Snappy: SSRF and local file read via the xsl-style-sheet option
Snappy is a PHP library allowing thumbnail, snapshot or PDF generation from a url or a html page. Prior to version 1.7.0, there is a SSRF and local file read vulnerability via the xsl-style-sheet option. This issue has been patched in version 1.7.0.
Snappy: Binary path is never shell-escaped due to an inverted is_executable check
Snappy is a PHP library allowing thumbnail, snapshot or PDF generation from a url or a html page. Prior to version 1.7.1, on POSIX, escapeshellarg(‘/usr/bin/wkhtmltopdf’) returns the literal string ‘/usr/bin/wkhtmltopdf’ with the single-quote characters included. is_executable() then looks for a file whose actual name contains those quote characters, which essentially never exists. The safe branch is dead code and $command always falls through to the raw, unescaped value. The rest of the arguments (options, input, output) are escaped correctly, so injection has to land in the binary string itself. That happens whenever the binary path is sour
knplabs/knp-snappy is a PHP library allowing thumbnail, snapshot or PDF generation from a url or a html page.
## Issue
On March 17th the vulnerability CVE-2023-28115 was disclosed, allowing an attacker to gain remote code execution through PHAR deserialization. Version 1.4.2 added a check `if (\strpos($filename, 'phar://') === 0)` in the `prepareOutput` function to resolve this CVE, however if the user is able to control the second parameter of the `generateFromHtml()` function of Snappy, it will then be passed as the `$filename` parameter in the `prepareOutput()` function. In the original vulnerability, a file name with a `phar://` wrapper
Snappy vulnerable to PHAR deserialization, allowing remote code execution
Snappy is a PHP library allowing thumbnail, snapshot or PDF generation from a url or a html page. Prior to version 1.4.2, Snappy is vulnerable to PHAR deserialization due to a lack of checking on the protocol before passing it into the `file_exists()` function. If an attacker can upload files of any type to the server he can pass in the phar:// protocol to unserialize the uploaded file and instantiate arbitrary PHP objects. This can lead to remote code execution especially when snappy is used with frameworks with documented POP chains like Laravel/Symfony vulnerable developer code. If a user can control the output file from the `generateFromH