### Impact
A stored XSS affecting RichText fields. RichTextValue.output returns the raw, unsanitized stored value whenever the stored mimeType equals the outputMimeType. Because the safe-HTML output type (`text/x-html-safe`) is the type that signifies "already sanitized", any value whose stored mimeType equals it bypasses the safe_html transform entirely on render. The transform itself is sound — it correctly strips `on*` event-handler attributes and `javascript:/data:` URIs; the defect is that it is never invoked for these values. The unsanitized value is then emitted via `tal:content="structure ..."`, which performs no escaping, so the pay
plone.restapi vulnerable to Stored Cross Site Scripting with SVG image in user portrait
### Impact
There is a stored cross site scripting vulnerability for SVG images uploaded in user portraits.
Note that a page that uses an image tag with an SVG image as source is never vulnerable, even when the SVG image contains malicious code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker would first need to upload an SVG image as user portrait, and then trick a user into following a link to this portrait.
### Patches
A patch will be released in `plone.restapi` 8.43.3. This version is good for Plone 6.0, and for Plone 5.2 on Python 3.
In `plone.restapi` 7 or earlier there was no `@portrait` endpoint yet, so there is nothing to fix in that ver