calico 3.32.0: bekannte Sicherheitslücken

Unauthenticated Go pprof exposure in Calico debug server

When Calico's shared debug server is enabled (disabled by default), the Calico kube-controllers and Goldmane components bind their Go pprof debug listener to 0.0.0.0 without authentication. Any pod with network reachability to the listener can retrieve the process heap, goroutine stacks (including function arguments), and command-line arguments. Depending on the process's in-memory state, the heap may contain sensitive material. The debug listener is opt-in but is unsafe when enabled because it offers no authentication and no safe localhost-only binding option.

• Auf 3.32.1 aktualisieren

Calico Tier Authorization Bypass via DeleteCollection

Calico's apiserver wraps tier-scoped resources so that every operation runs through AuthorizeTierOperation, but the Delete override on NetworkPolicy, GlobalNetworkPolicy, and their staged variants is not invoked for DeleteCollection requests. A user holding the deletecollection verb or wildcard verbs on tier-scoped policy resources can bulk-delete policies in tiers they otherwise have no rights on, breaking the tier authorization boundary.

• Auf 3.32.1 aktualisieren

ServiceAccount token disclosure via Azure IPAM CNI plugin logs

When Calico is configured with the Azure IPAM plugin, the Calico CNI binary mutates the incoming CNI configuration to attach subnet information before delegating to the IPAM plugin. After mutating, the Azure IPAM helper logs the entire unmarshaled configuration map (stdinData) at INFO level to /var/log/calico/cni/cni.log on every CNI ADD and DEL invocation — once per pod scheduled or terminated on the node. When the cluster is deployed using token-based Kubernetes authentication, this log entry contains the ServiceAccount token, client key, and certificate authority in plaintext. Any principal with read access to /var/log/calico/cni/cni.log o

Calicoctl leaks cluster credentials to stderr when verbose logging is enabled

When calicoctl is invoked with --log-level=info or --log-level=debug, the client prints the full contents of its loaded connection-configuration struct to stderr in a single log line. The struct embeds every credential calicoctl uses to talk to the cluster — inline kubeconfig (with bearer token), Kubernetes API bearer token, etcd password, and inline PEM-encoded etcd client certificate and key. Any reader of that stderr stream — CI job logs, session-recording archives, shared support-ticket transcripts, or local filesystem viewers on the host that ran calicoctl — can extract these credentials with zero Kubernetes privilege. calicoctl's defaul