PatchFirst · Aktuelle Sicherheitslücken
In den letzten 30 Tagen veröffentlichte Sicherheitslücken für zabbix: 6. Davon im KEV-Katalog: 0.
Sicherheitslücken: 53
Zabbix Agent 2 Docker plugin does not properly sanitize the 'docker.container_info' parameters when forwarding them to the Docker daemon. An attacker capable of invoking Agent 2 can read arbitrary files from running Docker containers by injecting them via the Docker archive API.
An authenticated Zabbix user (including Guest) is able to cause disproportionate CPU load on the webserver by sending specially crafted parameters to /imgstore.php, leading to potential denial of service.
An authenticated Zabbix Super Admin can exploit the oauth.authorize action to read arbitrary files from the webserver leading to potential confidentiality loss.
A regular Zabbix user with no permission to the Monitoring -> Problems view is still able to call the problem.view.refresh action and therefore still retrieve a list of active problems.
A regular Zabbix user can search other users in their user group via Zabbix API by select fields the user does not have access to view. This allows data-mining some field values the user does not have access to.
The LDAP 'Bind password' value cannot be read after saving, but a Super Admin account can leak it by changing LDAP 'Host' to a rogue LDAP server. To mitigate this, the 'Bind password' value is now reset on 'Host' change.
Due to a bug in Zabbix API, the hostprototype.get method lists all host prototypes to users that do not have any user groups assigned to them.
Zabbix Agent 2 smartctl plugin does not properly sanitize smart.disk.get parameters, allowing an attacker to inject unexpected arguments into the smartctl command. This can be used to leak the NTLMv2 hash from a Windows system.
Zabbix server is vulnerable to a DoS vulnerability due to uncontrolled resource exhaustion. An attacker can send specially crafted requests to the server, which will cause the server to allocate an excessive amount of memory and perform CPU-intensive decompression operations, ultimately leading to a service crash.
The endpoint /zabbix.php?action=export.valuemaps suffers from a Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability via the backurl parameter. This is caused by the reflection of user-supplied data without appropriate HTML escaping or output encoding. As a result, a JavaScript payload may be injected into the above endpoint causing it to be executed within the context of the victim's browser.
Zabbix API user.get returns all users that share common group with the calling user. This includes media and other information, such as login attempts, etc.
Execution time for an unsuccessful login differs when using a non-existing username compared to using an existing one.
A low privilege (regular) Zabbix user with API access can use SQL injection vulnerability in include/classes/api/CApiService.php to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the groupBy parameter.
When exporting media types, the password is exported in the YAML in plain text. This appears to be a best practices type issue and may have no actual impact. The user would need to have permissions to access the media types and therefore would be expected to have access to these passwords.
When the webdriver for the Browser object downloads data from a HTTP server, the data pointer is set to NULL and is allocated only in curl_write_cb when receiving data. If the server's response is an empty document, then wd->data in the code below will remain NULL and an attempt to read from it will result in a crash.
There was discovered a use after free bug in browser.c in the es_browser_get_variant function
The reported vulnerability is a stack buffer overflow in the zbx_snmp_cache_handle_engineid function within the Zabbix server/proxy code. This issue occurs when copying data from session->securityEngineID to local_record.engineid without proper bounds checking.
Setting SMS media allows to set GSM modem file. Later this file is used as Linux device. But due everything is a file for Linux, it is possible to set another file, e.g. log file and zabbix_server will try to communicate with it as modem. As a result, log file will be broken with AT commands and small part for log file content will be leaked to UI.
An administrator with restricted permissions can exploit the script execution functionality within the Monitoring Hosts section. The lack of default escaping for script parameters enabled this user ability to execute arbitrary code via the Ping script, thereby compromising infrastructure.
User with no permission to any of the Hosts can access and view host count & other statistics through System Information Widget in Global View Dashboard.
Gleichen Sie Ihren installierten Stack und seine Versionen mit den aktuellen Sicherheitsmeldungen ab.