When a libcurl-based application performs transfers via `SCP://` or `SFTP://`
and utilizes the `CURLOPT_SSH_KEYFUNCTION` callback, it may silently accept an
untrusted server. This vulnerability occurs when a server presents a host key
type that does not match the specific key type already recorded for that host
in the `known_hosts` file. Instead of rejecting the mismatch, the callback
mechanism fails to properly enforce the restriction, allowing the connection
to succeed without warning and risking a potential man-in-the-middle attack.
In this scenario, libcurl first uses a proper HTTP/3 server for the initial
transfers, and when it makes a second transfer to the same site it has been
replaced by the attacker's impostor machine - without a valid certificate.
When libcurl returns to the hostname the second time with a cached SSL session
(`CURLOPT_SSL_SESSIONID_CACHE` is not disabled) and early data enabled (the
`CURLSSLOPT_EARLYDATA` bit is set in `CURLOPT_SSL_OPTIONS`), libcurl might
send off the second request's bytes on that new connection *before* enforcing
the certificate verification failure. Potentially leaking sensitive
information.
Calling `curl_easy_pause()` within the event-based `CURLMOPT_SOCKETFUNCTION`
callback triggers a use-after-free vulnerability, where libcurl attempts to
store a flag using a dangling struct pointer immediately after that pointer's
memory has been freed.
libcurl had a flaw that when instructed to clear proxy authentication
credentials which made it not do so, leaving the old credentials around to get
used for subsequent transfers that should not know nor use them.
Alta · CVSS 7.5EPSS 0,4%Código de explotación públicoSin corrección publicada
incomplete mTLS config matching in conn reuse
libcurl would reuse a previously created connection even when some mTLS config
related option had been changed that should have prohibited reuse.
libcurl keeps previously used connections in a connection pool for subsequent
transfers to reuse if one of them matches the setup. However, some TLS
settings related to client certificates were left out from the configuration
match checks, making them match too easily. In particular options related to
the private key.
When reusing a libcurl handle for sequential transfers driven by
environment-variable proxy configuration, libcurl fails to clear the proxy
authentication state between requests. Specifically, if the initial transfer
authenticates against `proxyA` using Digest auth, a subsequent transfer routed
through `proxyB` erroneously leaks the `Proxy-Authorization:` header intended
solely for `proxyA`.
When asking curl to use a `.netrc` file to find credentials and at the same
time specifying a URL with a username (without a password), like
`https://[email protected]/`, curl could wrongly get and use the password for
*another* user set in the `.netrc` file for that host if such a one exists and
there is no match for the specified user.
The curl logic that works with SASL authentication could end up cleaning up
the GSASL context *twice* without clearing the pointer in between, making it
`free()` the same pointer twice.
A flaw in curl’s cookie parsing logic allows a malicious HTTP server to set
"super cookies" that bypass the Public Suffix List check. This enables an
attacker-controlled origin to inject cookies that curl subsequently scopes and
transmits to unrelated third-party domains.
libcurl might in some circumstances reuse the wrong connection when asked to
do Negotiate-authenticated ones, even when they are set to use different
"services".
libcurl features a pool of recent connections so that subsequent requests can
reuse an existing connection to avoid overhead.
When reusing a connection a range of criteria must be met. Due to a logical
error in the code, a request that was issued by an application could
wrongfully reuse an existing connection to the same server that was
authenticated using different services.
A vulnerability exists where a new transfer that uses STARTTLS to upgrade the
connection might reuse an existing live connection even though the TLS
configuration mismatches so it should not.
When a user invokes curl using a schemeless URL combined with
`--proto-default` sftp (or scp), a disconnect occurs between the tool layer
and libcurl. The tool layer incorrectly infers the URL scheme, which
erroneously bypasses the initialization of critical SSH security options like
CURLOPT_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_SHA256 and CURLOPT_SSH_KNOWNHOSTS. Conversely, the
libcurl runtime successfully honors CURLOPT_DEFAULT_PROTOCOL and establishes
the connection via SFTP/SCP as specified. Because the tool layer skipped the
security configuration, these SSH host verification options are silently
omitted, causing curl to connect to an unverified SSH remot
Successfully using libcurl to do a transfer to a specific HTTP origin
(`hostA`) with **Digest** authentication and then changing the origin to a
different one (`hostB`) for a second transfer, reusing the same handle, makes
libcurl wrongly pass on the `Authorization:` header field meant for `hostA`,
to `hostB`.
A use-after-free vulnerability exists in libcurl when an application
configures an HTTP/2 stream-dependency tree via `CURLOPT_STREAM_DEPENDS` or
`CURLOPT_STREAM_DEPENDS_E`, subsequently invokes `curl_easy_reset()`, and
finally terminates the handle with `curl_easy_cleanup()`. During this final
cleanup phase, libcurl attempts to access and modify an internal structure
that was already freed during the reset operation.
Successfully using libcurl to do a transfer over a specific HTTP proxy
(`proxyA`) with **Digest** authentication and then changing the proxy host to
a second one (`proxyB`) for a second transfer, reusing the same handle, makes
libcurl wrongly pass on the `Proxy-Authorization:` header field meant for
`proxyA`, to `proxyB`.
netrc credential leak with reused proxy connection
When asked to both use a `.netrc` file for credentials and to follow HTTP
redirects, libcurl could leak the password used for the first host to the
followed-to host under certain circumstances.
Using libcurl, when a custom `Host:` header is first set for an HTTP request
and a second request is subsequently done using the same *easy handle* but
without the custom `Host:` header set, the second request would use stale
information and pass on cookies meant for the first host in the second
request. Leak them.
curl might erroneously pass on credentials for a first proxy to a second
proxy.
This can happen when the following conditions are true:
1. curl is setup to use specific different proxies for different URL schemes
2. the first proxy needs credentials
3. the second proxy uses no credentials
4. while using the first proxy (using say `http://`), curl is asked to follow
a redirect to a URL using another scheme (say `https://`), accessed using a
second, different, proxy
libcurl might in some circumstances reuse the wrong connection for SMB(S)
transfers.
libcurl features a pool of recent connections so that subsequent requests can
reuse an existing connection to avoid overhead.
When reusing a connection a range of criteria must be met. Due to a logical
error in the code, a network transfer operation that was requested by an
application could wrongfully reuse an existing SMB connection to the same
server that was using a different "share" than the new subsequent transfer
should.
This could in unlucky situations lead to the download of the wrong file or the
upload of a file to the wrong place. When this happ
libcurl might in some circumstances reuse the wrong connection when asked to
do an authenticated HTTP(S) request after a Negotiate-authenticated one, when
both use the same host.
libcurl features a pool of recent connections so that subsequent requests can
reuse an existing connection to avoid overhead.
When reusing a connection a range of criteria must be met. Due to a logical
error in the code, a request that was issued by an application could
wrongfully reuse an existing connection to the same server that was
authenticated using different credentials.
An application that first uses Negotiate authentication to a server with
`user1:passwo