ConnMan through 2.0 has a stack-based buffer overflow via a DHCPv6 Reply message. This occurs in get_domains in gdhcp/client.c. It copies a fixed NS_MAXDNAME (1025) bytes from a DHCPv6 DOMAIN_LIST (option 24) value into a 1026-byte stack buffer dns_name regardless of the actual option length, then walks DNS labels with an unbounded "c += jump + 1" loop. A crafted DHCPv6 REPLY with a DOMAIN_LIST option of >= 1025 non-zero bytes makes the label walk leave the buffer and read/write '.' past its end in attacker-chosen strides. An on-link attacker can trigger this without authentication via a forged Router Advertisement (O=1) and a forged DHCPv6 R
In ConnMan through 1.44, the lookup string in ns_resolv in dnsproxy.c can be NULL or an empty string when the TC (Truncated) bit is set in a DNS response. This allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code, because those lookup values lead to incorrect length calculations and incorrect memcpy operations.
In ConnMan through 1.44, parse_rr in dnsproxy.c has a memcpy length that depends on an RR RDLENGTH value, i.e., *rdlen=ntohs(rr->rdlen) and memcpy(response+offset,*end,*rdlen) without a check for whether the sum of *end and *rdlen exceeds max. Consequently, *rdlen may be larger than the amount of remaining packet data in the current state of parsing. Values of stack memory locations may be sent over the network in a response.
DHCP routing options can manipulate interface-based VPN traffic
DHCP can add routes to a client’s routing table via the classless static route option (121). VPN-based security solutions that rely on routes to redirect traffic can be forced to leak traffic over the physical interface. An attacker on the same local network can read, disrupt, or possibly modify network traffic that was expected to be protected by the VPN.
client.c in gdhcp in ConnMan through 1.41 could be used by network-adjacent attackers (operating a crafted DHCP server) to cause a stack-based buffer overflow and denial of service, terminating the connman process.
In ConnMan through 1.41, a man-in-the-middle attack against a WISPR HTTP query could be used to trigger a use-after-free in WISPR handling, leading to crashes or code execution.
In ConnMan through 1.41, remote attackers able to send HTTP requests to the gweb component are able to exploit a heap-based buffer overflow in received_data to execute code.
An issue was discovered in the DNS proxy in Connman through 1.40. The TCP server reply implementation lacks a check for the presence of sufficient Header Data, leading to an out-of-bounds read.
gdhcp in ConnMan before 1.39 could be used by network-adjacent attackers to leak sensitive stack information, allowing further exploitation of bugs in gdhcp.