Dnsmasq: dnsmasq: out-of-bounds read in find_soa() due to missing extrabytes validation
An out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in dnsmasq's find_soa() function in src/rfc1035.c. When parsing NS section records, extract_name() is called with extrabytes=0, failing to validate that 10 additional bytes exist for fixed-length DNS record fields. A remote attacker controlling a DNS zone can exploit this via a crafted NXDOMAIN response to cause a 10-byte heap out-of-bounds read, potentially accessing stale data from prior transactions.
Dnsmasq: dnsmasq: heap buffer overflow in log_query() when logging unsupported ds/dnskey replies
A heap-based buffer overflow was found in dnsmasq. When DNSSEC validation and
query logging are both enabled, logging of DS or DNSKEY replies containing
unsupported algorithm or digest types can cause dnsmasq to write past the end
of an internal logging buffer. A remote attacker able to supply such a DNS
response may crash the dnsmasq process, resulting in denial of service.
A buffer overflow in dnsmasq’s extract_addresses() function allows an attacker to trigger a heap out-of-bounds read and crash by exploiting a malformed DNS response, enabling extract_name() to advance the pointer past the record’s end.
An information disclosure vulnerability in dnsmasq allows remote attackers to bypass source checks via a crafted DNS packet with RFC 7871 client subnet information.
A heap-based out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the DHCPv6 implementation of dnsmasq allows local attackers to execute arbitrary code with root privileges via a crafted DHCPv6 packet.
A heap-based out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the DNSSEC validation of dnsmasq allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DNS packet.
A Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability in the DNSSEC validation of dnsmasq allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DNS packet.
dnsmasqs extract_name() function can be abused to cause a heap buffer overflow, allowing an attacker to inject false DNS cache entries, which could result in DNS lookups to redirect to an attacker-controlled IP address, or to cause a DoS.
Rejected reason: ** REJECT ** DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This candidate was withdrawn by its CNA. Further investigation showed that it was not a security issue. Notes: Based on the analysis by MITRE and review of community feedback, the reported conditions represent expected and intentional behavior within dnsmasq's documented design, rather than security vulnerabilities.
Rejected reason: ** REJECT ** DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This candidate was withdrawn by its CNA. Further investigation showed that it was not a security issue. Notes: Based on the analysis by MITRE and review of community feedback, the reported conditions represent expected and intentional behavior within dnsmasq's documented design, rather than security vulnerabilities.
Rejected reason: ** REJECT ** DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This candidate was withdrawn by its CNA. Further investigation showed that it was not a security issue. Notes: Based on the analysis by MITRE and review of community feedback, the reported conditions represent expected and intentional behavior within dnsmasq's documented design, rather than security vulnerabilities.