CVE-2026-72407

CVE-2026-72407 · geneve: validate inner network offset in geneve_gro_complete()

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: geneve: validate inner network offset in geneve_gro_complete() Even with both paths gated on gs->gro_hint, geneve_gro_complete() re-derives the inner dispatch type and length from the packet and the current gs->gro_hint, independently of geneve_gro_receive(). The two can disagree if gs->gro_hint flips under a concurrent geneve_quiesce()/ geneve_unquiesce() (sk_user_data is NULL across a synchronize_net()), or if the re-read option bytes differ from the ones receive parsed. geneve_gro_receive() already records the inner network header position in NAPI_GRO_CB()->inner_network_offset. Have geneve_gro_complete() compute the offset it is about to dispatch at, adding ETH_HLEN in the ETH_P_TEB case where eth_gro_complete() steps over the inner MAC header, and bail out if it lands past inner_network_offset. Use a lower bound rather than exact equality: between gh_len and the inner L3 header, geneve_gro_receive() may also have pulled an inner VLAN tag (vlan_gro_receive() advances the recorded offset past it), which only moves inner_network_offset further out. A valid frame therefore always satisfies inner_nh <= inner_network_offset, while a gh_len inflated by a hint gro_receive() did not honour dispatches past the validated inner header, i.e. the out-of-bounds completion. Only the latter is rejected.

CVSS 10.0 · Crítica · EPSS 0,6% · Corrección disponible

Publicación

2026-08-15T05:56:30.847Z

Actualización

2026-08-17T05:43:47.398Z

Pila tecnológica: system

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