PatchFirst · Aktuelle Sicherheitslücken
In den letzten 30 Tagen veröffentlichte Sicherheitslücken für Node.js: 413. Davon im KEV-Katalog: 0.
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Laut GitHub Advisory Database wurde in Node.js eine Sicherheitslücke gefunden: Denial of Service (CVE-2026-109932). Die betroffenen Versionen sind nicht genau angegeben. Im Bericht wird keine Version mit Fehlerbehebung genannt.
Was jetzt zu tun ist: Prüfen Sie, ob ein Update für Node.js mit der Fehlerbehebung verfügbar ist, und installieren Sie es.
CVE-2026-109932
Laut OpenNet wurde in Node.js eine Sicherheitslücke gefunden: Remote-Codeausführung (CVE-2026-111497). Die betroffenen Versionen sind nicht genau angegeben. Im Bericht wird keine Version mit Fehlerbehebung genannt.
Was jetzt zu tun ist: Prüfen Sie, ob ein Update für Node.js mit der Fehlerbehebung verfügbar ist, und installieren Sie es.
CVE-2026-111497
Sicherheitslücken: 7795
9Router before 0.4.44 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the unauthenticated POST /api/tunnel/tailscale-install endpoint (this route is not covered by the dashboard middleware matcher, so no authorization check is applied). The sudoPassword field from the request body is written to the stdin of a 'sudo -S sh' child process. When sudo does not prompt for a password (the process runs as root, NOPASSWD is configured, or a recent sudo timestamp cache exists), the sudoPassword value is interpreted by sh as a shell command, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands. Exploitation evidence was first ob
Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenix (Presence JavaScript client) allows an attacker with ordinary channel access to cause a persistent client-side denial of service against every viewer of a presence channel topic. This vulnerability is associated with program files assets/js/phoenix/presence.js and program routines Presence.syncState and Presence.syncDiff. The Phoenix JavaScript presence client checks whether a presence already exists with a bare truthiness test (state[key]) instead of an own-property check. Presence keys can be attacker-controlled, because applications track prese
In version v0.3.32 of open-webui/open-webui, the application allows users to submit large payloads in the email and password fields during the sign-in process due to the lack of character length validation on these inputs. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS) condition when a user submits excessively large strings, exhausting server resources such as CPU, memory, and disk space, and rendering the service unavailable for legitimate users. This makes the server susceptible to resource exhaustion attacks without requiring authentication.
In version 0.3.32 of open-webui/open-webui, the absence of authentication mechanisms allows any unauthenticated attacker to access the `api/v1/utils/code/format` endpoint. If a malicious actor sends a POST request with an excessively high volume of content, the server could become completely unresponsive. This could lead to severe performance issues, causing the server to become unresponsive or experience significant degradation, ultimately resulting in service interruptions for legitimate users.
showdown contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the parseHeaders function of src/subParsers/makehtml/tables.js that fails to properly escape table header ID attributes. Attackers can inject arbitrary HTML and script-executing SVG elements through double-quote characters in markdown table headers, achieving stored XSS when untrusted markdown is rendered with the default github flavor configuration.
showdown contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in metadata title handling that allows attackers to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript. When completeHTMLDocument option is enabled, unescaped less-than and greater-than characters in markdown frontmatter metadata are inserted directly into HTML title tags, enabling attackers to break out of the title context and execute malicious scripts in the rendered page.
pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.4 and 11.8.0, pnpm accepts package names from the env lockfile configDependencies section and uses those names directly when creating config dependency symlinks under node_modules/.pnpm-config. A malicious repository can commit a crafted pnpm-lock.yaml whose env-lockfile document contains a traversal-shaped config dependency name. During pnpm install, pnpm installs the config dependency and creates a symlink at a path derived from that name. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.34.4 and 11.8.0.
pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.4 and 11.7.0, a crafted lockfile alias could be joined directly under a hoisted node_modules directory. Traversal aliases could escape that directory, while reserved aliases such as .bin or .pnpm could overwrite pnpm-owned layout. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.34.4 and 11.7.0.
pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.4 and 11.7.0, a crafted patch entry could resolve outside the configured patches directory and cause pnpm patch-remove to delete an arbitrary reachable file. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.34.4 and 11.7.0.
A vulnerability was detected in react create-react-app up to 5.0.1 on macOS. This affects the function startBrowserProcess of the file openBrowser.js of the component react-dev-utils. Performing a manipulation results in os command injection. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is now public and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A vulnerability was found in tiddly-gittly TidGi-Desktop up to 0.13.0. This impacts an unknown function of the file src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/loadWikiTiddlersWithSubWikis.ts of the component Git Repository Import. The manipulation results in code injection. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been made public and could be used.
The Execute Command node in n8n allows authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands on the host system where n8n runs. Attackers with user access or compromised credentials can exploit this node to run malicious commands, potentially leading to data exfiltration, service disruption, or complete system compromise.
webpack-dev-server versions 5.2.5 and earlier terminate the whole Node.js process when an unauthenticated peer sends either a normal HTTP request with a malformed Host header or a WebSocket upgrade to the default /ws endpoint with a malformed Origin header. The malformed value causes an uncaught exception in the host-validation path and crashes the dev server. Impact is limited to availability of the development server, no data disclosure, no code execution. Patches: upgrade to webpack-dev-server 5.2.6. Workarounds: keep the dev server bound to localhost (the default) and do not expose it to untrusted networks.
webpack-dev-server versions 5.2.5 and earlier expose two internal developer endpoints, /webpack-dev-server/open-editor and /webpack-dev-server/invalidate, that perform state-changing actions on any GET request without verifying that the request originated from the dev server's own page. Any website a developer visits while the dev server is running can trigger these endpoints cross-origin with no interaction beyond the visit. An attacker can open an arbitrary existing local file in the developer's editor, including files outside the project root, and repeated requests can spawn editor processes and force recompilations that degrade the develo
## Summary The `HTMLInputElement.checkValidity()` method constructed a `RegExp` directly from the user-controlled `pattern` property without any sanitization or timeout protection. This allowed an attacker to inject a regex with catastrophic backtracking, freezing the event loop. ## Fix Fixed in commit https://github.com/asymmetric-effort/NogginLessDom/commit/25a3cbac665fae5663f8b71c073b80c3152dbe7b on `main`. Added: - Pattern length limit (1024 characters) - Nested quantifier detection (`hasNestedQuantifiers`) that rejects patterns like `(a+)+` before constructing the regex - Patterns exceeding limits are treated as non-matching (safe def
## Summary The `matchFileSnapshot` function in `src/assertions/snapshots.ts` accepted a `filePath` parameter with zero validation. When snapshot update mode was active (`UPDATE_SNAPSHOTS=1` or `setUpdateMode('all')`), an attacker who controls test input could write arbitrary content to any filesystem path the process has write access to, including creating intermediate directories. ## Affected Code **File:** `src/assertions/snapshots.ts`, lines 732-769 ```typescript export function matchFileSnapshot(actual: unknown, filePath: string): void { const serialized = serialize(actual); const mode = resolveUpdateMode(); const fileExists = f
### Summary `UForm` and `UAuthForm` render a server-side `<form>` element with no `method` and no `action` attribute, relying on a hydrated `@submit.prevent` handler to intercept submission. If a user submits the form before Vue hydration has attached the handler (autofill plus Enter on a slow network, JS bundle blocked by CSP or CDN failure, etc.), the browser performs the native default: a `GET` to the current URL with every named field, including `<input type="password">`, serialised into the query string. ### Details `src/runtime/components/Form.vue` (around the template's `<form>` element) emits: ```vue <component :is="parentBus ?
## Summary Authorization for scoped (agent) MCP callers is enforced **inline, per tool**, and is applied inconsistently — several mutating tools silently omit the ancestry/workspace check that their siblings perform. Because the MCP server authenticates all outbound gRPC with the full server API key and the backend gRPC handlers perform **no caller-based authorization**, the MCP tool layer is the *sole* authorization boundary. A malicious or prompt-injected scoped agent can therefore perform cross-task and cross-session operations it should not be allowed to (an IDOR / privilege-boundary bypass). This advisory bundles the audit's **Systemic
## Summary The default git executor used for all worktree operations spawns `git` through a shell, and the untrusted task **branch** name flows into the command unsanitized. A caller able to reach the PowerLine `SpawnSession` RPC (a malicious or compromised agent acting through the orchestration layer, or any client able to spawn a task) can achieve **arbitrary command execution** as the PowerLine user on every provisioned environment (SSH host, Docker container, or Codespace), escaping the agent sandbox. This advisory bundles two related defects in `worktree.ts` (audit findings **F1** and **F13**). ## Affected versions `@grackle-ai/runti
## Finding **Location**: `core/src/shared/secure-fetch.ts` `assertSecureUrl` validated only the initial request URL. The `fetch()` API follows redirects by default (up to 20 hops). A request to a valid `https://` URL could redirect to `http://internal-service/` or other unvalidated destinations. ## Status **Fixed in v0.2.136** — `secureFetch` now defaults to `redirect: 'error'` which rejects any redirect. Callers can override with `{ redirect: 'follow' }` if they trust the target.
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