fsnotify: prevent mark additions during connector teardown
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fsnotify: prevent mark additions during connector teardown
fsnotify_destroy_marks() keeps a reference to its current mark while it
drops conn->lock to destroy the mark. This stabilizes the forward-walk
cursor, but does not prevent a new mark from being inserted before it.
For example, an inotify watch re-added after IN_IGNORED sorts before the
old, detached mark for the same group. The walk can miss the replacement
and then detach the entire connector from the object.
The replacement is still on its group's marks_list and, for inotify, in
the watch IDR. The group mutex no
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: free the sbi after a grace period
ext4_get_link() follows a symlink that keeps its target in a data block
in rcu pathwalk mode with ext4_getblk(EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CACHED_NOWAIT).
That reads s_mount_state in the ASSERT() of ext4_getblk() and again in
ext4_es_lookup_extent(), and the lookup bumps the extent status hit or
miss counter, all through sb->s_fs_info.
ext4_put_super() destroys those counters, clears sb->s_fs_info and frees
the sbi without waiting for a grace period. A pathwalk that is still in
ext4_get_link() when the last reference to the mount goes away then
d
eventfs: Free the eventfs_inode after an rcu grace period too
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eventfs: Free the eventfs_inode after an rcu grace period too
tracefs_d_revalidate() reads ->is_freed of the eventfs_inode that
dentry->d_fsdata points to, and ->d_revalidate() is called in rcu
pathwalk mode with nothing but rcu_read_lock() held. The dentry itself
stays around for such a walker, but tracefs_d_release() drops its
reference to the eventfs_inode when the dentry is killed, and
release_ei() then frees it after a grace period of eventfs_srcu. An
SRCU grace period doesn't wait for rcu_read_lock() sections, so the
walker can read an eventfs_inode that is already go
ipc: drop the mqueue mount with kern_unmount() on setup failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipc: drop the mqueue mount with kern_unmount() on setup failure
mq_init_ns() creates the mqueue mount with fc_mount_longterm(), so its
->mnt_ns is MNT_NS_INTERNAL. When setting up the mqueue or ipc sysctls
or msg_init_ns() fails afterwards, create_ipc_ns() drops it with a plain
mntput(). With ->mnt_ns set that takes the fast path of
mntput_no_expire(). The count drops to zero and nothing ever kills the
mount, so the mount and the mqueue superblock are leaked.
Commit dc55e35f9e81 ("ipc: Store mqueue sysctls in the ipc namespace")
added the first failure path after mq_init_n
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: free the sbi after a grace period
If the "nocase" mount option ntfs3 uses custom hash and dentry compare
functions. Both access ntfs3 superblock private information in rcu
pathwalk. ntfs_put_super() and ntfs3_kill_sb() drop the info without any
rcu delay. A lookup that's still inside the filesystem when the last
reference to the mount is dropped causes a UAF. With a pathwalk held up
in ntfs_d_hash() while the last reference to the mount goes away:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x752/0x940
Read of size 8 at addr ff1100010453c850 by task wal
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Fix mm reuse handling for FUT_OFF_MMSHARED
A FUT_OFF_MMSHARED futex is a shared futex that refers to an MM.
It is possible for a process to wait on a shared futex with a different MM
because a FUT_OFF_INODE waiter can be requeued onto a FUT_OFF_MMSHARED
futex by another process.
This can cause FUT_OFF_MMSHARED waiters on a freed MM to consume
wakeups intended for a newly allocated MM at the same address.
Fix it by keying FUT_OFF_MMSHARED using a unique 64-bit per-MM ID.
Leave private futexes as before to avoid influencing the performance of the
hotpath.
(Multi-thre
net/sched: fix use-after-free in __tcf_action_put()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fix use-after-free in __tcf_action_put()
__tcf_action_put() decrements the reference count before decrementing the
binding count. Another thread can free the action between these operations,
causing the binding-count update to access freed memory. KASAN reports it
as:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __tcf_action_put+0x327/0x340
Write of size 4 at addr ff11000000d46420 by task tc-put-pause/64
Hold the action IDR mutex across both counter updates and IDR removal,
keeping cleanup outside the lock.
net: rds: fix uninitialized trans dereference in CM event handler
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: rds: fix uninitialized trans dereference in CM event handler
rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn() assigns trans only when the RDMA
device is an InfiniBand CA (RDMA_NODE_IB_CA). On any other device
type, e.g. an iWARP RNIC such as siw, trans stays uninitialized, but
the event switch dereferences it: unconditionally in the
RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST case via trans->cm_handle_connect(),
and (with a connection context) in the ROUTE_RESOLVED and
ESTABLISHED cases.
An RDS listener on an iWARP device therefore crashes the kernel as
soon as a connect request arrives: with CONF
sctp: revalidate output stream after association connect wait
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: revalidate output stream after association connect wait
When message interleaving is enabled, the first send waits for association
establishment before building its data chunks. The wait drops the socket
lock, and handshake processing can reduce the output stream count to the
peer-advertised inbound stream count. sctp_stream_init() then frees the
extension of every removed stream.
The sender resumes with the stream that it checked before the wait. If the
peer removed that stream, sctp_outq_tail() later dereferences its NULL
extension. Fatal-oops policies then pan
tracing/histograms: Reject non-stacktrace fields for synthetic stacktrace fields
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/histograms: Reject non-stacktrace fields for synthetic stacktrace fields
In check_synth_field(), when a synthetic event field is a stacktrace
(field->is_stack) and the histogram field is not a "long[" stacktrace
array, validation falls through to the generic size and signedness
comparison.
Because parse_synth_field() sets a stacktrace field's type to
"__data_loc unsigned long[]", its size is sizeof(u64) and
synth_field_signed() marks it as signed. Consequently, any 8-byte
signed scalar histogram field passes the fallback check, and its scalar
value is subsequently
i2c: viai2c-wmt: Fix clock leak in wmt_i2c_probe()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: viai2c-wmt: Fix clock leak in wmt_i2c_probe()
In wmt_i2c_probe(), i2c->clk is acquired using of_clk_get(). If any
subsequent operation fails or when the module is unloaded, the clock
reference count is never decremented via clk_put(), leading to a
resource leak.
Switch to devm_clk_get() so that the clock is automatically managed
and released.
scsi: bsg: Pass reply_len to bsg_setup_queue() to fit UFS ARPMB replies
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: bsg: Pass reply_len to bsg_setup_queue() to fit UFS ARPMB replies
bsg-lib allocates a 96-byte (SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE) reply buffer per
job, but struct ufs_rpmb_reply is 104 bytes: a 40-byte struct
ufs_bsg_reply followed by a 64-byte EHS. When an Advanced RPMB command
returns an EHS, ufshcd_advanced_rpmb_req_handler() copies it right after
the 40-byte header and writes 8 bytes past the end of the buffer.
Let each BSG transport pass its reply buffer size to bsg_setup_queue()
and have ufs_bsg request sizeof(struct ufs_rpmb_reply), so the full
reply reaches user space. O
scsi: st: Fix use-after-free race between st_remove() and st_open()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: st: Fix use-after-free race between st_remove() and st_open()
st_remove() drops the probe reference on the scsi_tape with kref_put()
and only afterwards removes its index from st_index_idr. If that was the
last reference, scsi_tape_release() frees the structure while it is
still published in the idr.
scsi_tape_get(), called from st_open(), looks up the tape in
st_index_idr and takes a reference under st_ref_mutex and
st_index_lock. remove_cdevs() does not wait for opens that are already
past chrdev_open(), so an open that is blocked on st_ref_mutex while
st_remove()
scsi: xen/scsifront: Check for a NULL shadow entry on a backend response
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: xen/scsifront: Check for a NULL shadow entry on a backend response
scsifront_do_response() validates the rqid in a backend response against
VSCSIIF_MAX_REQS before using it to index info->shadow[], but then
dereferences the entry to test ->inflight without checking that the slot
is populated. Shadow slots are NULL before a command is submitted (the
host private area is zeroed at allocation) and are reset to NULL in
_scsifront_put_rqid() once a request completes, so an in-range rqid that
does not correspond to an outstanding request makes the frontend
dereference a NU
scsi: libiscsi: Reject a negative task index from parse_pdu_itt
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: libiscsi: Reject a negative task index from parse_pdu_itt
A transport that implements parse_pdu_itt hands libiscsi an index taken
from the PDU, and both lookups bound it from above only:
if (i >= session->cmds_max)
i and cmds_max are both int, so a negative index passes and
session->cmds[i] is read from before the array.
be2iscsi produces one. beiscsi_parse_pdu() assigns the raw tag,
*index = (int)itt;
and beiscsi_complete_pdu() forwards an unsolicited NOP-In from the
hardware async ring without replacing its ITT, so the value is the
target's. It also
scsi: libiscsi: Validate the ITT reflected in a Reject PDU
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: libiscsi: Validate the ITT reflected in a Reject PDU
A Reject PDU carries a copy of the header it rejects, and
iscsi_handle_reject() takes the ITT out of that copy to find the task to
clean up:
memcpy(&rejected_pdu, data, sizeof(struct iscsi_hdr));
...
task = iscsi_itt_to_task(conn, rejected_pdu.itt);
That value is whatever the target put there. iscsi_itt_to_task() bounds
the index against cmds_max and checks nothing else, so any task in the
pool can be named, and iscsi_nop_out_rsp() then completes it.
An index that has never been used gives a NUL
scsi: libiscsi: Validate the task named by a management response
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: libiscsi: Validate the task named by a management response
__iscsi_complete_pdu() fetches the task for five response types from one
place and checks only that the index resolved:
case ISCSI_OP_LOGOUT_RSP:
case ISCSI_OP_LOGIN_RSP:
case ISCSI_OP_TEXT_RSP:
case ISCSI_OP_SCSI_TMFUNC_RSP:
case ISCSI_OP_NOOP_IN:
task = iscsi_itt_to_task(conn, hdr->itt);
if (!task)
return ISCSI_ERR_BAD_ITT;
iscsi_itt_to_task() bounds the index against cmds_max and looks at
nothing else, so a target can name any
drm/amdgpu: don't drop the runtime PM reference twice in amdgpu_gpr
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: don't drop the runtime PM reference twice in amdgpu_gpr
amdgpu_debugfs_gpr_read() drops its runtime PM reference right after
reading the wave registers. When copying them to userspace fails, it
jumps to the err label, which drops the reference a second time. A read
into a bad buffer on Navi31 either steals a reference somebody else
holds (power/runtime_usage goes from 1 to 0) or underflows the count:
amdgpu 0000:03:00.0: Runtime PM usage count underflow!
The registers are already in the kernel buffer at that point, so finish
the hardware access first and cop
drm/exec: don't immediately add prelocked obj to array of locked objs
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/exec: don't immediately add prelocked obj to array of locked objs
When a contention is detected the drm_exec object grabs a reference to
the contended object, unlocks all other objects and pre-locks the
contended one before anything else.
The problem is that it is possible that this pre-locked object was about
to be destroyed and drm_exec is now holding the last reference to it.
So we never actually see this pre-locked object again to be explicitly
locked and so also never reserve a slot for a dma_fence object on it.
Should the driver now use drm_exec_for_each_locked
drm/i915/dmc: Add sanity check for DMC load address
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/dmc: Add sanity check for DMC load address
For DMC firmware header version 3, the firmware load address is stored
in dmc_info->start_mmioaddr and later used by dmc_load_program().
Unlike the MMIO address table, the firmware load address is not
validated. Add a sanity check to ensure it is within the valid range.
BSpec: 69671, 68378
(cherry picked from commit 5e47ee5c76ca9becde8df4ad5202845b7ffcbc4c)