md/raid5: avoid R5_Overlap races while breaking stripe batches
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid5: avoid R5_Overlap races while breaking stripe batches
KCSAN report a race in break_stripe_batch_list() vs. raid5_make_request()
on sh->dev[i].flags (plain word write vs. atomic bit op)..
and .. one possible scenario is:
CPU1 CPU2
break_stripe_batch_list(sh1)
-> handle sh2
-> lock(sh2)
-> sh2->batch_head = NULL
-> unlock(sh2)
-> test_and_clear_bit(R5_Overlap, sh2->dev[i].flags)
-> wake_up_bit(sh2->dev[i].flags)
raid5_make_request()
-> add_all_stripe_bios(sh2)
netfilter: nf_nat: avoid invalid nat_net pointer use on failed nf_nat_init()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_nat: avoid invalid nat_net pointer use on failed nf_nat_init()
We ran into below KASAN splat, which is mostly uninteresting, beside
for having nf_nat_register_fn() in the call chain as a cause for the
offending access:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nf_nat_register_fn+0x5f9/0x640
Read of size 8 at addr ffff890031e54c20 by task iptables/9510
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9510 Comm: iptables Not tainted 6.18.18-grsec-full-20260320181326 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PI
netfilter: nf_conncount: prevent connlimit drops for early confirmed ct
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conncount: prevent connlimit drops for early confirmed ct
Commit 69894e5b4c5e ("netfilter: nft_connlimit: update the count if add
was skipped") introduced a regression where packets for valid
connections are dropped when using connlimit for soft-limiting
scenarios.
The issue occurs when a new connection reuses a socket currently in
the TIME_WAIT state. In this scenario, the connection tracking entry
is evaluated as already confirmed. Previously, __nf_conncount_add()
assumed that if a connection was confirmed and did not originate from
the loopback interface,
netfilter: nft_compat: ebtables emulation must reject non-bridge targets
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_compat: ebtables emulation must reject non-bridge targets
xtables targets return netfilter verdicts: NF_ACCEPT, NF_DROP, and so
on. ebtables targets return incompatible verdicts: EBT_ACCEPT,
EBT_DROP, ... We cannot allow fallback to NFPROTO_UNSPEC.
ebtables doesn't permit this since
11ff7288beb2 ("netfilter: ebtables: reject non-bridge targets")
but that commit missed the nft_compat layer.
net: dsa: sja1105: round up PTP perout pin duration
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: sja1105: round up PTP perout pin duration
pin_duration is converted from the user-provided period to SJA1105
clock ticks and is later passed as the cycle_time argument to
future_base_time().
Very small period values may become zero after the conversion,
which can lead to a division by zero in future_base_time().
Round zero pin_duration up to 1 tick so that the smallest unsupported
periods use the minimum non-zero hardware duration instead of passing
zero to future_base_time().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix err_chunk memory leaks in INIT handling
When sctp_verify_init() encounters unrecognized parameters, it allocates an
err_chunk to report them. However, this chunk is leaked in several code
paths:
1. In sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(), if security_sctp_assoc_request() fails after
sctp_verify_init() has populated err_chunk, the function returns
immediately without freeing it.
2. In sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(), the same leak occurs on the
security_sctp_assoc_request() failure path.
3. In sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(), on the success path after copying
unrecogniz
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: Validate NIX maximum LFs correctly
NIX maximum number of LFs can be set via devlink command
but that can be done before assigning any LFs to a PF/VF.
The condition used to check whether any LFs are assigned is
incorrect. This patch fixes that condition.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mvneta: re-enable percpu interrupt on resume
On Marvell MPIC platforms (Armada 370/XP/38x), mvneta uses a percpu
IRQ disable/enable scheme for NAPI: the ISR (mvneta_percpu_isr) calls
disable_percpu_irq() to mask the MPIC per-CPU interrupt and schedules
NAPI poll, which calls enable_percpu_irq() on completion to unmask.
If suspend occurs while NAPI poll is pending (between
disable_percpu_irq in the ISR and enable_percpu_irq in poll
completion), the interrupt is never re-enabled:
1. mvneta_percpu_isr: disable_percpu_irq() + napi_schedule()
=> MPIC masked, percpu
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sungem: fix probe error cleanup
gem_init_one() calls gem_remove_one() when register_netdev() fails.
gem_remove_one() unregisters and frees resources owned by the net_device,
including the DMA block, MMIO mapping, PCI regions, and the net_device
itself. gem_init_one() then falls through to its own cleanup labels and
frees the same resources again.
Keep the register_netdev() error path in gem_init_one(): clear drvdata so
PM/remove paths do not see a half-registered device, remove the NAPI
instance added during probe, and let the existing cleanup labels release
the resou
net: udp_tunnel: prevent double queueing in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: udp_tunnel: prevent double queueing in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync
Yue Sun reported a use-after-free and debugobjects warning in
udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync_work() during concurrent device operations.
The workqueue core clears the internal pending bit before invoking the
worker. At that point, a concurrent thread can queue the work again.
When the already running worker eventually clears the work_pending flag
to 0, it mistakenly clears the flag for the newly queued instance.
udp_tunnel_nic_unregister() then observes work_pending as 0 and frees
the structure while the se
tipc: fix UAF in cleanup_bearer() due to premature dst_cache_destroy()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix UAF in cleanup_bearer() due to premature dst_cache_destroy()
TIPC UDP media bearer teardown calls dst_cache_destroy() on its
replicast caches before calling synchronize_net() to wait for
concurrent RCU readers (transmitters) to finish:
static void cleanup_bearer(struct work_struct *work)
{
...
list_for_each_entry_safe(rcast, tmp, &ub->rcast.list, list) {
dst_cache_destroy(&rcast->dst_cache);
list_del_rcu(&rcast->list);
kfree_rcu(rcast, rcu);
}
...
dst_cache_destroy(&ub->rcast.dst_cache);
udp_tunnel_sock_release(ub->sk);
synchronize_net();
...
}
This i
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Mask pseudo pointer values in verifier logs
print_bpf_insn() masks ldimm64 immediates for pointer-bearing pseudo
sources when pointer leaks are not allowed, but the mask only covers
BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD and BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE.
BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX, BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE, and BPF_PSEUDO_BTF_ID can
also be resolved to kernel pointer values before the verifier log prints
the instruction. Include them in the existing pointer classification so
the log prints 0x0 instead of the rewritten address.
seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields
seg6_validate_srh() reads fixed SRH fields such as srh->type and
srh->hdrlen before checking that the supplied length covers the fixed
struct ipv6_sr_hdr fields.
The BPF SEG6 encap path reaches this with a BPF program-supplied pointer
and length: bpf_lwt_push_encap() and the SEG6 local BPF END_B6 and
END_B6_ENCAP actions call bpf_push_seg6_encap(), which forwards the
length to seg6_validate_srh() with no minimum-size guard. A 2-byte SEG6
encap header can therefore make the validator read srh->type at offset 2
beyond th
net: enetc: check the number of BDs needed for xdp_frame
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: enetc: check the number of BDs needed for xdp_frame
The size of xdp_redirect_arr array is ENETC_MAX_SKB_FRAGS. However, the
number of fragments contained in xdp_frame may be greater than or equal
to ENETC_MAX_SKB_FRAGS, which will cause the access to xdp_redirect_arr
to be out of bounds.
sctp: add INIT verification after cookie unpacking
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: add INIT verification after cookie unpacking
In SCTP handshake, the INIT chunk is initially processed by the server
and embedded into the cookie carried in INIT-ACK. The client then
returns this cookie via COOKIE-ECHO, where the server unpacks it and
reconstructs the original INIT chunk.
When cookie authentication is enabled, the cookie contents are protected
against tampering, so reusing the unpacked INIT without re-verification
is safe.
However, when cookie authentication is disabled, the reconstructed INIT
can no longer be trusted. In this case, the INIT must be
hwmon: (pmbus/core) honor vrm_version in pmbus_data2reg_vid()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/core) honor vrm_version in pmbus_data2reg_vid()
pmbus_data2reg_vid() hardcoded the VR11 encoding regardless of the
vrm_version configured by the driver, while pmbus_reg2data_vid()
already switched on it. Any driver that selects a non-VR11 VID mode
and exposes a regulator (or hwmon vout setter) sent dangerously
wrong codes to PMBUS_VOUT_COMMAND -- e.g. an nvidia195mv part asked
for 200 mV got the VR11 clamp to 500 mV encoded as 0xB2, which the
chip interprets as 1080 mV.
Mirror pmbus_reg2data_vid() so writes round-trip with reads.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: adm1275: Prevent reading uninitialized stack
While adding support for the ROHM BD127X0 hot-swap controllers, sashiko
reported an error in device-name comparison, which can lead to reading
uninitialized stack memory.
Quoting Sashiko:
This is a pre-existing issue, but I noticed that just before this block in
adm1275_probe(), there might be an out-of-bounds stack read:
ret = i2c_smbus_read_block_data(client, PMBUS_MFR_MODEL, block_buffer);
if (ret < 0) { ... }
for (mid = adm1275_id; mid->name[0]; mid++) {
if (!strncasecmp(mid->name, block_buff
hwmon: (pmbus) Fix passing events to regulator core
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus) Fix passing events to regulator core
Sashiko reports:
Commit 754bd2b4a084 ("hwmon: (pmbus/core) Protect regulator operations with
mutex") introduced a worker to batch regulator events over time using
atomic_or(). The delayed worker then passes the combined bitmask unmodified
to regulator_notifier_call_chain().
The core regulator subsystem's regulator_handle_critical() function
evaluates the event parameter using a strict switch statement. If
multiple distinct faults occur before the worker runs (e.g.,
REGULATOR_EVENT_UNDER_VOLTAGE | REGULATOR_EVENT_OVER_CUR
ipv6: fib6: fix NULL deref in fib6_walk_continue() on multi-batch dump
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fib6: fix NULL deref in fib6_walk_continue() on multi-batch dump
inet6_dump_fib() saves its progress in cb->args[1] as a positional
index within the current hash chain. Between batches, a concurrent
fib6_new_table() can insert a new table at the chain head, shifting
all existing entries. The saved index then lands on a different
table, causing fib6_dump_table() to set w->root to the wrong table
while w->node still points into the previous one.
fib6_walk_continue() dereferences w->node->parent (NULL) and panics:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000
net: phy: sfp: free mii_bus in sfp_i2c_mdiobus_destroy
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: sfp: free mii_bus in sfp_i2c_mdiobus_destroy
sfp_i2c_mdiobus_create() allocates the I2C MDIO bus with mdio_i2c_alloc(),
a plain (non-devm) allocation, and registers it. sfp_i2c_mdiobus_destroy()
only unregisters the bus and clears sfp->i2c_mii without calling
mdiobus_free(). As the only reference to the bus is then cleared, the
struct mii_bus is leaked.
This is hit whenever a copper/RollBall SFP module that instantiated an MDIO
bus is removed: sfp_sm_main() takes the global teardown path and calls
sfp_i2c_mdiobus_destroy(). sfp_cleanup(), on driver unbind, frees