fbdev: core: Fix pointer desynchronization in fb_io_read()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: core: Fix pointer desynchronization in fb_io_read()
In fb_io_read(), if copy_to_user() performs a partial copy (e.g., due to
a faulty user buffer), the loop adjusts the chunk size 'c' and updates
the remaining 'count'. However, the hardware 'src' pointer has already
been eagerly advanced by the original chunk size.
If the loop is allowed to continue, the read will resume from an
incorrect, over-advanced offset. Since the remaining 'count' was only
decremented by the successful bytes, this desynchronization causes the
next iterations to execute more hardware reads th
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/panthor: skip zero-sized firmware sections
panthor_fw_load_section_entry() skips BO creation when the firmware section
VA range is empty. If such a section is added to the firmware section list,
section->mem is left as NULL.
Later reload and unplug paths iterate over all firmware sections and
dereference section->mem, which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference.
Zero-sized firmware sections are valid, so accept them as no-op entries but
skip adding them to the section list.
drm/amdgpu: reject oversized IBs with per-ring packet limits
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: reject oversized IBs with per-ring packet limits
On GFX rings, amdgpu_cs_p2_ib() passed user-supplied ib_bytes through
to ib->length_dw without a limit, while ring_emit_ib() encodes length
into packet fields. Oversized values can corrupt adjacent control bits
and destabilize command submission.
Add a per-ring IB packet size limit helper and reject command
submissions exceeding the corresponding dword limit before IB
allocation. Use the documented 20-bit limit for GFX/compute/SDMA/VPE,
and apply the MM fallback limit for other ring types.
(cherry picked from co
Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space
cs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect
straight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without
requiring it to hold anything:
work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic->custom_data,
periodic->custom_len,
sizeof(s16));
work_data.custom_len = periodic->custom_len;
The driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the
waveform bank in cs40l50_effec
Input: focaltech - fix array out-of-bounds in focaltech_process_rel_packet
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: focaltech - fix array out-of-bounds in focaltech_process_rel_packet
Make finger2 (and also finger1) unsigned, so that if the finger index in
the packet is 0 then subtracting 1 creates an array index which overflows
above the existing check for FOC_MAX_FINGERS, as the existing comment says
it should, instead of writing to state->fingers[-1].
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: iforce - validate input packet lengths
iforce_process_packet() reads fixed fields from joystick, wheel and
status packets without first checking their lengths. In particular, the
shared hats-and-buttons helper unconditionally reads data[6]. The status
tail is a sequence of 16-bit effect addresses, but an incomplete final
address is also consumed. A successful zero-length USB URB additionally
reads the packet ID before the common parser is called.
Reject the zero-length USB transfer, require the seven-byte joystick and
wheel prefixes and the two-byte status prefix, a
Input: byd - synchronize timer deletion before freeing private data
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: byd - synchronize timer deletion before freeing private data
byd_disconnect() uses timer_delete() before freeing the driver's private
data. This does not wait for a running byd_clear_touch() callback, which
dereferences the private data and its psmouse pointer. A callback racing
with disconnect can therefore access the private data after it has been
freed. The timer can also still be re-armed by byd_process_byte() while
the disconnect is in progress.
Use timer_shutdown_sync() before freeing the private data: it waits for
a running callback and turns any later re-
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - zero report size on F54 work error
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - zero report size on F54 work error
In rmi_f54_work(), if an error occurs during report request or command
verification, the code jumped directly to the 'error' label, bypassing
the 'abort' label where f54->report_size was normally zeroed out.
This left f54->report_size containing its previous successful payload
size. If a user then altered the V4L2 format to a smaller size, and a
subsequent run failed, rmi_f54_buffer_queue() would copy the stale,
larger payload size into the shrunken V4L2 buffer, causing a heap
buffer overflow.
Fix this by merging
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F54 report size to the allocated buffer
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F54 report size to the allocated buffer
rmi_f54_work() reads a diagnostics report from the device into
f54->report_data, sizing the transfer with rmi_f54_get_report_size():
report_size = rmi_f54_get_report_size(f54);
...
for (i = 0; i < report_size; i += F54_REPORT_DATA_SIZE) {
int size = min(F54_REPORT_DATA_SIZE, report_size - i);
...
rmi_read_block(.., f54->report_data + i, size);
}
report_data is allocated once at probe from F54's own electrode counts
(array3_size(f54->num_tx_electrodes, f54->num_rx_electrodes, sizeof(u16))),
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - block s_input when F54 queue is busy
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - block s_input when F54 queue is busy
Changing the input (diagnostic report type) mid-stream changes the
report size. Since V4L2 buffers are allocated based on the size at
stream start, changing the input while streaming could lead to a
heap buffer overflow if the new size is larger than the allocated
buffers.
Prevent this by blocking VIDIOC_S_INPUT with -EBUSY if the V4L2 queue
is busy (streaming).
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - propagate F54 worker errors to V4L2 queue
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: synaptics-rmi4 - propagate F54 worker errors to V4L2 queue
Previously, rmi_f54_buffer_queue() waited for the worker thread to
finish but ignored whether it succeeded. If the worker failed (e.g.,
due to a timeout or register read failure), the queue thread would
silently return success, delivering stale or uninitialized memory to
userspace.
Add a 'report_error' field to struct f54_data to store the worker's exit
status. Check this field in rmi_f54_buffer_queue() after the worker
finishes, and mark the buffer as VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR if an error
occurred.
Input: hynitron_cstxxx - validate touch count and finger IDs
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: hynitron_cstxxx - validate touch count and finger IDs
The driver allocates max_touch_num input slots, which are indexed from
zero through max_touch_num - 1. The current check allows a finger ID
equal to max_touch_num to reach cst3xx_report_contact(). While the input
core ignores out-of-range slot indices, reporting touch data without a
valid slot change corrupts the touch state of the previously active slot.
The touch count is read from the controller's report and is used to
index the fixed-size report buffer without first checking its range.
Reject counts larger th
crypto: qce - fix error path in devm_qce_register_algs
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qce - fix error path in devm_qce_register_algs
If ops->register_algs() fails, the error path repeatedly calls the same
ops->unregister_algs() from the failed registration. Use the loop index
to unregister the previously registered algorithms instead.
gpio: sloppy-logic-analyzer: fix use-after-free via debugfs trigger on unbind
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: sloppy-logic-analyzer: fix use-after-free via debugfs trigger on unbind
The "trigger" debugfs file has a hand-rolled ->write handler
(trigger_write()) that dereferences the per-device gpio_la_poll_priv. The
file is created with debugfs_create_file_unsafe(), and the handler never
takes a debugfs reference. Nothing keeps the object alive while the
handler runs.
priv is allocated with devm_kzalloc(). devres frees it when the platform
device is unbound. debugfs_create_file_unsafe() installs no full_proxy
wrapper, so debugfs_remove_recursive() in gpio_la_poll_remove() doe
gpio: ml-ioh: use raw_spinlock_t for the register lock
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: ml-ioh: use raw_spinlock_t for the register lock
ioh_irq_type() is registered as the irq_chip .irq_set_type callback and
takes chip->spinlock with spin_lock_irqsave(). This callback is reached
from __setup_irq() -> __irq_set_trigger() -> chip->irq_set_type() while
the caller holds desc->lock, a raw_spinlock_t, with hardirqs disabled.
That context is not sleepable, but on PREEMPT_RT a regular spinlock_t is
an rtmutex-backed sleeping lock, so acquiring it there is invalid.
ioh_irq_enable() and ioh_irq_disable() take the same lock from the
.irq_enable/.irq_disable callb
libceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()
decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode
operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger
slab-out-of-bounds reads:
1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding
bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts
struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past
the validated buffer boundary.
2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header
is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can pos
openrisc: signal: do not restore privileged SR bits on sigreturn
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openrisc: signal: do not restore privileged SR bits on sigreturn
restore_sigcontext() copies the whole supervision register (SR) from the
signal frame and only clears SPR_SR_SM before the value is reloaded into
the hardware SR (through ESR and l.rfe) on the return to user space. All
other SR bits are left under user control.
An unprivileged task can thus return from a signal handler through a
crafted sigframe that clears SPR_SR_DME. With the data MMU disabled the
CPU performs no translation or protection on data accesses, so the task
gains read and write access to arbitr
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: sur40 - fix input device registration ordering
In sur40_probe(), input_register_device() was previously called early before
the V4L2 video device and vb2_queue components were fully initialized. If
userspace opened the input device immediately upon registration, sur40_open()
would trigger and start the sur40_poll() worker thread. This worker thread
invokes sur40_process_video() and accesses the uninitialized vb2_queue
structure, leading to a data race and potential system crash.
Furthermore, if V4L2 or video registration failed after input_register_device()
succeede
libceph: Avoid using invalid osd indices from primary_temp
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Avoid using invalid osd indices from primary_temp
A corrupted osdmap received from a Ceph monitor or OSD may contain osd
indices in its pg_temp, primary_temp, pg_upmap, and pg_upmap_items parts
that don't exist, i.e., that are greater than max_osd or smaller than
CEPH_HOMELESS_OSD (-1). These indices are used to create the up and
acting set in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds(), called from calc_target().
While most of these osd indices are checked, the one from primary_temp
is not. Subsequently, this may lead to calc_target() returning this
(potentially invalid) index as
libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check
ceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the
buffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid:
ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or
compromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with
struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end,
leaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads.
The immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has
no preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byt