Vulnerabilidades de la pila Python · Página 71

Dosage Vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in HTML/RSS Output Handlers

## Summary The HTML and RSS output handlers in `dosagelib/events.py` write user-controlled content (comic text and page URLs) directly into generated files without proper HTML escaping. When a user scrapes a malicious webcomic and opens the generated HTML/RSS file, attacker-controlled JavaScript can execute in their browser. **CWE**: [CWE-79](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html) - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-site Scripting) --- ## Details ### Vulnerable Code Locations The vulnerability exists in `dosagelib/events.py` where untrusted content is written to HTML/RSS output without escaping:

• Actualiza a 3.3

semantic-router exposed to compromised litellm wheel (CVE-2026-42208) via unbounded transitive pin

## Impact semantic-router versions 0.1.8 through 0.1.14 declare `litellm>=1.61.3` with no upper bound. During the window in which `litellm==1.82.8` was the latest release on PyPI, a fresh install of any affected semantic-router version could resolve to that compromised wheel. The malicious `litellm==1.82.8` wheel ships a `litellm_init.pth` file that executes on Python interpreter startup — no import required. It collects and exfiltrates: - Process environment variables - AWS / GCP / Azure credentials - SSH keys, Kubernetes configs, shell history - Database credentials and CI/CD secrets - Cryptocurrency wallets Stage-two payload encrypts the

• Actualiza a 0.1.15

nono-py's policy JSON accepts unknown security fields

### Summary nono-py policy handling could fail open in two ways. First, resolving a policy-derived `ProxyConfig` did not automatically enforce `CapabilitySet.proxy_only`, allowing sandboxed children to bypass a resolved domain allowlist by using direct network access. Second, policy JSON accepted unknown security-sensitive fields, so misspelled or unsupported restrictions could be silently ignored. ### Impact A sandboxed child may receive broader network access than the policy author intended. This can allow outbound requests outside the configured proxy allowlist and may expose sensitive data depending on the execution environment and wor

• Actualiza a 0.10.1

nono-py vulnerable to authorization bypass / policy confusion

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints). That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue: - Intended policy: route-only proxy access. - Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT. - Boundary crossed: sandbox

• Actualiza a 0.11.0

nono-py has proxy-only network fallback bypass on older Linux kernels

## Summary On Linux kernels that do not support Landlock network rules, `nono_py.sandboxed_exec()` could run `CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy)` without supervising the seccomp-notify proxy-only fallback returned by the Rust core. In that configuration, a sandboxed child process could remove `HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` environment variables or use raw sockets and then open direct TCP connections that should have been denied by proxy-only policy. The issue affects proxy-only enforcement. It does not mean that all nono-py network blocking is ineffective. ECS validation showed `caps.block_network()` denied regular TCP and ECS metadata TCP on t

• Actualiza a 0.10.1

Malicious code in pyphetools (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of pyphetools were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Docling: Unsafe URI and Path Handling in HTML Backend

Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. Prior to 2.94.0, the HTML backend has unsafe URI and path handling. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.94.0.

• Actualiza a 2.94.0

Docling: Unsafe Archive Extraction and XML Parsing in METS-GBS Backend

Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. From 2.45.0 until 2.91.0, the METS-GBS backend's XML parsing and the input document format detection lacked security controls. An attacker could craft malicious METS-GBS archives that, when processed, could read sensitive files, exhaust system resources, or cause application crashes. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.91.0.

• Actualiza a 2.91.0

Malicious code in ppkt2synergy (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of ppkt2synergy were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Malicious code in phenopacket-store-toolkit (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of phenopacket-store-toolkit were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Apache Airflow FTP provider: FTP Provider does not protect FTPS data channel (missing PROT_P)

The Apache Airflow FTP provider's `FTPSHook.get_conn()` created an `ftplib.FTP_TLS` connection but never called `prot_p()`, so although the control channel was TLS-protected the data channel was transmitted in cleartext. Any deployment using `FTPSHook` or `FTPSFileTransmitOperator` to move files over FTPS exposed file contents and credentials-in-transit to a network attacker able to observe the data connection. Upgrade apache-airflow-providers-ftp to `3.15.1` or later, which issues `PROT P` to encrypt the data channel.

• Actualiza a 3.15.1

picklescan - Remote Code Execution via idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode

picklescan through 0.0.26 fails to detect malicious pickle files that invoke idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode in __reduce__ methods. Attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files that executes arbitrary commands when the file is loaded via pickle.load(), enabling supply chain attacks on PyTorch models and saved Python objects. This is fixed in version 0.0.30.

• Actualiza a 0.0.30

Glances: XML-RPC Multi-Origin CORS Configuration Silently Falls Back to Wildcard (Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-33533)

Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Prior to 4.5.5, the Glances XML-RPC server (glances -s) introduced a configurable CORS origin list in version 4.5.3 as a mitigation for CVE-2026-33533. However, the implementation silently falls back to Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * whenever cors_origins contains more than one entry. An operator who configures an explicit two-entry allowlist (e.g. two internal dashboard origins) intending to restrict browser access instead receives the unrestricted wildcard. A malicious web page served from any origin can issue a CORS simple request to /RPC2 and read the full system monitoring

• Actualiza a 4.5.5
• Actualiza a 4.5.5+dfsg-1

Glances: Insecure Pickle Deserialization in Version Cache Leads to Arbitrary Code Execution

Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Prior to 4.5.5, glances/outdated.py uses pickle.load() to read a version-check cache file stored at a predictable, world-accessible path (~/.cache/glances/glances-version.db or $XDG_CACHE_HOME/glances/glances-version.db). No integrity check, signature verification, or format validation is performed before deserialization. An attacker with write access to that path — through any of several realistic local or container-level scenarios — can plant a malicious pickle file and achieve arbitrary code execution as the OS user running Glances the next time it starts with version checkin

• Actualiza a 4.5.5
• Actualiza a 4.5.5+dfsg-1

Glances: Arbitrary file write and command execution via `secure_popen` redirection and chaining operators in AMP command configuration

Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. From 4.0.8 until 4.5.5, the secure_popen() function in glances/secure.py interprets > (file redirection), | (pipe), and && (command chaining) operators in command strings. These operators are applied without any validation on the target file path, piped command, or chained command. When Application Monitoring Process (AMP) modules load their command or service_cmd configuration values from glances.conf, those values are passed directly to secure_popen() with no sanitization. This allows an attacker who can modify the Glances configuration file to write arbitrary content to arbit

• Actualiza a 4.5.5
• Actualiza a 4.5.5+dfsg-1

Glances: Command Injection via KVM/QEMU VM Domain Names in glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py

Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Prior to 4.5.5, the Glances KVM/QEMU monitoring engine (glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py) passes VM domain names, read directly from virsh list --all output, into f-string command templates that are processed by secure_popen(). secure_popen() is explicitly designed to interpret &&, |, and > as shell operators. Because domain names are never sanitised before interpolation, any user with the ability to create or rename a KVM/QEMU virtual machine can execute arbitrary commands as the OS user running Glances — commonly root on hypervisor hosts. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5

• Actualiza a 4.5.5
• Actualiza a 4.5.5+dfsg-1

Glances: XML-RPC Server Missing Host Header Validation Enables DNS Rebinding Attack

Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Prior to 4.5.5, the Glances XML-RPC server (glances -s, implemented in glances/server.py) does not validate the HTTP Host header, leaving it vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks. An attacker can exploit DNS rebinding to exfiltrate the full system monitoring dataset from a victim's browser. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.5.

• Actualiza a 4.5.5
• Actualiza a 4.5.5+dfsg-1

Malicious code in gpsea (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of gpsea were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Malicious code in embiggen (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of embiggen were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

motionEye: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash

motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for motion software, a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 create the configuration file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf with 644 permissions (-rw-r--r--), making it readable by any local user on the system. This file contains sensitive data including the admin password hash, which can be leveraged by other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges. Additionally, per-camera configuration files (camera-*.conf) are also created with the same 644 permissions, potentially exposing camera-specific credentials and settings. The exposed SHA1 admin password hash can be cracked off

• Actualiza a 0.44.0