Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.listBackups()` reads each backup's `_manifest.json` and trusts the manifest's `path` field. `EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups()` later passes that trusted `entry.path` directly to `rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true })`. An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside `data/<env>/.backups/<name>/_manifest.json` can cause `network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n>` or any code path invoking `pruneBackups()` to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. This is fixed in v5.12
Network-AI: ApprovalInbox HTTP server has no authentication — anyone can approve pending agent actions
Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called `ApprovalInbox` (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which `ApprovalGate` uses to require explicit human approval for high-risk operations. The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every route, including the state-changing `POST /approvals/:id/approve` and `/deny`. As a result, in versions 5.0.0 through 5.12.1, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the s
Network-AI: Unauthenticated Cross-Origin MCP Tool Invocation via Empty Default Secret
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.4.5, the MCP SSE server defaults to an empty secret (`process.env['NETWORK_AI_MCP_SECRET'] ?? ''` at `bin/mcp-server.ts:89`), which causes `_isAuthorized` (`lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:254`) to return `true` unconditionally for every request — no `Authorization` header is required. Simultaneously, `_handleRequest` sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` (`lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:272`) on every response, so a cross-origin browser fetch can read the result without restriction. An unauthenticated attacker who can lure a user to a malicious web page can invoke all 22 expo
Network-AI: AgentRuntime sandbox path-prefix checks allow file access outside the configured base directory
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `AgentRuntime` promises scoped file access under a configured sandbox `basePath`, but its path containment checks use raw string prefix tests. A sandbox base such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox` also matches a sibling path such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox_evil/secret.txt`. An agent/user that can call `AgentRuntime.readFile()` or `AgentRuntime.listDir()` can read or list files outside the intended sandbox when the target path is in a sibling directory sharing the base path prefix. This breaks the documented sandbox boundary. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `Sandb
Network-AI: EnvironmentManager.backup() follows symlinked directories and copies files outside the environment root into backups
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.backup()` recursively collects files using `_collectBackupFiles()`. `_collectBackupFiles()` uses `statSync(full)`, which follows symlinks. If `data/<env>` contains a symlink to a directory outside the environment root, backup recursion follows the symlink and copies external files into `data/<env>/.backups/<backupId>/`. An attacker who can place a symlink under the environment data directory can cause backup operations to disclose files outside the environment root into backup artifacts. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `_collectBackupFiles
EnvironmentManager.restore() backup ID path traversal copies arbitrary directories into environment data
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.restore(env, backupId)` computes the backup path with `join(envDir, '.backups', backupId)` and only checks that this path exists. It does not resolve the result or verify that it remains under `data/<env>/.backups`. A caller can pass a traversal backup ID such as `../../../outside/source-dir` to restore files from an arbitrary directory into the target environment data directory. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `restore()` now validates `backupId` against `/^[\w\-]+$/` and asserts `dirname(resolve(join(backupsDir, backupId))) === resolve(b
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.9.1, the agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (`SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed`), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but `ShellExecutor` runs that string through `/bin/sh -c`. So any wildcard allow such as `git *`, `npm *` or `node *` also matches `git status; <anything>`, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution. The issue is fixed in v5.9.1. `ShellExecutor` now executes via `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })` using a quote-aware
Network-AI: Empty default secret still authorizes all requests (Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-46701)
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. In versions 5.7.1 and earlier, the MCP SSE server allows unauthenticated cross-origin MCP tool invocation due to an empty default secret. This issue was partially addressed by CVE-2026-46701 in version 5.4.5 by closing the CORS flaw (with Access-Control-Allow-Origin now set only for localhost origins), but the empty-default-secret flaw described in the title remained: the SSE MCP server still defaulted to an empty secret, _isAuthorized() still returned true when the secret was empty, and a non-loopback bind only produced a warning. As a result, the server still ran fully unauthentic
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to 5.1.3, the MCP HTTP transport accepts JSON-RPC tools/call requests with no authentication, session, origin, or token check, and dispatches them directly to the orchestrator's tool registry. The default bind address is 0.0.0.0. As a result, any party with network reachability to the service can enumerate and invoke privileged management tools. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.1.3.