Media · CVSS 6.1EPSS 0,24%Sin corrección publicada
fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: XML Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters
fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Prior to version 5.7.0, XMLBuilder does not escape the "-->" sequence in comment content or the "]]>" sequence in CDATA sections when building XML from JavaScript objects. This allows XML injection when user-controlled data flows into comments or CDATA elements, leading to XSS, SOAP injection, or data manipulation. This issue has been patched in version 5.7.0.
Media · CVSS 5.9EPSS 0,47%Sin corrección publicada
fast-xml-parser: Entity Expansion Limits Bypassed When Set to Zero Due to JavaScript Falsy Evaluation
fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. From version 4.0.0-beta.3 to before version 5.5.7, the DocTypeReader in fast-xml-parser uses JavaScript truthy checks to evaluate maxEntityCount and maxEntitySize configuration limits. When a developer explicitly sets either limit to 0 — intending to disallow all entities or restrict entity size to zero bytes — the falsy nature of 0 in JavaScript causes the guard conditions to short-circuit, completely bypassing the limits. An attacker who can supply XML input to such an application can trigger unbounded entity expansion, leading to memory e
fast-xml-parser affected by numeric entity expansion bypassing all entity expansion limits (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-26278)
fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Versions 4.0.0-beta.3 through 5.5.5 contain a bypass vulnerability where numeric character references (&#NNN;, &#xHH;) and standard XML entities completely evade the entity expansion limits (e.g., maxTotalExpansions, maxExpandedLength) added to fix CVE-2026-26278, enabling XML entity expansion Denial of Service. The root cause is that replaceEntitiesValue() in OrderedObjParser.js only enforces expansion counting on DOCTYPE-defined entities while the lastEntities loop handling numeric/standard entities performs no counting at all. An attacker
fast-xml-parser has stack overflow in XMLBuilder with preserveOrder
fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. Prior to version 5.3.8, the application crashes with stack overflow when user use XML builder with `preserveOrder:true`. Version 5.3.8 fixes the issue. As a workaround, use XML builder with `preserveOrder:false` or check the input data before passing to builder.
fast-xml-parser has an entity encoding bypass via regex injection in DOCTYPE entity names
fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. From 4.1.3to before 5.3.5, a dot (.) in a DOCTYPE entity name is treated as a regex wildcard during entity replacement, allowing an attacker to shadow built-in XML entities (<, >, &, ", ') with arbitrary values. This bypasses entity encoding and leads to XSS when parsed output is rendered. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.3.5.
fast-xml-parser affected by DoS through entity expansion in DOCTYPE (no expansion limit)
fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. In versions 4.1.3 through 5.3.5, the XML parser can be forced to do an unlimited amount of entity expansion. With a very small XML input, it’s possible to make the parser spend seconds or even minutes processing a single request, effectively freezing the application. Version 5.3.6 fixes the issue. As a workaround, avoid using DOCTYPE parsing by `processEntities: false` option.