TanStack Router: Unauthenticated reflected XSS in TanStack Start server-function responses
TanStack Router is a client-first, server-capable, fully type-safe router and full-stack framework for the web. From 1.143.12 until 1.169.39 for @tanstack/start-server-core, 1.168.60 for @tanstack/react-start, 1.168.57 for @tanstack/solid-start, and 1.168.56 for @tanstack/vue-start, an unauthenticated attacker can place non-public fields in a server-function request payload so that attacker-controlled middleware state reaches the error path and a response-shaped object is accepted as an HTTP response. A crafted server-function URL can therefore return attacker-controlled HTML from the application's origin; when a visitor opens the URL, the in
TanStack Start - Server Core: Inbound server-function request deserialization could invoke a sibling client-referenced server function
### Summary
A type-confusion bug in seroval ≤ 1.5.2 ([upstream advisory](https://github.com/lxsmnsyc/seroval/security/advisories)) allowed a crafted JSON body sent to one TanStack Start server function to trigger invocation of a different client-referenced server function as a side effect of deserializing the request payload.
This is not an authentication bypass and not remote code execution. The mechanism only invokes server functions that the same client could already reach directly via /_serverFn/<id>, and the target function's full middleware chain — including any user-supplied authentication, authorization, and inputValidator — runs as
Critique · CVSS 9.6EPSS 3,28%Dans le catalogue KEVCorrectif disponible
Malware in 42 @tanstack/* packages exfiltrates cloud credentials, GitHub tokens, and SSH keys
On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target "Pwn Request" misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each aff