vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()
The neighbour hardware address n->ha can be updated asynchronously by the
neighbour subsystem, protected by n->ha_lock seqlock. Reading n->ha without
holding the seqlock loop can lead to torn reads or reading a partially updated
MAC address.
Use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit() to safely copy n->ha under
read_seqbegin()/read_seqretry() lock protection before using it.
Note that arp_reduce() and neigh_reduce() seem to have the same issue
left for future patches.
vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() for transmit path header pulls
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() for transmit path header pulls
In vxlan_xmit(), arp_reduce(), and vxlan_mdb_entry_skb_get(), pskb_may_pull() was
being called to verify the availability of network layer headers (ARP, IPv6/ND,
IP/IPv6 MDB keys).
However, during transmit skb->data points to the MAC header, so skb_network_offset(skb)
is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, len) only checks len bytes from skb->data
rather than skb_network_offset(skb) + len, which can leave part of the network header
in non-linear frags.
Replace these remaining pskb_may_pull() calls
vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit()
route_shortcircuit() currently calls pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr))
(or ipv6hdr), which checks if bytes are available starting from skb->data.
However, in vxlan_xmit(), skb->data points to the MAC header, so
skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, 20)
only checks 20 bytes from skb->data (which is 14 bytes MAC header + 6 bytes of
IP header), leaving the rest of the IP header potentially un-pulled in non-linear
frags. Subsequent dereferences of ip_hdr(skb)->daddr can read be
tracing: Check return value of __register_event() in trace_module_add_events()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Check return value of __register_event() in trace_module_add_events()
trace_module_add_events() ignores the return value of __register_event()
and unconditionally calls __add_event_to_tracers() for each event.
If __register_event() fails (for example, if event_init() fails), the
trace_event_call is not added to ftrace_events list, but
__add_event_to_tracers() still creates a trace_event_file pointing to it.
If module loading subsequently fails and module memory is freed, tracing
state retains a stale trace_event_call pointer in trace_event_file,
leading to a use-a
scsi: scsi_debug: Fix REPORT ZONES alloc_len underflow OOB write
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: scsi_debug: Fix REPORT ZONES alloc_len underflow OOB write
resp_report_zones() sizes the reply buffer from the CDB allocation
length. The v3 fix rounds alloc_len up with ALIGN() before deriving the
descriptor count:
rep_max_zones = (ALIGN((u64)alloc_len, RZONES_DESC_HD) -
RZONES_DESC_HD) >> ilog2(RZONES_DESC_HD);
arr_len = (u64)RZONES_DESC_HD * (rep_max_zones + 1);
For alloc_len in 0xFFFFFFC1..0xFFFFFFFF, ALIGN() rounds up to
0x100000000, so arr_len is 4 GB. On 32-bit, kzalloc()'s size_t is 32-bit
and truncates 0x100000000 to 0; kzalloc(0) returns ZERO_SIZE_PT
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: prevent peer transport count overflow
sctp_assoc_add_peer() increments the association's 16-bit transport_count
for every new unique peer. Adding the 65,536th transport wraps the count to
zero.
SCTP sock_diag uses transport_count to reserve the INET_DIAG_PEERS payload,
then copies one sockaddr_storage for every entry in transport_addr_list.
After the wrap, a diagnostic dump reserves an empty payload and writes
8 MiB of peer addresses past the skb tail.
Reject a new unique peer when transport_count has reached U16_MAX. Perform
the check after the existing-peer lookup
gpio: pch: use raw_spinlock_t for the register lock
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: pch: use raw_spinlock_t for the register lock
pch_irq_type() is registered as the irq_chip .irq_set_type callback and
takes chip->spinlock with spin_lock_irqsave(). This callback is reached
from __setup_irq() -> __irq_set_trigger() -> chip->irq_set_type() while
the caller holds desc->lock, a raw_spinlock_t, with hardirqs disabled.
That context is not sleepable, but on PREEMPT_RT a regular spinlock_t is
an rtmutex-backed sleeping lock, so acquiring it there is invalid.
This was confirmed on a PREEMPT_RT kernel with lockdep
(PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING and DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLE
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/qeth: Check CAP_NET_ADMIN for private ioctls
Gate the SIOCDEVPRIVATE ioctl commands SIOC_QETH_ADP_SET_SNMP_CONTROL,
SIOC_QETH_GET_CARD_TYPE and SIOC_QETH_QUERY_OAT with CAP_NET_ADMIN
capable check to ensure unprivileged users cannot invoke them.
net: openvswitch: fix potential UAF on meter attach failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix potential UAF on meter attach failure
While attaching a newly created meter attach_meter() function makes
the new meter visible to other CPUs but can still fail afterwards.
On failure, it detaches the meter back and returns an error.
However, this is an unexpected behavior for the ovs_meter_cmd_set()
that uses a plain kfree(meter) on attach failure without waiting for
RCU readers to stop using it, assuming it was never visible.
This is never a problem for ovs-vswitchd as it always creates meters
before creating any flows that use them. But the UAF c
net: openvswitch: fix skb leak on flow key update failure during ct
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: fix skb leak on flow key update failure during ct
ovs_ct_execute() always steals or frees the skb on failure while
ovs_flow_key_update() does not. So, if it fails and we return right
away, the skb ends up leaked.
Fix that by breaking instead and letting the common error handling
code at the bottom of the loop to free the skb properly.
This is a very unlikely scenario as it requires the packet to become
unparseable by applying a set of actions on a previously parseable skb,
but should be fixed nevertheless.
Reported by Sashiko.
i2c: jz4780: Cache host clock rate at probe to prevent CCF prepare_lock deadlock
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: jz4780: Cache host clock rate at probe to prevent CCF prepare_lock deadlock
Fix a severe AB/BA deadlock between the Common Clock Framework (CCF)
and the I2C adapter lock, which triggers when an I2C-controlled clock
generator client (like the Si5351) is registered or modified under the CCF.
During an i2c client clock (generator) frequency change, the CCF acquires its global
'prepare_lock' mutex and the driver calls i2c_transfer() to update the client's
chip registers, stalling for the adapter's I2C bus lock.
Concurrently, an independent, parallel transfer on the same
i2c: imx: Cancel hrtimer before clearing slave pointer
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: imx: Cancel hrtimer before clearing slave pointer
In i2c_imx_unreg_slave(), the slave pointer is set to NULL after
disabling interrupts. However, a pending interrupt might already
have started the hrtimer (i2c_imx_slave_timeout) before the pointer
was cleared. If the hrtimer fires after i2c_imx->slave is set to
NULL, the timer callback i2c_imx_slave_finish_op() will call
i2c_imx_slave_event() with a NULL slave pointer, which results in a
use-after-free / NULL pointer dereference.
Fix by canceling the hrtimer and waiting for it to complete after
disabling interrupts,
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: ems_usb: validate CPC message lengths
ems_usb_read_bulk_callback() walks CPC messages packed in one USB
receive buffer.
Check that each declared message fits in the URB payload. Also require the
type-specific payload to cover the fields used by the CAN, state, error and
overrun handlers.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: etas_es58x: es58x_read_bulk_callback(): fix RX buffer leak on URB resubmit failure
es58x_read_bulk_callback() resubmits the RX URB after processing a received
packet. If the resubmit succeeds, the URB remains anchored and will be
handled by the normal RX path or by teardown.
However, if usb_submit_urb() fails, the callback unanchors the URB and then
returns directly. This skips the existing free_urb path, so the coherent
transfer buffer allocated with usb_alloc_coherent() is not released.
Reuse the existing free_urb path after a resubmit failure so that the RX
cohere
can: kvaser_usb_leaf: kvaser_usb_leaf_wait_cmd(): validate received command extents
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: kvaser_usb_leaf: kvaser_usb_leaf_wait_cmd(): validate received command extents
The wait and bulk receive paths walk variable-length commands from a
USB buffer. A nonzero command shorter than CMD_HEADER_LEN can still be
dispatched, and the wait path copies a matching command into a fixed
caller-owned struct kvaser_cmd using the device-provided length.
Reject nonzero commands that do not contain the fixed header or that
extend beyond the current USB buffer item. In the wait path, also reject
a matching command that exceeds the destination before copying it.
can: peak_usb: add bounds check for USB channel index
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: peak_usb: add bounds check for USB channel index
The channel control index ctrl_idx is derived from rx->len which comes
directly from a device USB payload. The mask 0x0f allows values 0-15, but
the array size of usb_if->dev[] is only 2. Values 2-15 cause heap
out-of-bounds read, eventually causing kernel panic in the IRQ context.
Add bounds checking for ctrl_idx before the array access in both
pcan_usb_pro_handle_canmsg() and pcan_usb_pro_handle_error().
can: peak_usb: peak_usb_start(): fix double free of transfer buffer on URB submit error
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: peak_usb: peak_usb_start(): fix double free of transfer buffer on URB submit error
In peak_usb_start(), each RX URB transfer buffer is allocated with kmalloc()
and the URB is flagged URB_FREE_BUFFER so that the final usb_free_urb() also
frees the transfer buffer.
If usb_submit_urb() fails, the error path frees the buffer explicitly with
kfree(buf) and then calls usb_free_urb(urb). Because URB_FREE_BUFFER is set,
usb_free_urb() -> urb_destroy() frees the same buffer a second time, a double
free of the transfer buffer.
BUG: KASAN: double-free in usb_free_urb.part.0+0
can: peak_usb: validate uCAN receive record lengths
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: peak_usb: validate uCAN receive record lengths
pcan_usb_fd_decode_buf() walks uCAN records packed in one USB
receive buffer.
Require each record to contain the fixed header for its type, and verify
CAN payload bytes before copying them into the skb.
drm/vc4: Supply the overflow slot size in BPOS, not the whole bin BO size
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vc4: Supply the overflow slot size in BPOS, not the whole bin BO size
vc4_overflow_mem_work() points BPOA at a 512KB slot inside the 16MB
binner BO, but writes the size of the whole BO to BPOS. On every binner
out-of-memory event the PTB is therefore authorized to write tile lists
across all the other slots (which may hold the tile state, tile alloc and
overflow memory of in-flight jobs) and, for any slot but the first, past
the end of the binner BO into unrelated CMA memory.
Since CMA pages are recycled into page cache and user allocations, this
is arbitrary memory co
drm/vc4: Zero the tile state data array before each BIN job
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vc4: Zero the tile state data array before each BIN job
The binner BO is a single 16MB buffer split into 512KB slots that are
handed out to jobs at submission time and recycled as jobs complete,
without ever being cleared. Each slot holds the job's Tile State Data
Array (TSDA) at its start, followed by the tile allocation pool.
While the tile allocation pool is only walked by the render thread
through branches the binner generated during the current job, the
TSDA is the PTB's own per-tile bookkeeping and is consumed by the
hardware itself. Although the kernel sets the