_spi_irq
remoteproc: Prevent crash handling to race with rproc_del()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
remoteproc: Prevent crash handling to race with rproc_del()
There's no synchronization between rproc_crash_handler_work() and
rproc_del(), as such it's possible for a driver to be removed while
crash-handler work is scheduled, or even executing - resulting in
use-after-free issues.
To avoid this the scheduled work need to be cancelled and synchronized
against before the removal proceeds.
In order to ensure that this doesn't race with the reporting, and
thereby scheduling new work, a "deleting" flag is introduced. This is
similar to the RPROC_DELETE state that was introduc
PCI: Fix UAF when probe runs concurrent to dyn ID removal
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: Fix UAF when probe runs concurrent to dyn ID removal
Dynamic IDs are only guaranteed to be valid when dynids.lock is held,
as remove_id_store() can free the node. Thus, make a copy in
pci_match_device(). Also, clarify that the id parameter is only valid
during probe.
nilfs2: fix infinite loop in nilfs_clean_segments()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix infinite loop in nilfs_clean_segments()
syzbot reported a hung task in nilfs_transaction_begin(). This occurs
because the cleaner ioctl falls into an infinite loop if
nilfs_segctor_construct() repeatedly returns -EROFS (e.g. the device
is remounted as read-only after an I/O error).
Currently in nilfs_clean_segments(), if err is non-zero, it logs the
error and sleeps but doesn't abort when it encounters a terminal error
like -EROFS. This causes the thread to loop forever.
Fix this by breaking out of the loop if nilfs_segctor_construct()
returns -EROFS. This mat
nilfs2: prevent out-of-bounds read in super root block parsing
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: prevent out-of-bounds read in super root block parsing
super-root inode metadata size is trusted before nilfs_read_inode_common().
Reject super-root inode sizes whose computed on-disk footprint exceeds the
filesystem block size. This prevents malformed filesystem images from
making nilfs_read_inode_common() read past the end of the super-root block.
[ryusuke: clarify the commit title]
nilfs2: fix BUG in nilfs_copy_dirty_pages() on dirty state mismatch
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix BUG in nilfs_copy_dirty_pages() on dirty state mismatch
Syzbot reported a kernel BUG triggered within nilfs_copy_dirty_pages(),
which copies dirty DAT file folios/pages to its shadow page cache. The
BUG occurs when a retrieved dirty folio/page unexpectedly loses its
'dirty' status.
This issue arises because, since the commit referenced below, the 'dirty'
flag of a folio/page can be cleared asynchronously after the filesystem
detects metadata corruption and transitions to read-only mode.
Resolve the issue by returning an -EROFS error if the filesystem has
tran
RDMA/cxgb4: Fix dereg_skb leak and double free in write_tpt_entry()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/cxgb4: Fix dereg_skb leak and double free in write_tpt_entry()
When the device is in the fatal error state, write_tpt_entry() returns -EIO
before handing the caller's preallocated skb to the transmit path; its
allocation-failure returns do the same. c4iw_dereg_mr() ignores the error
and frees mhp, leaking mhp->dereg_skb. c4iw_get_dma_mr() instead frees the
skb a second time after dereg_mem() already consumed it, a double free.
Make write_tpt_entry() the sole owner of a non-NULL skb, freeing it on
every return preceding handoff to c4iw_ofld_send(): fatal error, tpt and
RDMA/mlx5: Fix stack out-of-bounds read in cc_params debugfs
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix stack out-of-bounds read in cc_params debugfs
get_param() reads a congestion parameter as a u32 but formats it with the
signed "%d" into an 11-byte stack buffer. A value with bit 31 set, such as
0x80000000, renders as "-2147483648\n" whose full length is 12. snprintf()
stores only 11 bytes yet returns 12, so simple_read_from_buffer() treats 12
bytes as valid and reads one byte past lbuf[].
Size the buffer for the widest unsigned decimal, format with "%u" to match
the u32, and use scnprintf() so the length passed to
simple_read_from_buffer() reflects the byte
RDMA/cxgb4: free STAG index when TPT entry write fails
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/cxgb4: free STAG index when TPT entry write fails
write_tpt_entry() allocates a new STAG index with c4iw_get_resource() and
bumps stats.stag.cur before programming the entry. When
write_adapter_mem() fails, it returns the error without releasing the index
or reversing the statistic. No MR is inserted into rhp->mrs, so
deregistration never reclaims it, leaking the index until device teardown.
Record whether this call allocated the index and, on a failed write, return
it to tpt_table and decrement stats.stag.cur. Key the rollback on both the
write error and that flag
IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received
isert_recv_done() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without
ever looking at wc->byte_len, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed
in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the
data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS
(ntoh24(hdr->dlength), via the derived unsol_data_len / imm_data_len) -
out of the fixed-size descriptor:
isert_handle_iscsi_dataout():
sg_copy_from_buffer(sg_start, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc),
unsol_d
IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received
isert_login_recv_done() records how many bytes the HCA actually placed in
the login buffer, but nothing compares that against the length the login
PDU's BHS declares. isert_rx_login_req() copies min(login_req_len,
MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) bytes into login->req_buf, and the login code then
reads the declared length back out of that buffer - for the first PDU in
iscsi_target_locate_portal(),
payload_length = ntoh24(login_req->dlength);
tmpbuf = kmemdup_nul(login->req_buf, payload_length, GFP_KERNEL);
and for t
nvme-fc: unmap cmd_iu DMA on rsp_iu mapping failure in init_request
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-fc: unmap cmd_iu DMA on rsp_iu mapping failure in init_request
__nvme_fc_init_request() maps cmd_iu and then rsp_iu for DMA. If the
rsp_iu mapping fails, the original code only recorded the error and fell
through: it left the already-mapped cmd_iu unmapped and still marked the
op as FCPOP_STATE_IDLE before returning. Since blk-mq does not call
.exit_request() when .init_request() fails, the cmd_iu mapping is leaked
for every op whose rsp_iu mapping fails.
Jump to an error path on rsp_iu mapping failure that unmaps cmd_iu and
returns the error without marking the op id
spi: davinci: switch to managed controller allocation
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: davinci: switch to managed controller allocation
The controller is allocated with the non-managed spi_alloc_host() while
the interrupt is registered with devm_request_threaded_irq(). During
removal, spi_bitbang_stop() only unregisters the controller; the
subsequent spi_controller_put() then frees the controller together with
its embedded davinci_spi devdata, which is the IRQ handler's dev_id.
The devm_request_threaded_irq() release action (free_irq()), which
drains the handler, does not run until after .remove() returns. A late
or latched interrupt can therefore reac