Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,17%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
ext4: don't enable DAX on new encrypted files
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: don't enable DAX on new encrypted files
Currently, when a new encrypted regular file is created, the call to
ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=true) in __ext4_new_inode() is made
before EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT is set. As a result, it can set S_DAX if the
filesystem is mounted with "-o dax=always".
EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT then actually gets set a bit later in
__ext4_new_inode(), when it calls fscrypt_set_context() which calls
ext4_set_context(). ext4_set_context() sets EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT and
calls ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=false) to set S_ENCRYPTED too.
This was intend
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,19%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
xfs: validate attr entry pointer before field access
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: validate attr entry pointer before field access
xfs_attr3_leaf_verify_entry() accesses lentry/rentry fields (namelen,
valuelen) before checking if the entry pointer itself is within bounds.
If nameidx is crafted to point near the end of the buffer, these field
accesses can read out-of-bounds before the bounds check at
name_end > buf_end is performed.
Add explicit bounds checks for entry pointers before accessing their
fields. Use offsetof() to check that the start of the flexible array
member (nameval/name) is within bounds, which ensures all preceding
fields are safe
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,24%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
nfc: digital: clamp SENSF_RES length to the destination buffer
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: digital: clamp SENSF_RES length to the destination buffer
digital_in_recv_sensf_res() memcpy()s resp->len bytes from a remote
NFC-F device response into the NFC_SENSF_RES_MAXSIZE-byte target.sensf_res
field without an upper-bound check. A nearby malicious NFC-F device can
send an oversized SENSF_RES response to overflow the stack-local struct
nfc_target.
Clamp resp->len to NFC_SENSF_RES_MAXSIZE before the copy.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,24%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
nfc: fdp: bound the device-reported read length and fix an skb leak
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: fdp: bound the device-reported read length and fix an skb leak
fdp_nci_i2c_read() takes the next packet length from two device-supplied
bytes and never validates it. The value is a u16 used as the
i2c_master_recv() count into a 261-byte on-stack buffer: a malicious,
counterfeit or malfunctioning controller (or an i2c bus interposer) can
drive it far past the buffer for a stack out-of-bounds write that
clobbers the canary and return address, or below the minimum frame size
(directly, or by truncating the computed sum) so the header/LRC strip
and the next length read run
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: microread: validate target discovery payload lengths
microread_target_discovered() parses target discovery payloads from
skb->data according to the HCI gate. The fixed field offsets and UID
copies were checked only against the destination nfc_target buffers, not
against the actual skb length.
Validate that each gate-specific payload contains the fixed fields and
UID bytes before reading or copying them.
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,23%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
nfc: llcp: bound the connect_sn TLV walk to the skb
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: bound the connect_sn TLV walk to the skb
Commit 27256cdb290e ("nfc: llcp: bound SNL TLV parsing to the skb and
add length checks") fixed the unbounded TLV walk in nfc_llcp_recv_snl(),
and commit d8bd2dedbde5 ("nfc: llcp: fix OOB read and u8 offset wrap in
TLV parsers") subsequently bounded nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv() and
nfc_llcp_parse_connection_tlv(). One sibling parser sharing the same
pattern remains unbounded: nfc_llcp_connect_sn().
nfc_llcp_connect_sn() walks a TLV list, reading a two-byte header
(type, length) followed by length bytes of value, without checki
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,23%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
nfc: llcp: fix OOB read and u8 offset wrap in TLV parsers
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: fix OOB read and u8 offset wrap in TLV parsers
nfc_llcp_parse_gb_tlv() and nfc_llcp_parse_connection_tlv() contain
three related bugs in their TLV parsing loops:
1. 'offset' is declared u8 but tlv_array_len is u16. When TLV data
advances offset past 255 it silently wraps to zero, causing
infinite loops or double-processing of buffer data.
2. Before reading tlv[0] (type) and tlv[1] (length) there is no
check that offset+2 <= tlv_array_len. A truncated TLV causes
an OOB read of one byte past the buffer end.
3. After reading the length field, the valu
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,23%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
nfc: llcp: reject PDUs shorter than the LLCP header
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: reject PDUs shorter than the LLCP header
Every LLCP PDU begins with a two-byte header (DSAP/SSAP + PTYPE), but the
receive path never checked that a frame is at least LLCP_HEADER_SIZE bytes
before parsing it.
nfc_llcp_rx_skb() reads the header via nfc_llcp_ptype()/nfc_llcp_dsap()/
nfc_llcp_ssap(), which dereference pdu->data[0] and pdu->data[1], and a
CONNECT or CC PDU then computes
tlv_array_len = skb->len - LLCP_HEADER_SIZE;
as a size_t and hands it to the TLV walk. When the frame is shorter than
the header the subtraction wraps to a huge value and the walk
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,24%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
nfc: pn533: purge fragmented skbs during cleanup
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: pn533: purge fragmented skbs during cleanup
pn53x_common_clean() purges resp_q before freeing the common PN533 state,
but it leaves fragment_skb untouched. The fragmentation helpers queue
transmit fragments there while sending large initiator or target-mode
frames, and those skbs remain owned by the driver until they are sent or
discarded.
If the device is removed while fragments are still queued, the common
cleanup path frees the PN533 state without releasing the queued fragment
skbs, leaking them.
Purge fragment_skb during cleanup alongside resp_q.
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,19%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors
nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep() and
nci_extract_activation_params_nfc_dep() read an inner length byte from
the NCI RF_INTF_ACTIVATED_NTF payload and use it to memcpy() into fixed
kernel buffers, but neither function receives the caller-validated
activation_params_len. A crafted NCI notification with
activation_params_len=1 and an inner length byte of up to 20 (NFC-A) or
50 (NFC-B) causes memcpy() to read that many bytes past the one valid
byte in the activation params region -- a slab out-of-bou
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,24%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
nfc: nci: fix out-of-bounds write in nci_target_auto_activated()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: nci: fix out-of-bounds write in nci_target_auto_activated()
nci_target_auto_activated() appends a target to the fixed-size array
ndev->targets[NCI_MAX_DISCOVERED_TARGETS] and increments ndev->n_targets
without first checking the array is full; unlike its sibling
nci_add_new_target(), which bails out when n_targets already equals
NCI_MAX_DISCOVERED_TARGETS.
ndev->n_targets is only cleared by nci_clear_target_list(), so an NFCC
that repeatedly re-runs discovery (RF_DISCOVER_RSP, which re-enters
NCI_DISCOVERY without clearing the target list) and reports an
auto-activate
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,24%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
nfc: nci: fix uninit-value in the RF discover/activated NTF handlers
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: nci: fix uninit-value in the RF discover/activated NTF handlers
nci_rf_discover_ntf_packet() and nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_packet() each
parse a notification into an on-stack struct (nci_rf_discover_ntf /
nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf) that is not initialised. The RF
technology-specific parameters are only extracted when
rf_tech_specific_params_len is non-zero, so a notification that reports a
zero length leaves the rf_tech_specific_params union uninitialised - and
both handlers then pass it to nci_add_new_protocol(), which reads it:
- discover: nci_add_new_target() ->
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,19%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
ipv4: reject undersized MTUs in ip_do_fragment()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: reject undersized MTUs in ip_do_fragment()
ip_do_fragment() subtracts the IPv4 header length from the effective
MTU and passes the resulting payload MTU to ip_frag_next().
If the effective MTU is smaller than hlen + 8, ip_frag_next() rounds
the fragment payload length down to zero. The fragmentation state then
never makes forward progress: state->left, state->ptr and state->offset
stay unchanged while ip_do_fragment() keeps allocating and transmitting
header-only fragments until the softlockup detector fires.
This is reproducible with a route installed using "mtu lo
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,19%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
ipv6: fix use-after-free in ip6_finish_output2()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix use-after-free in ip6_finish_output2()
ip6_finish_output2() caches a pointer to the IPv6 destination
address (daddr) before invoking lwtunnel_xmit(). The LWT-BPF
transmit path or other encapsulation operations within
lwtunnel_xmit() can reallocate the skb head, freeing the memory
that daddr points to. When lwtunnel_xmit() returns
LWTUNNEL_XMIT_CONTINUE, the function continues to use the stale
daddr pointer to compute the nexthop and to look up or create the
neighbour entry. This results in a use-after-free read, which can
leak sensitive kernel data, pollute the
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,19%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
nvmet-fc: fix invalid free in LS IOD error path
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-fc: fix invalid free in LS IOD error path
nvmet_fc_alloc_ls_iodlist() advances iod while initializing the LS IOD
array. If an rqstbuf allocation or response buffer DMA mapping fails,
the unwind loop decrements iod past the start of the array. The final
kfree(iod) therefore frees an address before the allocated object.
This can be reproduced with nvme-fcloop and failslab by setting
fail-nth to 6 before creating a target port. KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: invalid-free in nvmet_fc_register_targetport
Free of addr ffff88816cf8ff48 by task nvmet_fail_nth/9552
Free the
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,23%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
nvmet-tcp: bound SGL data length before allocating command buffers
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-tcp: bound SGL data length before allocating command buffers
nvmet_tcp_map_data() reads the host-controlled 32-bit sgl->length
and, for the in-capsule offset descriptor (type 0x01), checks it
against port->inline_data_size before use. Any other SGL descriptor
type -- including the non-inline transport SGL data-block descriptor
(type (NVME_TRANSPORT_SGL_DATA_DESC << 4) | NVME_SGL_FMT_TRANSPORT_A,
the type a real host uses for out-of-capsule writes) skips that check
entirely and falls straight through to:
cmd->req.sg = sgl_alloc(len, GFP_KERNEL, &cmd->req.sg_cnt);
wi
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,19%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
nvmet-tcp: Do not WARN on remotely-controlled oversized SGL allocations
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-tcp: Do not WARN on remotely-controlled oversized SGL allocations
When fuzzing the nvme target code, I tripped a kernel warning in
nvmet_tcp_map_data() because the length passed into the allocator is
controlled by the remote initiator.
A remote initiator that sends a command with an SGL claiming a huge
number, can create a scatterlist and iovec allocation of over 1 million
entries, which causes the backing kmalloc call to exceed MAX_PAGE_ORDER
and then the page allocator will trip on a WARN_ON_ONCE_GFP() message:
WARNING: mm/page_alloc.c:5280 __alloc_frozen_pages_
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,21%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
fbdev: Wrap user-invoked calls to fb_set_var() in helper
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: Wrap user-invoked calls to fb_set_var() in helper
Handle fbcon during display updates in fb_set_var_from_user(). Check
with fbcon if the mode change is possible, update hardware state and
finally update fbcon. Update all callers.
Only the FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO ioctl currently does all steps. Other
mode-changes callers in sysfs and driver code are missing fbcon-related
steps.
With the new helper, ps3fb and sh_mobile_lcdcfb no longer maintain
fbcon state themselves.
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,15%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
fbdev: serialize mode sysfs access with lock_fb_info()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: serialize mode sysfs access with lock_fb_info()
show_mode(), show_modes(), and store_mode() access fb_info->modelist
and fb_info->mode without holding lock_fb_info(). store_modes() takes
lock_fb_info() while replacing the modelist and freeing the old one.
A concurrent reader or writer can load a pointer to an old modelist
entry before store_modes() frees it, then dereference freed memory or
store a stale freed pointer in fb_info->mode.
Take lock_fb_info() in show_mode(), show_modes(), and store_mode() to
serialize with store_modes(). In show_mode(), copy the mode t
Nicht bewertetEPSS 0,19%Keine Korrektur veröffentlicht
HID: magicmouse: prevent unbounded recursion in magicmouse_raw_event()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: magicmouse: prevent unbounded recursion in magicmouse_raw_event()
magicmouse_raw_event() handles DOUBLE_REPORT_ID (0xf7) packets, which pack
two touch reports into one, by splitting the packet and calling itself on
each half. The only guard against runaway recursion is a "size < 1" check,
which stops zero-sized calls but does not bound the recursion depth.
A malicious HID device that matches this driver can send a report starting
with DOUBLE_REPORT_ID and filled with the sequence [0xf7, 0x00]. Each level
consumes two bytes and recurses on the remainder, so an incoming