DOMPurify from 3.4.4 before 3.4.17 SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES Bypass via Shadow Root Content
DOMPurify from 3.4.4 before 3.4.17 contains a SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass that lets attackers preserve template expressions in attached shadow roots when using RETURN_DOM, RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT, or IN_PLACE modes. Attackers can split expressions across text nodes separated by disallowed elements, which merge after removal and are evaluated by downstream template engines for cross-site scripting.
DOMPurify before 3.4.17 DOM XSS via IN_PLACE Hook-Detached Subtrees
DOMPurify before 3.4.17 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows attackers to keep event handlers armed when an IN_PLACE hook removes a parent or sibling node. Attacker markup in detached subtrees is never walked or neutralized, so handlers like img onerror fire after sanitize() returns, causing DOM XSS.
DOMPurify before 3.4.17 XSS via SMIL attributeName Guard Bypass in XHTML Mode
DOMPurify before 3.4.17 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass the SMIL attributeName=href guard when PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE is application/xhtml+xml, because transformCaseFunc does not lowercase attribute names. Attackers can submit SVG with an animate or set element using attributeName="href" and a javascript: entry in values to execute script when users click the sanitized link.
DOMPurify before 3.4.16 XSS via IN_PLACE Returned Rawtext Root
DOMPurify before 3.4.16 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass sanitization because IN_PLACE mode returns a force-removed style element whose text content still carries markup. Attackers can supply a style element containing a closing style tag and an img onerror payload, which executes script when the application serializes and re-parses the returned node.
DOMPurify before 3.4.13 Cross-Site Scripting via IN_PLACE hook
DOMPurify before 3.4.13 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in IN_PLACE sanitization where element-removal hooks fail to neutralize detached subtrees. Attackers can supply HTML with event handlers on descendant elements that execute after sanitization completes, even though the returned root appears clean.
DOMPurify before 3.4.12 Hook Bypass via CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING
DOMPurify before 3.4.12 fails to execute afterSanitizeElements hook for custom elements allowed via CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, allowing attributes to bypass application security policies. Attackers can preserve sensitive attributes on custom elements that later re-inject them into innerHTML sinks, creating second-order XSS gadgets.
DOMPurify before 3.4.7 Hook Mutation Pollution via allowedTags
DOMPurify before 3.4.7 (affected versions <= 3.4.5) passes direct references to the module-level DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS and DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR sets to the uponSanitizeElement and uponSanitizeAttribute hooks via data.allowedTags / data.allowedAttributes when sanitize is called without an explicit cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS / cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR array. A hook that mutates these fields permanently widens the default allow-lists for the lifetime of the DOMPurify instance, so all subsequent default-config sanitize calls inherit the widened defaults and attacker payloads using the poisoned tag/attribute name survive sanitization. removeAllHooks(), clearConfig()
DOMPurify 3.4.6 Cross-Site Scripting via IN_PLACE nodeName
DOMPurify through 3.4.6 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in IN_PLACE mode that trusts attacker-controlled nodeName on live non-form nodes. Attackers can supply hostile live DOM objects with real script children whose observable nodeName is clobbered to appear as allowed elements, causing scripts to execute when the sanitized tree is inserted into a live document.
DOMPurify before 3.4.8 Template Expression Injection via RETURN_DOM
DOMPurify versions >=3.0.0 and before 3.4.8, when configured with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES together with a DOM output mode (RETURN_DOM, RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT, or IN_PLACE), fail to strip template expressions (e.g. ${evil}, {{evil}}, <%evil%>) inside <template> element content. The final normalization/scrub pass (_scrubTemplateExpressions) uses a NodeIterator and node.normalize() that do not descend into template.content, so expressions that only form after adjacent text nodes merge survive sanitization. This bypasses SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES and can allow a downstream template engine to evaluate attacker-supplied expressions. The string output path is not
DOMPurify before 3.4.9 Trusted Types Policy State Contamination
DOMPurify 3.0.0 before 3.4.9 does not reset the retained Trusted Types policy when clearConfig() is called, so a DOMPurify instance reused across trust boundaries stays bound to a previously supplied TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY. A later caller that requests RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE output receives a TrustedHTML object created by the old (potentially unsafe) policy rather than a clean default, which can lead to script execution at a Trusted Types sink. Passing TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null on the later call also does not clear the retained policy.
DOMPurify before 3.4.11 Permanent Attribute Allowlist Pollution via setConfig
DOMPurify before 3.4.11 fails to clone the ALLOWED_ATTR allowlist when setConfig() is used with an uponSanitizeAttribute hook, allowing the hook to permanently mutate the shared allowlist. Attackers can register a hook that conditionally allows dangerous attributes like onerror for trusted elements, then submit untrusted content that inherits the polluted allowlist and executes event handlers as stored XSS.
DOMPurify IN_PLACE Sanitization Bypass via Attached Shadow Root Inside <template>.content
DOMPurify is a DOM-only cross-site scripting sanitizer for HTML, MathML, and SVG. Prior to 3.4.7, DOMPurify IN_PLACE sanitization could skip shadow contents attached to an element inside <template>.content, allowing attacker-controlled markup such as event handlers, JavaScript URLs, or scripts to survive and execute when an application cloned and inserted the sanitized template. This issue is fixed in version 3.4.7.
DOMPurify: IN_PLACE mode preserves attributes of a clobbered root element, allowing XSS via attacker-controlled root DOM
DOMPurify is a DOM-only cross-site scripting sanitizer for HTML, MathML, and SVG. Prior to 3.4.6, DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true }) could preserve event-handler attributes on an attacker-controlled <form> root when a descendant name clobbered properties checked by _isClobbered, because _forceRemove no-opped on the parent-less root and _sanitizeAttributes returned early. This issue is fixed in version 3.4.6.
DOMPurify is a DOM-only cross-site scripting sanitizer for HTML, MathML, and SVG. Prior to 3.4.6, DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true }) accepted same-origin foreign-realm DOM nodes while follow-on checks used parent-realm constructors, causing instanceof checks for forms, named node maps, document fragments, and elements to fail and skip clobber, template-content, and shadow-DOM sanitization branches so executable markup could survive. This issue is fixed in version 3.4.6.
DOMPurify is a DOM-only cross-site scripting sanitizer for HTML, MathML, and SVG. In 3.4.4, DOMPurify allowed selectedcontent by default, allowing browsers to re-clone an XSS payload after sanitization so that unsanitized markup inside <selectedcontent> is returned. This issue is fixed in version 3.4.5.