Evolution-data-server: local file disclosure via attach file:// uris
A flaw was found in evolution-data-server. Calendar events containing a file:// URI in their ATTACH property automatically read the targeted local file, base64-encode its contents and upload it back to the server when the event is saved. There are no file path restrictions or checks to verify whether the attachment originally came from the server or was added locally. This allows an attacker with access to a shared CalDAV calendar to exfiltrate arbitrary files the user has access to when interacting with malicious calendar events.
In GNOME evolution-data-server before 3.35.91, a malicious server can crash the mail client with a NULL pointer dereference by sending an invalid (e.g., minimal) CAPABILITY line on a connection attempt. This is related to imapx_free_capability and imapx_connect_to_server.
evolution-data-server (eds) through 3.36.3 has a STARTTLS buffering issue that affects SMTP and POP3. When a server sends a "begin TLS" response, eds reads additional data and evaluates it in a TLS context, aka "response injection."
GNOME Evolution through 3.28.2 is prone to OpenPGP signatures being spoofed for arbitrary messages using a specially crafted email that contains a valid signature from the entity to be impersonated as an attachment.
camel/providers/imapx/camel-imapx-server.c in the IMAPx component in GNOME evolution-data-server before 3.21.2 proceeds with cleartext data containing a password if the client wishes to use STARTTLS but the server will not use STARTTLS, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain sensitive information by sniffing the network. The server code was intended to report an error and not proceed, but the code was written incorrectly.
addressbook/backends/ldap/e-book-backend-ldap.c in Evolution-Data-Server in GNOME Evolution through 3.29.2 might allow attackers to trigger a Buffer Overflow via a long query that is processed by the strcat function. NOTE: the software maintainer disputes this because "the code had computed the required string length first, and then allocated a large-enough buffer on the heap.