CVE-2026-31709

CVE-2026-31709 · smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl

CVSS 8.8 · Élevée · EPSS 0,3% · Correctif disponible

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the chmod/chown security descriptor. The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body. A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs. Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL.

Publication

2026-05-01T13:56:06.522Z

Mise à jour

2026-10-19T19:06:06.980Z

Pile logicielle: system

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