OpenClaw hardened the skill download target directory validation
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, a bug in `download` skill installation allowed `targetDir` values from skill frontmatter to resolve outside the per-skill tools directory if not strictly validated. In the admin-only `skills.install` flow, this could write files outside the intended install sandbox. Version 2026.2.15 contains a fix for the issue.
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, `normalizeForHash` in `src/agents/sandbox/config-hash.ts` recursively sorted arrays that contained only primitive values. This made order-sensitive sandbox configuration arrays hash to the same value even when order changed. In OpenClaw sandbox flows, this hash is used to decide whether existing sandbox containers should be recreated. As a result, order-only config changes (for example Docker `dns` and `binds` array order) could be treated as unchanged and stale containers could be reused. This is a configuration integrity issue affecting sandbox recreation behavior. Starting in
OpenClaw session tool visibility hardening and Telegram webhook secret fallback
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, in some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted. In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured. In shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. In single
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Telegram bot tokens can appear in error messages and stack traces (for example, when request URLs include `https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/...`). Prior to version 2026.2.15, OpenClaw logged these strings without redaction, which could leak the bot token into logs, crash reports, CI output, or support bundles. Disclosure of a Telegram bot token allows an attacker to impersonate the bot and take over Bot API access. Users should upgrade to version 2026.2.15 to obtain a fix and rotate the Telegram bot token if it may have been exposed.
OpenClaw: Docker container escape via unvalidated bind mount config injection
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, a configuration injection issue in the Docker tool sandbox could allow dangerous Docker options (bind mounts, host networking, unconfined profiles) to be applied, enabling container escape or host data access. OpenClaw 2026.2.15 blocks dangerous sandbox Docker settings and includes runtime enforcement when building `docker create` args; config-schema validation for `network=host`, `seccompProfile=unconfined`, `apparmorProfile=unconfined`; and security audit findings to surface dangerous sandbox docker config. As a workaround, do not configure `agents.*.sandbox.docker.binds` to m
OpenClaw: Unsanitized CWD path injection into LLM prompts
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, OpenClaw embedded the current working directory (workspace path) into the agent system prompt without sanitization. If an attacker can cause OpenClaw to run inside a directory whose name contains control/format characters (for example newlines or Unicode bidi/zero-width markers), those characters could break the prompt structure and inject attacker-controlled instructions. Starting in version 2026.2.15, the workspace path is sanitized before it is embedded into any LLM prompt output, stripping Unicode control/format characters and explicit line/paragraph separators. Workspace pa
OpenClaw has a Path Traversal in Browser Download Functionality
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. In versions 2026.1.12 through 2026.2.12, OpenClaw browser download helpers accepted an unsanitized output path. When invoked via the browser control gateway routes, this allowed path traversal to write downloads outside the intended OpenClaw temp downloads directory. This issue is not exposed via the AI agent tool schema (no `download` action). Exploitation requires authenticated CLI access or an authenticated gateway RPC token. Version 2026.2.13 fixes the issue.
OpenClaw has a path traversal in browser upload allows local file read
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, authenticated attackers can read arbitrary files from the Gateway host by supplying absolute paths or path traversal sequences to the browser tool's `upload` action. The server passed these paths to Playwright's `setInputFiles()` APIs without restricting them to a safe root. An attacker must reach the Gateway HTTP surface (or otherwise invoke the same browser control hook endpoints); present valid Gateway auth (bearer token / password), as required by the Gateway configuration (In common default setups, the Gateway binds to loopback and the onboarding wizard generates a gateway
OpenClaw iMessage group allowlist authorization inherited DM pairing-store identities
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, under iMessage `groupPolicy=allowlist`, group authorization could be satisfied by sender identities coming from the DM pairing store, broadening DM trust into group contexts. Version 2026.2.14 fixes the issue.
OpenClaw allows unauthenticated discovery TXT records to steer routing and TLS pinning
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Discovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as `lanHost`, `tailnetDns`, `gatewayPort`, and `gatewayTlsSha256`. TXT records are unauthenticated. Prior to version 2026.2.14, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs. iOS and macOS used TXT-provided host hints (`lanHost`/`tailnetDns`) and ports (`gatewayPort`) to build the connection URL. iOS and Android allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (`gatewayTlsSha256`) to override a previously stored TLS pin. On a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue `_openclaw-gw._tcp` service. Thi
OpenClaw skills.status could leak secrets to operator.read clients
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, `skills.status` could disclose secrets to `operator.read` clients by returning raw resolved config values in `configChecks` for skill `requires.config` paths. Version 2026.2.14 stops including raw resolved config values in requirement checks (return only `{ path, satisfied }`) and narrows the Discord skill requirement to the token key. In addition to upgrading, users should rotate any Discord tokens that may have been exposed to read-scoped clients.
OpenClaw Node host system.run rawCommand/command mismatch can bypass allowlist/approvals
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, a mismatch between `rawCommand` and `command[]` in the node host `system.run` handler could cause allowlist/approval evaluation to be performed on one command while executing a different argv. This only impacts deployments that use the node host / companion node execution path (`system.run` on a node), enable allowlist-based exec policy (`security=allowlist`) with approval prompting driven by allowlist misses (for example `ask=on-miss`), allow an attacker to invoke `system.run`. Default/non-node configurations are not affected. Version 2026.2.14 enforces `rawCommand`/`command[]`
OpenClaw has a SSRF guard bypass via full-form IPv4-mapped IPv6 (loopback / metadata reachable)
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.14, OpenClaw's SSRF protection could be bypassed using full-form IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals such as `0:0:0:0:0:ffff:7f00:1` (which is `127.0.0.1`). This could allow requests that should be blocked (loopback / private network / link-local metadata) to pass the SSRF guard. Version 2026.2.14 patches the issue.
OpenClaw has a command injection in maintainer clawtributors updater
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Versions 2026.1.8 through 2026.2.13 have a command injection in the maintainer/dev script `scripts/update-clawtributors.ts`. The issue affects contributors/maintainers (or CI) who run `bun scripts/update-clawtributors.ts` in a source checkout that contains a malicious commit author email (e.g. crafted `@users[.]noreply[.]github[.]com` values). Normal CLI usage is not affected (`npm i -g openclaw`): this script is not part of the shipped CLI and is not executed during routine operation. The script derived a GitHub login from `git log` author metadata and interpolated it into a shell command (via `execSync`)
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to OpenClaw version 2026.2.14, the Gateway tool accepted a tool-supplied `gatewayUrl` without sufficient restrictions, which could cause the OpenClaw host to attempt outbound WebSocket connections to user-specified targets. This requires the ability to invoke tools that accept `gatewayUrl` overrides (directly or indirectly). In typical setups this is limited to authenticated operators, trusted automation, or environments where tool calls are exposed to non-operators. In other words, this is not a drive-by issue for arbitrary internet users unless a deployment explicitly allows untrusted users to trig
OpenClaw has a local file disclosure via sendMediaFeishu in Feishu extension
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to OpenClaw version 2026.2.14, the Feishu extension previously allowed `sendMediaFeishu` to treat attacker-controlled `mediaUrl` values as local filesystem paths and read them directly. If an attacker can influence tool calls (directly or via prompt injection), they may be able to exfiltrate local files by supplying paths such as `/etc/passwd` as `mediaUrl`. Upgrade to OpenClaw `2026.2.14` or newer to receive a fix. The fix removes direct local file reads from this path and routes media loading through hardened helpers that enforce local-root restrictions.
OpenClaw macOS deep link confirmation truncation can conceal executed agent message
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. OpenClaw macOS desktop client registers the `openclaw://` URL scheme. For `openclaw://agent` deep links without an unattended `key`, the app shows a confirmation dialog that previously displayed only the first 240 characters of the message, but executed the full message after the user clicked "Run." At the time of writing, the OpenClaw macOS desktop client is still in beta. In versions 2026.2.6 through 2026.2.13, an attacker could pad the message with whitespace to push a malicious payload outside the visible preview, increasing the chance a user approves a different message than the one that is actually e
OpenClaw has Missing Webhook Authentication in Telnyx Provider Allowing Unauthenticated Requests
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Versions 2026.2.13 and below allow the optional @openclaw/voice-call plugin Telnyx webhook handler to accept unsigned inbound webhook requests when telnyx.publicKey is not configured, enabling unauthenticated callers to forge Telnyx events. Telnyx webhooks are expected to be authenticated via Ed25519 signature verification. In affected versions, TelnyxProvider.verifyWebhook() could effectively fail open when no Telnyx public key was configured, allowing arbitrary HTTP POST requests to the voice-call webhook endpoint to be treated as legitimate Telnyx events. This only impacts deployments where the Voice Ca
OpenClaw affected by cross-site request forgery (CSRF) through loopback browser mutation endpoints
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 2026.2.14, browser-facing localhost mutation routes accepted cross-origin browser requests without explicit Origin/Referer validation. Loopback binding reduces remote exposure but does not prevent browser-initiated requests from malicious origins. A malicious website can trigger unauthorized state changes against a victim's local OpenClaw browser control plane (for example opening tabs, starting/stopping the browser, mutating storage/cookies) if the browser control service is reachable on loopback in the victim's browser context. Starting in version 2026.2.14, mutating HTTP methods (POST/PUT/PATCH
OpenClaw has BlueBubbles webhook auth bypass via loopback proxy trust
OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 2026.2.13, the optional BlueBubbles iMessage channel plugin could accept webhook requests as authenticated based only on the TCP peer address being loopback (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, `::ffff:127.0.0.1`) even when the configured webhook secret was missing or incorrect. This does not affect the default iMessage integration unless BlueBubbles is installed and enabled. Version 2026.2.13 contains a patch. Other mitigations include setting a non-empty BlueBubbles webhook password and avoiding deployments where a public-facing reverse proxy forwards to a loopback-bound Gateway without strong upstream authenti