JupyterLab: Cross-site scripting (XSS) in JupyterLab via notebook cells pasted from the system clipboard
JupyterLab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. From JupyterLab 4.5.0 until 4.5.11 and 4.6.4, from Notebook 7.5.0 until 7.6.3, and from JupyterLite Core 0.7.0 until 0.8.4, the system clipboard cell-paste path accepts attacker-controlled cell JSON without clearing metadata.trusted. When useSystemClipboardForCells is active and pasteCodeCellsWithoutOutput is disabled, a pasted code cell can mark HTML output as trusted, bypass output sanitization, and execute script in the authenticated JupyterLab origin without executing the cell. Markdown and raw cells are not affe
Jupyter Notebook and JupyterLab token theft via stored XSS in help command linker
In Jupyter Notebook versions 7.0.0 through 7.5.5, JupyterLab versions 4.5.6 and earlier, and the corresponding @jupyter-notebook/help-extension and @jupyterlab/help-extension packages before 7.5.6 and 4.5.7, a stored cross-site scripting issue in the help command linker can be chained with attacker-controlled notebook content to steal authentication tokens with a single click.
An attacker can craft a malicious notebook file containing elements that appear indistinguishable from legitimate controls and trigger execution when a user interacts with them. Successful exploitation allows theft of the user's authentication token and complete takeov
The package sanitize-html before 2.7.1 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to insecure global regular expression replacement logic of HTML comment removal.