PatchFirst · Vulnérabilités récentes
Vulnérabilité publiée pour xen au cours des 30 derniers jours : 0. Dans le catalogue KEV : 0.
Vulnérabilités : 127
When oxenstored is tearing a domain down, the node data is cleaned up but the usage counts are leaked. When the domain ID is eventually reused, the new domain can create fewer nodes before beeing deemed to be over quota.
Some shadow paging errors paths will switch the page-tables without updating the currently running vCPU reference. This causes a mismatch between the loaded page-tables and the mapcache metadata which can lead to corruption of the mapcache.
[This CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] To create and manage guests, domctl operations are used by the control domain, a possible Xenstore domain, or by a domain controlling a particular guest. Some of these operations may not be executed in parallel, so a system-wide lock is used. The way that lock is acquired is, however, not providing any fairness. This is CVE-2026-42489. Furthermore, with XSM/Flask in use, the lock acquire will, for some operations, occur ahead of any permission checking. This is CVE-2026-42490.
[This CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] To create and manage guests, domctl operations are used by the control domain, a possible Xenstore domain, or by a domain controlling a particular guest. Some of these operations may not be executed in parallel, so a system-wide lock is used. The way that lock is acquired is, however, not providing any fairness. This is CVE-2026-42489. Furthermore, with XSM/Flask in use, the lock acquire will, for some operations, occur ahead of any permission checking. This is CVE-2026-42490.
HVM guest I/O port accesses are subject to either emulation or at least translation. Translations are managed by the device model (via XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping), and hence the linked list used may changed at any time. Traversal of those lists (while handling guest I/O port accesses) therefore needs synchronizing with updates, which was missing so far.
Arm C1-Ultra, C1-Premium, Neoverse V3 & V3AE, Neoverse V2, Neoverse V1, Neoverse-N2, Neoverse-N1, Cortex-X925, Cortex-X4, Cortex-X3, Cortex-X2, Cortex-X1 & X1C, Cortex-A710, Cortex-A78, A78AE & A78C, Cortex-A77, Cortex-A76 & A76A may allow writes to resources owned by a higher exception level.
The adjustments made for XSA-379 as well as those subsequently becoming XSA-387 still left a race window, when a HVM or PVH guest does a grant table version change from v2 to v1 in parallel with mapping the status page(s) via XENMEM_add_to_physmap. Some of the status pages may then be freed while mappings of them would still be inserted into the guest's secondary (P2M) page tables.
Any guest can cause xenstored to crash by issuing a XS_RESET_WATCHES command within a transaction due to an assert() triggering. In case xenstored was built with NDEBUG #defined nothing bad will happen, as assert() is doing nothing in this case. Note that the default is not to define NDEBUG for xenstored builds even in release builds of Xen.
Improper isolation of shared resources within the CPU operation cache on Zen 2-based products could allow an attacker to corrupt instructions executed at a different privilege level, potentially resulting in privilege escalation.
A transient execution vulnerability within AMD CPUs may allow a local user-privileged attacker to leak data via the floating point divisor unit, potentially resulting in loss of confidentiality.
Any guest issuing a Xenstore command accessing a node using the (illegal) node path "/local/domain/", will crash xenstored due to a clobbered error indicator in xenstored when verifying the node path. Note that the crash is forced via a failing assert() statement in xenstored. In case xenstored is being built with NDEBUG #defined, an unprivileged guest trying to access the node path "/local/domain/" will result in it no longer being serviced by xenstored, other guests (including dom0) will still be serviced, but xenstored will use up all cpu time it can get.
The Intel EPT paging code uses an optimization to defer flushing of any cached EPT state until the p2m lock is dropped, so that multiple modifications done under the same locked region only issue a single flush. Freeing of paging structures however is not deferred until the flushing is done, and can result in freed pages transiently being present in cached state. Such stale entries can point to memory ranges not owned by the guest, thus allowing access to unintended memory regions.
In the context switch logic Xen attempts to skip an IBPB in the case of a vCPU returning to a CPU on which it was the previous vCPU to run. While safe for Xen's isolation between vCPUs, this prevents the guest kernel correctly isolating between tasks. Consider: 1) vCPU runs on CPU A, running task 1. 2) vCPU moves to CPU B, idle gets scheduled on A. Xen skips IBPB. 3) On CPU B, guest kernel switches from task 1 to 2, issuing IBPB. 4) vCPU moves back to CPU A. Xen skips IBPB again. Now, task 2 is running on CPU A with task 1's training still in the BTB.
Shadow mode tracing code uses a set of per-CPU variables to avoid cumbersome parameter passing. Some of these variables are written to with guest controlled data, of guest controllable size. That size can be larger than the variable, and bounding of the writes was missing.
When passing through PCI devices, the detach logic in libxl won't remove access permissions to any 64bit memory BARs the device might have. As a result a domain can still have access any 64bit memory BAR when such device is no longer assigned to the domain. For PV domains the permission leak allows the domain itself to map the memory in the page-tables. For HVM it would require a compromised device model or stubdomain to map the leaked memory into the HVM domain p2m.
[This CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Some Viridian hypercalls can specify a mask of vCPU IDs as an input, in one of three formats. Xen has boundary checking bugs with all three formats, which can cause out-of-bounds reads and writes while processing the inputs. * CVE-2025-58147. Hypercalls using the HV_VP_SET Sparse format can cause vpmask_set() to write out of bounds when converting the bitmap to Xen's format. * CVE-2025-58148. Hypercalls using any input format can cause send_ipi() to read d->vcpu[] out-of-bounds, and operate on a wil
[This CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] Some Viridian hypercalls can specify a mask of vCPU IDs as an input, in one of three formats. Xen has boundary checking bugs with all three formats, which can cause out-of-bounds reads and writes while processing the inputs. * CVE-2025-58147. Hypercalls using the HV_VP_SET Sparse format can cause vpmask_set() to write out of bounds when converting the bitmap to Xen's format. * CVE-2025-58148. Hypercalls using any input format can cause send_ipi() to read d->vcpu[] out-of-bounds, and operate on a wil
[This CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] There are two issues related to the mapping of pages belonging to other domains: For one, an assertion is wrong there, where the case actually needs handling. A NULL pointer de-reference could result on a release build. This is CVE-2025-58144. And then the P2M lock isn't held until a page reference was actually obtained (or the attempt to do so has failed). Otherwise the page can not only change type, but even ownership in between, thus allowing domain boundaries to be violated. This is CVE-2025-58145.
[This CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] There are two issues related to the mapping of pages belonging to other domains: For one, an assertion is wrong there, where the case actually needs handling. A NULL pointer de-reference could result on a release build. This is CVE-2025-58144. And then the P2M lock isn't held until a page reference was actually obtained (or the attempt to do so has failed). Otherwise the page can not only change type, but even ownership in between, thus allowing domain boundaries to be violated. This is CVE-2025-58145.
[This CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] There are multiple issues related to the handling and accessing of guest memory pages in the viridian code: 1. A NULL pointer dereference in the updating of the reference TSC area. This is CVE-2025-27466. 2. A NULL pointer dereference by assuming the SIM page is mapped when a synthetic timer message has to be delivered. This is CVE-2025-58142. 3. A race in the mapping of the reference TSC page, where a guest can get Xen to free a page while still present in the guest physical to machine (
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