Vulnerabilidades recientes · Página 85

filelock: StrictSoftFileLock creates its claim directories without the lock mode, so another local user with a write bit on them can end a live hold

`StrictSoftFileLock` and `AsyncStrictSoftFileLock` apply the caller's `mode` to the sentinel (the lock file at `<path>`) and to both claim files (the files whose presence says a process wants or holds the lock). They create the two directories that hold the claims, `<path>.filelock` and `<path>.filelock/claims`, with a bare `mkdir()`. That gives `0o777` filtered through the umask (a per-process mask that removes permission bits from new files and directories) or, under a parent with a default ACL (an access control list on a directory that sets the permissions of entries created inside it), through that ACL. A hold consists of two claim name

• Actualiza a 4.2.1

filelock: WindowsFileLock ignores mode: a 0o600 lock file and the ReadWriteLock database inherit the directory ACL

filelock on Windows ignores the `mode` argument. `FileLock(path, mode=0o600)` creates the same file as `FileLock(path)`: one with no security descriptor of its own (the Windows record that says who may access a file). Its access list, or ACL, is whatever the lock directory hands down to new files. filelock creates the `ReadWriteLock` database, which it asks to be `0o600`, the same way. In a directory whose inheritable ACL grants other local accounts access to new files, those accounts can open the lock file or database. They can take the byte-range lock (a lock on a span of bytes in a file) once the owner releases it and keep the owner's late

• Actualiza a 4.2.1

filelock: StrictSoftFileLock follows a symbolic link swapped in at <path>.filelock and creates claim files in a directory another local user chooses

`StrictSoftFileLock` and `AsyncStrictSoftFileLock` check `<path>.filelock` (the coordination directory that holds the lock's state) with one `lstat` call on its name. `lstat` reports what a name is without following a symbolic link (a file that redirects to another path). After that check, the code reaches `<path>.filelock/claims` by pathname for every later operation (`mkdir`, scan, publish, link, unlink). `_open_directory` passes `O_NOFOLLOW` (a flag that makes an open fail when the final name is a symbolic link), but the flag covers only the final `claims` component. The kernel follows a symbolic link in any earlier component. Another loc

• Actualiza a 4.2.1

i18next-http-backend 4.0.2 Protocol-Relative URL Injection via Namespace in interpolateUrl

i18next-http-backend 4.0.2 contains an incomplete fix in interpolateUrl() that allows attackers to redirect translation requests by supplying an ns value starting with a slash. Attackers controlling the namespace value can form a protocol-relative URL in loadPath or addPath templates to load attacker-hosted translations, enabling UI content injection and cross-site scripting.

• Actualiza a 4.0.3

LangGraph JavaScript custom authentication may permit cross-user Store access

langgraph-api implements the LangGraph API for rapid development and testing. From 0.1.2 until 0.15.0, JavaScript or TypeScript custom authentication Store authorization handlers can return a rewritten namespace that is not carried across the runtime boundary and applied before the Store operation. An authenticated user can therefore access another user's Store namespace when a deployment relies on namespace rewriting for isolation, allowing unauthorized reads, overwrites, searches, or deletions. Python custom authentication and handlers that reject unauthorized namespaces instead of rewriting them are not affected. This issue is fixed in ver

• Actualiza a 0.15.0

LangGraph: Unencoded identifiers in LangGraph SDK v3 streaming can redirect authenticated GET requests

LangGraph Python SDK is used to connect to running LangGraph API servers, manage assistants, threads and stream runs from Python applications. From langgraph-sdk 0.4.0 until 0.4.6, and from langgraph 1.2.3 until 1.2.14 when RemoteGraph v3 streaming uses an affected langgraph-sdk version, the synchronous and asynchronous v3 stream get_tree and _fetch_state helpers interpolate caller-controlled assistant_id and thread_id values into authenticated GET request paths without using _quote_path_param. Relative path segments can therefore be normalized into another readable path on the configured server while retaining authentication headers. This is

• Actualiza a 0.4.6
• Actualiza a 1.2.14

GraphQL Tools: Shared legacy executor routes one subscription's results to a different caller

GraphQL Tools provides utilities for building, stitching, and mocking GraphQL schemas. Prior to version 1.1.36 of the GraphQL Tools legacy WebSocket executor package, buildWSLegacyExecutor in packages/executors/legacy-ws/src/index.ts reuses one WebSocket and replaces its single websocket.onmessage handler whenever a new overlapping subscription starts. The handler delivers LEGACY_WS.DATA frames to the newest observer without comparing data.id with the subscription operation id, so a caller using the same executor can receive another user's authorized subscription payload while the earlier caller's stream is starved. This issue is fixed in ver

• Actualiza a 1.1.36

GraphQL Tools: Per-request connection parameters persist into later users' WebSocket authentications

GraphQL Tools provides utilities for building, stitching, and mocking GraphQL schemas. Prior to version 1.1.36 of the GraphQL Tools legacy WebSocket executor package, buildWSLegacyExecutor in packages/executors/legacy-ws/src/index.ts retains request.extensions.connectionParams in the closure-scoped executorConnectionParams object after cleanupWebsocket closes a connection. When one executor is reused across different authorization contexts, a later request that omits a sensitive key can send an earlier caller's Authorization or tenant value in its connection_init payload, causing the downstream server to authenticate the later caller as the e

• Actualiza a 1.1.36

decode-uri-component: Denial of service via quadratic replacement of percent-encoded runs

decode-uri-component provides a more robust alternative to decodeURIComponent. Prior to 0.5.1, decodeUriComponent in index.js falls back to customDecodeURIComponent after native decoding throws, and the fallback collects every distinct percent-encoded run before performing a full-string regular-expression replacement for each entry. Malformed input containing many distinct runs can therefore make both the number of replacements and the scanned input length grow together, causing quadratic CPU consumption and blocking the Node.js event loop; request-body inputs can reach the demonstrated size, while ordinary URL header limits reduce the practi

• Actualiza a 0.5.1

@hono/node-server: `serveStatic` decodes the request path a second time, leading to bypass of middleware on static paths

@hono/node-server allows running the Hono application on Node.js. From 1.19.10 until 2.1.3, serveStatic decodes a request path a second time after Hono has already decoded it for routing, so a malformed percent-encoded sequence can make route middleware evaluate an encoded path while static file resolution uses a different directory. An unauthenticated attacker can bypass middleware mounted on a protected static prefix and read a file inside the configured static root, although the flaw does not permit traversal outside that root. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.3.

• Actualiza a 2.1.3

Vite: `server.fs.deny` bypassed with queries

Vite is a frontend tooling framework for JavaScript. From 6.4.4 until 6.4.5, the Vite development server can evaluate server.fs.deny before stripping loader query parameters such as ?raw, ?import&raw, or ?import&url&inline. When the development server is exposed to the network and a sensitive file is inside server.fs.allow but matched by server.fs.deny, an unauthenticated attacker can append one of these queries and retrieve the denied file. This issue is fixed in version 6.4.5.

• Actualiza a 6.4.5

Happy DOM: Cookie scope forgery: no DNS-label boundary on Domain= matching , attacker origin sets victim cookies

Happy DOM is a JavaScript implementation of a web browser without its graphical user interface. Prior to 20.14.6, Happy DOM's CookieContainer in src/cookie/CookieContainer.ts does not correctly validate or match Domain cookie attributes. It can accept a Domain unrelated to the origin setting the cookie, including a public suffix, and separately treats an unrelated suffix-sharing hostname as a match because cookieMatchesURL does not enforce a DNS-label boundary. In server-side rendering and prerendering applications that contact attacker-controlled origins and then make requests to a victim origin, these behaviors can plant and deliver a forge

• Actualiza a 20.14.6

Happy DOM: SSRF via iframe and link stylesheet when parsing untrusted HTML

Happy DOM is a JavaScript implementation of a web browser without its graphical user interface. Prior to 21.0.0, Happy DOM loads iframe src URLs and link rel="stylesheet" href URLs by default while parsing untrusted HTML on the server because disableIframePageLoading and disableCSSFileLoading default to false. An attacker who controls parsed HTML can therefore cause server-side requests to arbitrary internal or cloud endpoints without an application opt-in and may expose confidential responses or credentials returned by those endpoints. This issue is fixed in version 21.0.0.

• Actualiza a 21.0.0

Command Injection Vulnerability in Quantum Networks Router QN-I-470

This vulnerability exists in Quantum Networks router due to inadequate sanitization of user-supplied input in the management CLI interface. An authenticated remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by injecting arbitrary OS commands on the targeted device. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow the attacker to perform remote code execution with root privileges on the targeted device.

@happy-dom/server-renderer: ServerRendererServer Target-Origin Bypass SSRF / Open Proxy

Happy DOM is a JavaScript implementation of a web browser without its graphical user interface. Prior to 21.0.2, the Happy DOM server-renderer package's ServerRendererServer accepts unauthenticated HTTP/2 requests and resolves attacker-controlled :path values against server.targetOrigin in #onIncomingRequest in packages/@happy-dom/server-renderer/src/ServerRendererServer.ts without confirming that the resolved origin remains trusted before calling fetch. A protocol-relative path can change the destination to an arbitrary HTTP or HTTPS endpoint reachable by the server, including local and internal services, and the proxy relays the fetched res

Echo: Arbitrary Scheme Injection in WWWRedirect/NonWWWRedirect Middlewares via X-Forwarded-Proto

Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.15.2 and 5.1.1, Context.Scheme returns values from X-Forwarded-Proto, X-Forwarded-Protocol, or X-Url-Scheme without validating that they are supported web schemes. WWWRedirect and NonWWWRedirect use that value to construct a Location header, so an attacker controlling a forwarded scheme header can cause a redirect to use an arbitrary URI scheme. Exploitation requires an affected redirect middleware and user interaction with the response; the HTTPS-specific redirect variants hardcode HTTPS and are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 4.15.2 and 5.1.1.

Echo: HTTPS Redirect and HSTS Bypass via Unconditional Trust of Forwarded Scheme Headers

Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.16.0 and 5.4.0, Context.Scheme unconditionally trusts forwarded scheme headers from any client. A client that reaches Echo directly over plaintext HTTP can claim an HTTPS scheme and bypass HTTPSRedirect because the request is treated as already secure. Separately, behind a TLS-terminating proxy that passes an attacker-controlled header, a claimed HTTP scheme can suppress the Strict-Transport-Security header even though the browser receives the response over HTTPS. The practical risk is reduced when a trusted proxy overwrites the headers and direct backend access is prevented, but the framework previously

Echo: Open Redirect via Control-Character Prefix Defeating sanitizeURI

Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.16.0 and 5.4.0, sanitizeURI checks only the first two bytes of a redirect target before deciding whether it begins with an absolute-path separator pair. When AddTrailingSlash or RemoveTrailingSlash is configured with a redirect status, a slash, TAB, separator path form can evade the guard, be emitted in the Location header, and be normalized by a browser into an attacker-controlled host. This issue is fixed in 4.16.0 and 5.4.0.

Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance and Secure Firewall Threat Defense Software Remote Access SSL VPN Tunnel Denial of Service Vulnerability

A vulnerability in the Remote Access SSL VPN service of Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause the device to reload unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. This vulnerability is due to logic errors when secondary authentication is configured on a tunnel group. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted request when connecting to the SSL remote access VPN. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the affected device to reload, resulting in a DoS c

Echo: Static Middleware Double-Unescape Path Traversal

Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.15.3 and 5.2.0, middleware.Static can decode an already decoded Request.URL.Path a second time. Double-encoded separators can consequently be reconstructed before filesystem resolution. This can reach a file under a guarded route when the static middleware is registered globally. This issue is fixed in 4.15.3 and 5.2.0.