OpenClaude's MCP OAuth Callback: State Check Bypass via error Param Leads to DoS
OpenClaude is an open-source coding-agent command line interface for cloud and local model providers. Prior to version 0.5.1, the OpenClaude MCP authentication flow starts a temporary local HTTP server to handle OAuth callbacks. To prevent CSRF attacks, the server validates a state parameter against an internally stored value. However, due to a logic flaw in the order of conditionals, an attacker can completely bypass this check and force the server to shut down — without knowing the state value at all. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.1.
OpenClaude has Sandbox Bypass via Early-Exit Logic Flaw that Allows Path Traversal
OpenClaude is an open-source coding-agent command line interface for cloud and local model providers. Versions prior to 0.5.1 have a logic flaw in `bashToolHasPermission()` inside `src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts`. When the sandbox auto-allow feature is active and no explicit deny rule is configured, the function returns an `allow` result immediately — before the path constraint filter (`checkPathConstraints`) is ever evaluated. This allows commands containing path traversal sequences (e.g., `../../../../../etc/passwd`) to bypass directory restrictions entirely. Version 0.5.1 contains a patch for the issue.