WebOb: Open redirect in Location header normalization via leading C0 control / space characters
WebOb provides objects for HTTP requests and responses. Prior to 1.8.11, Response._make_location_absolute() in src/webob/response.py checks a Location value for a URI scheme or leading double slash before urllib.parse.urljoin() strips leading C0 control characters and spaces. An attacker-controlled value such as a space followed by a protocol-relative or absolute URL can therefore bypass SCHEME_RE and startswith("//") checks and be normalized to an off-host redirect. Request.relative_url() and webob.exc._HTTPMove subclasses, including HTTPFound, are also affected because they use the same unsafe URL joining behavior or bypass the earlier norm
WebOb: Location header normalization during redirect leads to open redirect
WebOb provides objects for HTTP requests and responses. Prior to 1.8.10, the normalization of the HTTP Location header during a redirect is vulnerable to an open redirect: WebOb joins the redirect target to the request URI using Python's urljoin, and since Python 3.10 the underlying urlsplit strips ASCII tab, carriage return, and newline characters before parsing, so a redirect target containing such characters can be reinterpreted as a protocol-relative URL whose authority is an attacker-controlled host. This bypasses the CVE-2024-42353 fix that escaped a leading double slash, allowing an attacker who influences the redirect location to send