PatchFirst · Aktuelle Sicherheitslücken
Bekannte Sicherheitslücken für grafana 13.0.0: 41. Vergleichen Sie die unten genannten Korrekturen mit Ihrer installierten Version.
Sicherheitslücken: 41
A user with organization administrator permissions can delete dashboard snapshots belonging to other organizations on the same Grafana instance, and can recover a snapshot's secret delete key using only its public share key (broken access control).
An authenticated attacker with Editor access or alert.instances.external:write can submit an external Alertmanager alert containing a controlled generatorURL. The attacker is authorized to create the alert, but not to execute script in another user's Grafana session. Grafana renders alert.generatorURL directly as the Alert Details See source LinkButton href without URL-scheme sanitization or a safe-protocol allowlist. The click interceptor's :// heuristic can be bypassed by placing :// inside a JavaScript comment. When a user with read access clicks See source, the browser executes attacker-controlled JavaScript in the Grafana origin with th
An authenticated user with permission to create or edit alert rules can bypass datasource query authorization by marking an alert rule query as a server-side expression while referencing a real datasource UID (incorrect authorization). This can expose data accessible through Grafana's configured datasource credentials to users who lack permission to query that datasource.
This vulnerability only affects Grafana stacks configured with multiple organizations; single-organization deployments are not impacted. In a multi-organization stack, a user who is an Org Admin of a single organization can call GET /api/access-control/users/permissions/search?actionPrefix=dashboards: and receive permission data belonging to other organizations. The disclosed data is limited to dashboard and folder identifiers (UIDs) and per-user permission/scope mappings (which user holds which access on which dashboard). Dashboard contents, panels, query results, datasource credentials, secrets, and personal data are not exposed. This is a
A user with Editor permissions can craft a dashboard whose table (TableNG) panel contains a malicious field name that executes as a script in the browser of any user who views the dashboard (stored cross-site scripting).
An unauthenticated attacker can repeatedly call Grafana's OAuth login route with unique values, causing unbounded memory growth that can eventually exhaust memory and crash the Grafana instance (denial of service).
Several Grafana API endpoints, some of them unauthenticated, do not limit the size of the request body before processing it. An attacker can send very large payloads that force excessive memory allocation, potentially exhausting memory and causing a denial of service.
The public dashboard query endpoint does not limit request body size before processing, allowing unauthenticated attackers to trigger excessive memory allocation by sending arbitrarily large JSON payloads. This can lead to denial of service through memory exhaustion. No valid dashboard access token or authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.
A user with Editor permissions can place a malicious script in the attribution field of a Geomap panel's XYZ tile layer via a template variable. The script then executes in the browser of any user who views the affected dashboard (stored cross-site scripting).
A user with Viewer permissions can use specially crafted requests to the Tempo and Loki data source plugins to reach unintended backend endpoints. Depending on the backend configuration this can expose data source credentials, leak internal responses, or trigger administrative actions on the configured backend.
A user with Viewer permissions can use a path traversal in the Loki data source plugin to reach administrative Loki endpoints and read sensitive backend configuration and internal service information.
Editors could delete any annotation, even those they do not have read access to. The editor user cannot create or read the annotations.
Using the $__timeGroup macro, one can achieve an OOM by overloading the server. This requires a SQL datasource. If the server is set up to auto-restart, the impact is minimal or non-existent, as the attack can take upwards of half an hour to crash the server.
A request to the Grafana plugin resources endpoint can cause unbounded memory allocation by reading the entire request body into memory. An authenticated user can exploit this to trigger an out-of-memory condition, potentially causing a denial of service.
When using an IPv6 allow-list for the Auth Proxy feature, it defaults to /32 addresses. Addresses specifying a mask explicitly are not affected; to mitigate easily, add the desired mask (usually /128) to the addresses. Only auth proxy is affected; Okta, SAML, LDAP, etc are unaffected here.
A vulnerability in SQL Expressions allows an authenticated attacker to read arbitrary files from the Grafana server's filesystem. Only instances with the sqlExpressions feature toggle enabled are vulnerable.
Any Editor could delete any snapshot, even if they have no access to read or write them.
When a user's access to mint tokens for a service account is revoked, it is sometimes still possible to do so for a few seconds after the event. The user will eventually lose access to do this.
An Editor can overwrite a dashboard not owned by them to acquire admin on that specific dashboard. The user must have write access to the dashboard to escalate privilege.
The Grafana Live push endpoint can be exploited to cause unbounded memory allocation by sending a large or streaming request body, potentially leading to out-of-memory conditions. An authenticated user with access to the Grafana Live API can trigger this issue.
Gleichen Sie Ihren installierten Stack und seine Versionen mit den aktuellen Sicherheitsmeldungen ab.