PatchFirst · Aktuelle Sicherheitslücken
In den letzten 30 Tagen veröffentlichte Sicherheitslücke für samba: 1. Davon im KEV-Katalog: 0.
Sicherheitslücken: 51
A flaw was found in the way Samba handled file/directory metadata. This flaw allows an authenticated attacker with permissions to read or modify share metadata, to perform this operation outside of the share.
Kerberos acceptors need easy access to stable AD identifiers (eg objectSid). Samba as an AD DC now provides a way for Linux applications to obtain a reliable SID (and samAccountName) in issued tickets.
In DCE/RPC it is possible to share the handles (cookies for resource state) between multiple connections via a mechanism called 'association groups'. These handles can reference connections to our sam.ldb database. However while the database was correctly shared, the user credentials state was only pointed at, and when one connection within that association group ended, the database would be left pointing at an invalid 'struct session_info'. The most likely outcome here is a crash, but it is possible that the use-after-free could instead allow different user state to be pointed at and this might allow more privileged access.
A flaw was found in the way samba implemented DCE/RPC. If a client to a Samba server sent a very large DCE/RPC request, and chose to fragment it, an attacker could replace later fragments with their own data, bypassing the signature requirements.
All versions of Samba prior to 4.15.5 are vulnerable to a malicious client using a server symlink to determine if a file or directory exists in an area of the server file system not exported under the share definition. SMB1 with unix extensions has to be enabled in order for this attack to succeed.
Multiple flaws were found in the way samba AD DC implemented access and conformance checking of stored data. An attacker could use this flaw to cause total domain compromise.
A flaw was found in the way Samba, as an Active Directory Domain Controller, implemented Kerberos name-based authentication. The Samba AD DC, could become confused about the user a ticket represents if it did not strictly require a Kerberos PAC and always use the SIDs found within. The result could include total domain compromise.
A flaw was found in the way samba, as an Active Directory Domain Controller, is able to support an RODC (read-only domain controller). This would allow an RODC to print administrator tickets.
A flaw was found in the way Samba maps domain users to local users. An authenticated attacker could use this flaw to cause possible privilege escalation.
A flaw was found in the way samba implemented SMB1 authentication. An attacker could use this flaw to retrieve the plaintext password sent over the wire even if Kerberos authentication was required.
A null pointer de-reference was found in the way samba kerberos server handled missing sname in TGS-REQ (Ticket Granting Server - Request). An authenticated user could use this flaw to crash the samba server.
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