Vulnerabilidades de jackson-core

jackson-core: Delayed maxNameLength enforcement for char-backed input (ReaderBasedJsonParser) allows memory-exhaustion denial of service

StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength (default 50,000 characters) is intended to bound how much memory a single JSON Object property name can consume while being parsed, independently of the much larger maxStringLength (default 100,000,000 characters) that bounds ordinary string values. For parsers built over character input — Reader, String or char[] sources, all served by ReaderBasedJsonParser — that bound is not applied while the name is being accumulated. The code path instead re-uses the string-value length check, which is roughly 2000x larger by default. In the character-input slow path, ReaderBasedJsonParser._parseName2() accumulates

• Actualiza a 2.18.11-1

jackson-core: UTF8DataInputJsonParser._reportInvalidToken() does not honor maxErrorTokenLength, allowing unbounded StringBuilder growth

UTF8DataInputJsonParser._reportInvalidToken() in FasterXML jackson-core builds the offending-token text for its error message by appending Java identifier characters to a StringBuilder in a loop that has no upper bound. Unlike the three sibling parser implementations, including UTF8StreamJsonParser, it never consults ErrorReportConfiguration.getMaxErrorTokenLength() (default 256). A malformed token supplied to a parser created through JsonFactory.createParser(DataInput) is therefore accumulated in full. No StreamReadConstraints setting mitigates this: maxDocumentLength cannot be applied to DataInput sources at all, and maxStringLength does no

• Actualiza a 2.18.11-1

jackson-core: quadratic backtracking in NumberInput.PATTERN_FLOAT via looksLikeValidNumber() enables ReDoS

NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber() in FasterXML jackson-core pre-validates "stringified numbers" with two regular expressions: PATTERN_FLOAT ([+-]?[0-9]*[\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?), present since 2.17.0, and PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT, added in 2.17.2. PATTERN_FLOAT places adjacent quantifiers over the same character class -- an optional [0-9]* run, an optional dot, then a required [0-9]+ run -- so input that ultimately fails to match forces Java's backtracking engine to retry every possible split point of the digit run.  Matching cost therefore grows with the square of the input length.  An attacker who can supply JSON that an appli

jackson-core Has Potential for StackoverflowError if user parses an input file that contains very deeply nested data

jackson-core contains core low-level incremental ("streaming") parser and generator abstractions used by Jackson Data Processor. In versions prior to 2.15.0, if a user parses an input file and it has deeply nested data, Jackson could end up throwing a StackoverflowError if the depth is particularly large. jackson-core 2.15.0 contains a configurable limit for how deep Jackson will traverse in an input document, defaulting to an allowable depth of 1000. jackson-core will throw a StreamConstraintsException if the limit is reached. jackson-databind also benefits from this change because it uses jackson-core to parse JSON inputs. As a workaround,

• Actualiza a 2.14.1-2

Jackson-core Vulnerable to Memory Disclosure via Source Snippet in JsonLocation

Jackson-core contains core low-level incremental ("streaming") parser and generator abstractions used by Jackson Data Processor. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.13.0, a flaw in jackson-core's `JsonLocation._appendSourceDesc` method allows up to 500 bytes of unintended memory content to be included in exception messages. When parsing JSON from a byte array with an offset and length, the exception message incorrectly reads from the beginning of the array instead of the logical payload start. This results in possible information disclosure in systems using pooled or reused buffers, like Netty or Vert.x. This issue was silently f

• Actualiza a 2.13.0-1