Sync-in Server has Username/Login Enumeration via Timing Side-Channel on POST /api/auth/login (incomplete fix of the prior timing-attack advisory)
Sync-in Server is an open-source platform for file storage, sharing, collaboration, and syncing. Versions prior to 2.4.1 contain an observable timing discrepancy in the login endpoint because authentication attempts for nonexistent accounts return without performing the bcrypt comparison used for existing accounts. An unauthenticated attacker can measure response times to enumerate valid usernames or email addresses, facilitating credential-stuffing, password-spraying, and phishing attacks. Version 2.4.1 contains a patch.
Sync-in Server has a ReDoS via Unsanitized Regex in Sync Diff `pathFilters`
Sync-in Server is an open-source platform for file storage, sharing, collaboration, and syncing. Prior to version 2.4.0, the sync diff endpoint compiles a user-supplied string into a `RegExp` with no complexity validation. A catastrophic-backtracking pattern (e.g. `^(a+)+b`) blocks the Node.js event loop, making the entire server unresponsive to all users until the container is restarted. Version 2.4.0 patches the issue.
Sync-in Server has a complete 2FA Bypass via `POST /api/auth/token`
Sync-in Server is an open-source platform for file storage, sharing, collaboration, and syncing. Prior to version 2.4.0, `POST /api/auth/token` authenticates with username and password only, then calls `getTokens()`, which returns full access and refresh JWTs without checking whether the account has TOTP 2FA enabled. An attacker with stolen or phished credentials can bypass 2FA in a single request. The parallel login endpoint (`POST /api/auth/login`) correctly enforces 2FA by calling `setCookies(user, res, true)`, which gates on `user.twoFaEnabled`. Version 2.4.0 patches the issue.
@sync-in/server vulnerable to TOTP Brute-Force via `POST /api/app/sync/register`
Sync-in Server is an open-source platform for file storage, sharing, collaboration, and syncing. Prior to version 2.4.0, `POST /api/app/sync/register` accepts credentials and a TOTP code to register a desktop sync client. On a failed TOTP, `SyncClientsManager.register()` calls `updateAccesses(user, ip, false)`, which hits a freeze branch that writes `passwordAttempts` back unchanged. The counter never reaches `USER_MAX_PASSWORD_ATTEMPTS` (10) and the lockout gate never fires. A successful guess returns a `{clientId, clientToken}` pair. The token can be exchanged via `POST /api/app/sync/auth/cookie` for a full JWT. While the code is valid, the
Sync-in Server: SSRF protection bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses in regExpPrivateIP
Sync-in Server is a secure, open-source platform for file storage, sharing, collaboration, and syncing. Prior to version 2.3.0, the private IP blocklist regex used in the URL download feature does not match IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (e.g. ::ffff:127.0.0.1), allowing SSRF protection to be bypassed on dual-stack systems. Version 2.3.0 fixes the issue.
Sync-in Server is a secure, open-source platform for file storage, sharing, collaboration, and syncing. Prior to version 2.2.0, the /api/auth/login endpoint contains a logic flaw that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to enumerate valid usernames by measuring the application's response time. This issue has been patched in version 2.2.0.
A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Sync-in Server before 1.9.3 allows an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in a victim's browser. By uploading a crafted SVG file containing a malicious payload, an attacker can access and exfiltrate sensitive information, including the user's session cookies.