Nx: OS command injection via git revisions and remote refs
## Summary
Nx core builds several `git` invocations as shell command strings with untrusted values interpolated into them, so a value that should be a git revision or ref is parsed by `/bin/sh` instead. Two entry points are reachable by an attacker: `affected` commands, where `defaultBase` / `affected.defaultBase` from `nx.json` (and the `NX_BASE` / `NX_HEAD` environment variables) reach `git merge-base` and `git diff`; and `nx import`, where a branch name advertised by a remote repository reaches `git fetch`, `git checkout`, and `git config`. In both cases an attacker who controls a repository — or who opens a pull request against one — get
Nx daemon and plugin worker sockets are accessible to other local users
Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 14.6.0 until 22.7.9 and 23.1.2, Nx creates Unix domain sockets for its daemon and isolated plugin workers in shared temporary locations without owner-only directory and socket permissions. Another unprivileged local account on a shared build server, developer host, or multi-user container can discover and connect to a running socket because the transport performs no authentication and relies on filesystem containment. The daemon's PROCESS_IN_BACKGROUND request accepts a module path and invokes its default export, allowing a caller that controls a file to execute code as the
Nx: Path traversal in nx migrate package-migrations extraction
Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 13.10.0 until 22.7.10 and 23.2.1, Nx migration planning reads the nx-migrations.migrations value from a target package manifest without validating that it is a contained relative path. A hostile direct dependency or a package introduced through a trusted package's packageGroup can supply .. segments or an absolute path, causing nx migrate to join an escaping destination onto its temporary directory. The migration archive can then write attacker-controlled bytes outside the temporary directory, while opening the destination stream can truncate an existing writable file even
Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From version 20.8.0 until 22.7.7 and 23.0.2, the Nx self-hosted HTTP remote cache extracts downloaded cache artifacts without constraining where files are written. A malicious or on-path (MITM) remote cache server can return a crafted tar archive whose entries escape the cache directory and write to arbitrary locations on the machine running Nx, which can be escalated to remote code execution. Nx's default local cache and Nx Cloud are not affected; only workspaces configured to use a self-hosted remote cache are affected. This issue is fixed in versions 22.7.7 and 23.0.2.
Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 17.0.4 until 22.7.2 and 23.0.0-beta.2, the local HTTP server started by nx graph sent Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on every response, letting any website a developer visited read the server's responses cross-origin — including the full project graph and the output of the /help endpoint, which runs a target's configured help command. The practical impact is typically cross-origin information disclosure, but can be arbitrary command injection in rare cases. This vulnerability is fixed in 22.7.2 and 23.0.0-beta.2.
Nx: nx/devkit: malicious versions of nx and plugins published to npm
Malicious code was inserted into the Nx (build system) package and several related plugins. The tampered package was published to the npm software registry, via a supply-chain attack. Affected versions contain code that scans the file system, collects credentials, and posts them to GitHub as a repo under user's accounts.