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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: arp/nd proxy: fix reading neigh ha Currently neigh ha address is read directly, but that can result in torn/partial reads if the neigh is being updated. Use neigh_ha_snapshot to take a stable snapshot of the address.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: fix reading neigh ha Currently arp/neigh_reduce read neigh ha directly which can lead to partial reads while the neigh is being updated. Use neigh_ha_snapshot to take a stable snapshot of the address similar to route_shortcircuit which already does the right thing.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4.1: zero referring call lists before decoding decode_cb_sequence_args() allocates csa_rclists with kmalloc_objs(), so each referring_call_list starts uninitialized. decode_rc_list() assigns rcl_refcalls only when rcl_nrefcalls is nonzero. A valid list with zero referring calls therefore leaves the pointer uninitialized, and nfs4_callback_sequence() later passes stale slab contents to kfree(). Allocate csa_rclists with kzalloc_objs() so every rcl_refcalls member is NULL from the beginning, including valid empty referring call lists.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4.2: fix LAYOUTSTATS send buffer exhaustion encode_layoutstats_maxsz budgets XDR_QUADLEN(PNFS_LAYOUTSTATS_MAXSIZE), i.e. 256 bytes, for the layoutupdate4 body written by the layout driver. The flexfiles record can exceed that. ff_layout_encode_ff_layoutupdate() emits, per data server, a netaddr4, an nfs_fh4, two ff_io_latency4, an nfstime4 and a bool. A data server whose filehandle is NFS_MAXFHSIZE bytes long already accounts for 132 of those bytes, and the two ff_io_latency4 at 64 bytes each, the nfstime4 and the bool add a further 144, so the body passes 256 bytes b
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4/pnfs: key the data server cache on the NFS version nfs4_pnfs_ds_add() keys the per-net data server cache on the multipath address set alone, and struct nfs4_pnfs_ds records no version. That suffices for the files layout driver, which always connects with version 4, but flexfiles takes its version tuple from GETDEVICEINFO per device, and one address can legitimately serve both NFSv3 and NFSv4. Two deviceids on one address with different ds_versions[0].version therefore share a single nfs4_pnfs_ds, and whichever mirror connects first pins ds_clp to its own version. The
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: account classifier filter allocations to memcg Allocations in the tc classifier *_change() paths (filter objects, per-CPU counters, and per-filter aux data) use plain GFP_KERNEL without __GFP_ACCOUNT, allowing unprivileged users to pin kernel memory outside memcg charging. The shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array allocation in cls_api.c was also uncharged; this patch closes it along with the per-classifier filter-object/percpu/aux allocations that remain unaccounted. Add GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT to: - the shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array (cls_api.c), common to
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sparx5: fix sleep in atomic context in MAC table access sparx5_set_rx_mode() runs with netif_addr_lock_bh held and iterates dev->mc via __dev_mc_sync(), which per address calls sparx5_mc_sync() / sparx5_mc_unsync() -> sparx5_mact_learn() / sparx5_mact_forget(). These take sparx5->lock, a mutex, and then poll the MAC access command register with readx_poll_timeout(). A mutex may block, which is not allowed from atomic context. Convert the driver to the new .ndo_set_rx_mode_async callback introduced in commit 3554b4345d85 ("net: introduce ndo_set_rx_mode_async and netd
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Drivers: hv: vmbus: Skip VMBus module cleanup for non-nested root partition The VMBus module initialization function, hv_acpi_init(), currently does nothing when running in the root partition and root is not nested in another VM. But the initialization function reports success, so the VMBus module is indeed loaded. VMBus functionality is not actually needed, but the VMBus module must be loaded so that hv_vmbus_exists() can answer correctly. Furthermore, the mshv_root dependency on the VMBus module is needed as described in the commit message for 840b740a35bf ("mshv: Add con
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject accept queue add unless BT_LISTEN New sk should not be added to parent socket accept queue after last l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() has run in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() and state set to BT_CLOSED, as that can result to UAF on dereferencing the dangling parent reference. l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() may race with parent l2cap_chan teardown, due to chan->state accessed without consistent locking: [Task 1] [Task 2] l2cap_sock_release(parent) l2cap_connect l2cap_sock_shutdown pchan = l2cap_global
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btmtksdio: Fix out-of-bounds DMA read in the TX path btmtksdio_tx_packet() rounds the transfer size up to the SDIO block size of 256 bytes, but hands the host controller the SKB buffer as is: err = sdio_writesb(bdev->func, MTK_REG_CTDR, skb->data, round_up(skb->len, MTK_SDIO_BLOCK_SIZE)); Only skb->len bytes hold packet data, so the controller reads up to 255 bytes of uninitialised memory and sends it to the device over the SDIO bus. Depending on how much tailroom slack the SKB allocation happens to carry, that read can also extend past the end of the bu
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Validate MTU in rfcomm_apply_pn() to prevent infinite loop rfcomm_apply_pn() accepts the MTU value from a remote PN (Parameter Negotiation) frame without checking for zero. When the remote peer sends an MTU of zero, d->mtu is set to 0. This causes the sendmsg path to enter an infinite loop when fragmenting data, as each fragment has size == min_t(size_t, len, 0) == 0, so the remaining length never decreases. The infinite allocation of zero-length skbs exhausts all system memory. Fix by clamping d->mtu to RFCOMM_DEFAULT_MTU when the negotiated value is ze
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-vf: fix workqueue and netdev race in probe/remove Initialize the VF workqueue before register_netdev() so ndo_set_rx_mode does not queue work on a NULL workqueue. Unregister the netdev before destroying the workqueue, and add proper probe error cleanup.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_ife: Only operate on Ethernet frames act_ife encapsulates/decapsulates the original Ethernet header and uses skb->dev->hard_header_len as the length of that header. That is only correct for Ethernet devices: on a device where hard_header_len does not match the L2 header that was actually pulled (PPP reports PPP_HDRLEN while nothing is stripped on ingress), the ingress skb_push()/skb_pull() use the wrong length and can hit skb_under_panic when headroom is tight. IFE is Ethernet-only by design - it builds an outer ethhdr, rewrites h_source/h_dest/h_proto, and
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: use wq_has_sleeper() in rds_cong_map_updated() rds_cong_map_updated() runs after a peer's congestion map has been rewritten (by rds_tcp_cong_recv() and rds_ib_cong_recv(), or the clear-all in the loopback and IB send-completion paths). It bumps rds_cong_generation and then checks waitqueue_active() on map->m_waitq and on rds_poll_waitq to decide whether anyone needs waking. atomic_inc() carries no ordering and waitqueue_active() is a plain load, so nothing orders the map and generation stores before the wait queue reads. The waiters do the mirror image: rds_cong
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_skbmod: fix length calculations and avoid invalid header warnings syzbot reported a warning in skb_network_header_len() triggered by tcf_skbmod_act(): !skb_transport_header_was_set(skb) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14949 at include/linux/skbuff.h:3243 skb_network_header_len include/linux/skbuff.h:3243 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14949 at net/sched/act_skbmod.c:55 tcf_skbmod_act+0xfe8/0x1810 net/sched/act_skbmod.c:55 There are a few issues in tcf_skbmod_act(): 1. Calling skb_network_header_len() assumes skb->transport_header is set, which is not guarante
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum fq_init() computes quantum = 2 * psched_mtu() and initial_quantum = 10 * psched_mtu() with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000; the 2 * and 10 * multiplications wrap to 0 in 32-bit arithmetic, so q->quantum == 0. Then in fq_dequeue() the credit-refill loop adds 0 to f->credit (which stays <= 0) and goto begin loops forever under the qdisc lock, creating a soft lockup. Clamp psched_mtu() to [1, 1 << 20] before
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fq_codel: clamp default quantum and mtu fq_codel_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) without clamping. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, which overflows the signed flow->deficit to INT_MIN in fq_codel_dequeue(), causing an infinite loop and soft lockup. Emulate fq_codel_change() and constrain to [256, FQ_CODEL_QUANTUM_MAX]. The same unclamped psched_mtu() is assigned to q->cparams.mtu a bit below, and fq_codel_change() never updates it. codel_should_drop() tests
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fq_pie: clamp default quantum to avoid signed overflow fq_pie_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) without clamping. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, which overflows the signed flow->deficit to INT_MIN in fq_pie_qdisc_dequeue(), causing an infinite loop and soft lockup. Emulate fq_pie_policy which is already bounded to [1, 1 << 20]; clamp the default to [256, 1 << 20]. 256 matches fq_codel's floor and is a sane minimum for a DRR quantum. Conditions to recreate th
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum before hhf_change() to avoid overflow hhf_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes weight * quantum overflow the signed deficit in hhf_dequeue(), spinning forever. Clamp q->quantum before hhf_change() so both the opt and !opt paths see a sane quantum. Without this, bare "tc qdisc add ... hhf" succeeds with a clamped quantum but "tc qdisc add ... hhf limit 1000" (any option present) fails with -EINVAL because hhf_change() re
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sfq: clamp quantum to avoid signed overflow soft lockup sfq_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) (unsigned). A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, so slot->allot = INT_MIN and INT_MIN + INT_MIN toggles between INT_MIN and 0 forever, spinning sfq_dequeue() under the qdisc lock. Clamp the quantum to [256, 1 << 20] so the refill loop terminates. The lower bound also covers q->quantum == 0 (psched_mtu() returning 0), which spins sfq_dequeue() identically. sfq_change() alr
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